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BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY IN PRACTICE:  
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF REVENUE ADMINISTRATIONS IN  
JAMAICA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Over the past three decades, agencification and autonomous organisation seem to 
have emerged as the new orthodoxy in the reform of public administration. Such 
development has fuelled a lively academic debate on bureaucratic autonomy and 
political control  whether these two phenomena are diametrically opposed, or whether 
the possibility exists for their co-existence within the public administrative space. This 
cross-jurisdictional, interdisciplinary piece of research seeks to advance current 
understanding of bureaucratic autonomy on two fronts. First, the study explores the 
under-researched issue of factors which may serve to condition the exercise of 
bureaucratic discretion. Second, it is distinct from current works because of its 
comparative analysis of the scope for bureaucratic manoeuvrability within differing legal 
traditions and differing systems of government. Drawing on resource dependency and 
institutional theories, the research uses as its empirical basis two case studies of 
revenue administrations in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Notwithstanding the 
historical and cultural differences, research findings show a number of common 
functional realities. The more influential macro-institutional constraints fed through to 
impact on internal operational functioning in areas such as the establishment of tax 
priorities and revenue targets. No support was found for the hypothesis that different 
legal traditions have a differential impact on bureaucratic functioning. In both 
jurisdictions, a detailed fussy style of drafting revenue laws aims towards certainty and 
predictability, with no particular bias towards taxpayers or the bureaucracy. Legal 
drafting style may be a function of the specific policy area.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
 
The changing role of the State in achieving sustainable economic development and 
broader developmental objectives remained a central concern during the mid-1960s 
to mid-1990s. A shift in thinking away from the 1930s Keynesian model of the 
welfare interventionist state towards neo-liberal policies advocating a minimalist 
state stemmed from a number of transnational and national challenges. Today, 
faced with pressures and demands from citizens, civil society organisations, local 
businesses, investors and international organisations (Flynn, 2009), governments 
are still wrestling with the issue of the most appropriate role of the State in an 
increasingly marketised economy and pluralised society. Now, the talk is of an 
alternate strategy that factors the state back into development, the focus being the 
effective state (World Bank, 1997:1) - not so much less government but better 
government (Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram, 2001:66).  
 
Such developments have resulted in public administration, the machinery through 
which government conducts its business, receiving unprecedented and increasing 
attention. Public sector modernisation, through the implementation of public sector 
reform programmes, has been a common worldwide experience, including in Latin 
American and the Caribbean (Sutton, 2008). Many Latin American countries 
embarked on first generation reforms that centred on structural adjustment in the 
1980s. The trend toward democratisation across the region in the early 1990s led to 
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second generation reforms; followed by anti-corruption, decentralisation and 
regulatory reforms being implemented in the late 1990s (World Bank, 2004). 
Likewise in the Commonwealth Caribbean, in the 1980s, several countries in the 
region underwent structural adjustment programmes that shaped and provided 
impetus for subsequent public sector reform programmes (Bissessar, 1998; Sutton, 
2008). 
In terms of rationale, reforms sought to address a number of the assumed defects in 
the traditional Weberian model of public administration characterised as costly, 
wasteful, inefficient, sclerotic, overly-formalised, and unresponsive to service users 
(Talbot and Caulfield, 2002; Batley and Larbi, 2004; Thynne and Wettenhall, 2004). 
Hence the move away from the traditional model of administration towards the 
more flexible and customer-oriented management of public service planning and 
delivery (Keen and Murphy, 1996; Panozzo, 2000). The new emphasis on public 
management produces reforms that ostensibly aim for improved efficiency and 
better quality service delivery; but may also represent power struggles within 
government; be part of a wider socio-political reform such as liberalisation; or be a 
symbolic response to a significant failure of government in the face of events such 
as natural disasters (Flynn, 2009). Whatever the motive(s), it is important to 
understand the underlying rationale behind reform and the type of reform most likely 
to emerge.  
 
Regarding the nature of reforms, dominating the reform agenda of all countries is a 
universal phenomenon referred to as the New Public Management1 (NPM) (Hood, 
                                               
1
 Note that NPM is posited here as only one philosophical approach to public sector reform. Many developing 
countries are known to be undertaking reforms completely at variance with NPM precepts, for example, in 
areas such as capacity building and controlling corruption (Polidano and Hulme, 1999; Batley and Larbi, 2004) 
  
22 
 
1991; McCourt and Minogue, 2001; Sarker, 2005). For OFlynn (2007), NPM 
represented a post-bureaucratic paradigm of public management, incorporating a 
suite of reforms intended to enact a break from the traditional model of public 
administration underpinned by Webers (1946) bureaucracy, Wilsons (1987) policy-
administration divide, and Taylors (1911) scientific management model of work 
organisation. The model embodies a set of assumptions and value statements about 
how public sector organisations should be designed, organised, and managed and 
how, in a quasi-business manner, they should function (Diefenbach, 2009).  
 
Components of NPM may be incorporated into two broad, but not mutually exclusive 
strands  one emphasising managerialism and organisation; the second derived 
from the new institutional economics and focusing on markets and competition as a 
way of giving voice and choice to users and promoting efficiency in service 
delivery (Batley and Larbi, 2004). A key sub-component of managerialism is 
management decentralisation.  Whilst several related elements of management 
decentralisation can be distilled from the NPM literature, one key trend involves the 
structural disaggregation or  unbundling of the bureaucracy (Talbot et al, 2000; 
Pollitt et al, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000), whereby the ministerial-type large 
monolithic organisation is broken up into a small strategic policy core and larger 
operational units, the latter located on a continuum at arms-length (Talbot et al, 
2000:2) of the ministerial structure.  
 
Structural disaggregation has resulted in a number of institutional variants. Hailed as 
the hallmark of the NPM reform, however, is the executive agency model (Yesilkagit, 
2004); the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand providing important 
examples.  Some authors writing on agencification refer to an outbreak of an 
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internationally infectious agency flu (Pollitt et al, 2001:272). Linked to the practice 
of agencification is the concept of autonomisation (Kickert and Verhaak, 1995:532; 
Pollitt et al, 2001:275), the idea of letting managers manage, free and 
unencumbered from political and bureaucratic constraints. Bureaucratic autonomy, 
described as the formal exemption of an agency head from full political supervision 
by the departmental minister (Christensen, 1999:1), is a process whereby 
managerial responsibility is transferred from bureaucratic hierarchy to managers that 
can be held accountable for the responsibilities attributed (de Kruijf, 2010). Even 
though the higher offices predominate, all elements of the organisation are expected 
to share in the exercise of this discretion. The literature makes distinctions between 
different dichotomies of autonomy, including formal vs. informal (Thynne, 2004; Kidd 
and Crandall, 2006); formal vs. factual (Moe, 1995; Batley and Larbi, 2004; 
Yesilkagit, 2004); ascribed vs. earned (Joshee and Ayee, 2009); as well as static vs. 
dynamic (Talbot et al, 2000; Bouckaert and Peters, 2004; Taliercio, 2004; Young 
and Taveres, 2004; Christensen and Lægreid, 2004) 
 
Regarding the benefits of agencification and autonomisation, Pollitt et al (2001) note 
a theoretical convergence towards the hypothesis that more specialised, more 
autonomous public bodies will improve technical as well as allocative efficiency, 
permit a distancing of agencies from political intervention, and allow for higher 
quality service delivery through an escape from the iron cage of central civil 
service rules and regulations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:147). Other benefits 
include greater transparency, through the agencys subjection to contract-like 
regimes; as well as an ability to bring services closer to the customer as a result of 
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stakeholder identification and their participation in the agencys decision making 
processes. 
 
A corollary to the concept of bureaucratic autonomy is the notion of control of the 
bureaucracy. Political control of the bureaucracy is one of the most central concerns 
in the academic literature. For Scott (2003), bureaucratic control is embedded in the 
social and organisational structure of the firm and is built into features such as the 
definition of responsibilities, job categories, work rules, promotion procedures, and 
wage scales. One debate centres around the argument that political control and 
bureaucratic autonomy are dichotomous opposites: if there is political control, there 
cannot be bureaucratic autonomy, and vice versa (Doo-Rae, 2008). In order for 
autonomy to co-exist alongside bureaucratic control, autonomy must be anchored 
within an appropriate policy and performance framework (Batley and Larbi, 2004). 
For there to be co-existence, interactions at the politico-administrative interface 
should not only focus on the creation of conditions whereby bureaucracies are 
forced to respond to the will of elected officials and central authorities; the 
opportunity must also exist for bureaucrats to make strategic choices and to reflect 
their own preferences in the implementation of policies. 
 
 1.2  THE PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT 
 
 
Whatever the limitations of the state, government is still directly responsibility and 
accountable for a number of key functions. One such responsibility, public resource 
mobilisation, remains vital to state building (North-South Institute, 2010). Most 
developing countries still depend on external financing to fund their development 
activities. Within the current global economic context, where austerity is required 
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and access to foreign resources from aid donors has become increasingly difficult, 
the sustainable development of developing countries now hinges on a shift from 
external grant and loan financing, towards a greater reliance on domestic resource 
mobilisation. Reliance on internal resources not only reduces the volatility 
associated with external funding, it ties accountability to citizens rather than to 
external investors and aid donors (Hlope and Friedman, 2002; Moore, 2004; Moore 
and Unsworth, 2006; North-South Institute, 2010). 
 
Continual need for greater revenues  largely a question of direct and indirect 
taxation - has thus become a priority in governments reform agenda. Critical to 
successful resource mobilisation is the formulation of sound tax policies coupled 
with the existence of good tax institutions to implement such policies. Gill (2003) 
argues that while tax policy and tax laws create the potential for raising tax 
revenues, the actual amount of taxes collected depends, to a large extent, on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of revenue administration. For Bird (1998:184), ...tax 
administration is tax policy, hence the need to place the administrative dimension at 
the centre, rather than at the periphery of tax reform efforts.   
 
Many developing countries have pursued reforms in the area of tax policy, efforts 
which in themselves were frequently insufficient to increase revenues.  Over the last 
two decades, many countries have also embarked on administrative reforms of their 
revenue administrations (tax and customs). In terms of the shape of such reforms, 
revenue administration has not been immune to the new governance arrangements 
advocated by the NPM, and is now very much at the forefront of the growing trend 
towards decentralisation and autonomisation. Institutional design has resulted in the 
use of the (semi) autonomous revenue authority (SARA) as the delivery model for 
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improved administration - a current practice which mirrors the broader development 
of the use the executive agency model in public service administration. 
 
 
Under the SARA governance model, autonomy may be increased in one of two 
ways. In one instance, increase in authority is provided within existing structural 
arrangements; whilst in the second case, revenue departments are brought together 
under one umbrella institution that is placed at arms-length from the finance 
ministry and the central machinery of government. There are presently close to forty 
SARAs around the world, clustered largely in Africa and Latin America (Crandall, 
2010). Within the Caribbean, the importance of the administration dimension of tax 
reforms has also resulted in the use of SARAs in Jamaica and Guyana. 
 
 
Practical reasons advanced for the establishment of SARAs include: increased 
effectiveness of tax administration and the ability to mobilise a larger share of fiscal 
revenues; the opportunity to escape the constraints of civil service rules; the 
reduced likelihood of political/ministerial interference; reduced levels of corruption; 
and improved service delivery. Taliercio (2004) asserts that SARAs enable 
politicians to overcome problems of credible commitment  the ability to reassure 
taxpayers that tax collection is undertaken without political bias or corruption.  
 
 
Despite the rhetoric and ongoing calls in the literature for increased bureaucratic 
discretion, autonomy enhancing elements are easier to legislate than to realise in 
practice (Batley and Larbi, 2004). The matter, one can safely argue, hinges around 
that of implementation - an issue that has generated a great deal of discussion in 
the academic literature. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 132) argued the need for 
more people to begin with the understanding that implementation, under the best of 
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circumstances, is exceedingly difficult; oft time going down a tortuous and 
frustrating path. Appreciation for the number of steps involved in the process, the 
number of participants whose preferences have to be taken into consideration, the 
number of clearances involved at the various decision points throughout the history 
a programme, all combined with the geometric growth of interdependencies over 
time, provides an idea of the task involved in implementation. 
 
Similarly the argument of Dunsire (1980:9)  about the popularly held view that 
putting policies in place is something technical, yet simple - a domestic chore that 
people below the stairs can be left to. The author posits that it is only when things 
go wrong that attention is drawn to the below the stairs activity, to questions of 
implementation, which over the years have proven to be the very rocks on which 
programmes have eventually floundered. 
 
Crandall (2010:3) aptly summarises the challenge faced by tax bureaucracies: 
 
the revenue administration requires sufficient autonomy to exercise its 
powers and responsibilities set out in the revenue laws. It should be noted 
that these powers are amongst the most pervasive that any law or statute 
provides. As a result, there are usually limits to autonomy and to the extent 
that the administration of these laws can be distanced from government. 
 
Examination of some of the empirical findings on the formal freedoms granted to 
revenue administrations and the actual practice of bureaucratic discretion have 
yielded mixed results. The fair degree of sustainable autonomy found within at least 
three of the six SARAs investigated across Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa 
led Taliercio (2004) to conclude that not only does autonomy matter, but that more 
autonomy leads to improved performance. Relative to the other cases in the study, 
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the Kenya Revenue Authority and Perus National Tax Administration 
Superintendency (SUNAT) used their autonomy to make significant advances in the 
area of personnel management; the latters personnel system highly resistant to 
political interference. Factual financial autonomy resulted in SUNATs complete 
control over the formulation of its budget, with decisions externally reviewed only for 
the purpose of ensuring the consistency of the budget with governments overall 
macroeconomic goals. 
On the contrary, in their survey of 29 SARAs, Kidd and Crandall (2006) note that 
none of the respondents appeared to have been very far removed from government. 
Likewise the findings of Fjeldstad and Moore (2008) who note that even though the 
creation of revenue agencies facilitated a series of nuts and bolts reforms in the 
ways in which taxes were assessed and collected, despite the rhetoric and debate 
about autonomy, there was very little loosening of the political and bureaucratic grip 
of central executive authorities over the revenue collectors. Presidents and Ministers 
of Finance were still very much in control. One major challenge for tax bureaucrats 
they argued, is in the application of the concept of autonomy to an organisation that 
handles large sums of money  invariably resulting in problems involving political 
control.  
 
 
Such findings highlight the need for further research on the issues surrounding this 
topic. Going beyond an assessment of the nature and extent of formal and factual 
autonomy, what remains to be done is empirical work that focuses on factors likely 
to impact on the actual practice of autonomy, either through their enlarging or 
reducing the field of what is possible and what is practicable. Greater 
understanding of what works, what does not, and more importantly why, can inform 
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future reform efforts, both at the institutional design and the policy implementation 
stages.  
 
 
1.3   THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The study first seeks to understand the reason(s) behind reforms, the choice of 
institutional form, as well as the process of reform. At issue is the question of 
whether the espoused doctrine prescribing the granting and actual practice of 
bureaucratic autonomy has an empirical foundation, or whether organisations still 
find themselves trapped within the iron cage or clutches of system-wide 
regulations. The research also explores the nature and characteristics of factors 
which impact on the capacity of the bureaucracy to exercise administrative 
discretion. 
 
At the heart of the studys framework lies an institutional approach that draws on 
resource dependency theory. Pollitt et al (2001) argue that the two theoretically 
crucial variables of bureaucratic autonomy and political control seem to depend on a 
multitude of contextual factors. The institutional context, as a significant determinant 
of what is possible (Flynn, 2009), is crucial in determining reform outcomes (Batley 
and Larbi, 2004).  Whilst the institutional approach will capture the fluidity and 
dynamism embodied in socio-political relations, the *combined theoretical 
perspective allows for a more complete explanation of the issues surrounding the 
phenomenon under study.  
 
 
The studys institutional framework will be applied to investigate causal factors within 
the organisations broader institutional environment. Factors are identified at the 
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intra-organisational, immediate task network2 and broader macro-institutional levels. 
Whilst the more micro intra-organisational factors will show how the internal 
workings of the bureaucracy is structured by external activities, the focus on 
environmental factors beyond the organisations boundaries at the meso and macro 
levels will provide knowledge on interactions between the bureaucracy and political 
institutions. At the macro level, two factors currently under-researched in the 
autonomy literature  legal tradition and system of government  are also 
investigated. 
 
Given the preceding background information, explanations and arguments, the 
research aim, its objectives and the research questions can now be specified with 
greater clarity. 
1.4   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The broad aim of the study is to examine the process and outcomes of 
autonomisation focusing, from an institutional perspective, on constraints and 
opportunities for action. 
 
The specific research objectives, research questions and hypotheses are outlined 
as follows: 
 
Obj.1: To explain the purpose behind fiscal administrative reforms, 
analysing the political and institutional factors that led to the 
selected choice of institutional form. 
 
RQ1:  What was the rationale behind reform? Why did reform take 
on the particular shape and character which it did? 
 
                                               
2
 The organisations task network comprises the various entities, organisations and institutions with which the 
organisation is required to interface for goal accomplishment. 
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Obj.2: To examine the nature and extent of bureaucratic autonomy 
exercised in practice by semi-autonomous revenue agencies:  
 
RQ2: How autonomous are semi-autonomous revenue agencies in 
practice? Do revenue agencies make use of informal strategies 
to escape bureaucratic controls? 
 
H1: Semi-autonomous revenue agencies are likely to exercise a 
limited amount of autonomy. However, agencies may add to 
their flexibilities by making use of informal strategies. 
 
Obj.3: To examine the nature of factors influencing the actual practice 
of bureaucratic autonomy:  
 
RQ3: What are the factors that condition levels of Bureaucratic 
Autonomy? 
 
H2: Factors within the revenue agencys broader institutional 
environment are more likely to condition levels of autonomy than 
factors within its internal or task network environments. 
 
1.5   THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
 
The research, a comparative case study centering around fiscal administrative 
reforms, focuses on the two Caribbean islands of Jamaica and the Dominican 
Republic (DR). In each of the two cases the institutions under investigation are the 
Customs Department and the Internal Revenue Department. Reforms of these 
institutions took place in 1999 in Jamaica and 2006 in the DR.  
 
It is expedient to explain this choice of setting; in particular why the DR was chosen 
as Jamaicas opposite in the ensuing comparison. One might argue that a parallel 
between Jamaica and one of its English-speaking counterparts might provide for a 
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more balanced equation. Case selection was in response to a number of factors. As 
a comparative study, there was a need to ensure that the investigation focused on 
cases which: (a) were comparable and (b) allowed for the research questions to be 
appropriately addressed. 
 
Regarding comparability, the two cases exhibit a number of similarities. Both 
Jamaica and the DR share common economic experiences in terms of their costly 
debt service. Both countries face the complex of constraints upon small resource-
poor insular states, challenged to develop frameworks to redress social and 
economic inequities (Hillman and DAgostino, 1992). In both countries ongoing 
reforms in tax administration, as part of a wider initiative to improve efficiency in 
areas considered core functions of government, have resulted in some degree of 
decentralisation of decision-making power to top civil servants within revenue 
departments.  
 
Notwithstanding these similarities, there are differences between the two countries. 
Despite their location within the same broad geographic area, Jamaica (which 
remains part of the Anglophone Caribbean) and the DR (a part of the Hispanic-
Caribbean) have cultural and linguistic differences that stem from their history of 
colonisation by different colonial powers. Both countries, despite being enveloped in 
dependency relations vis-à-vis the outside world, have varied ties with the different 
world powers. 
 
Previously mentioned was the studys interest in examining the potential influence of 
the system of government as well as the legal tradition on bureaucratic functioning. 
In order to check such influence, case selection needed to allow for variance on 
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these two independent variables. Whereas Jamaica follows the Westminster 
parliamentary model of government and its legal system is based on the common 
law tradition; the DR is governed by a presidentialist system and operates under the 
civil law tradition.   
 
 
Having explained the rationale behind case selection, Table 1.1 uses relevant 
criteria to summarise case similarities and differences. 
 
The two sections following provide background information, as well as a brief 
overview of the two cases and the four focal organisations under study. A number of 
the issues discussed here are pertinent to the ensuing later analysis and are 
therefore being introduced to set the tone for the arguments that will later follow. 
 
 
Srl. 
No. 
 
 
Item Descriptor 
 
 
Similarities 
 
Differences 
Jamaica Dominican Republic 
 
1. 
 
Geographic 
Location 
 
Same geographic locale  - the Caribbean 
Region 
 
Part of the Anglophone 
Caribbean 
 
Part of the Hispanic/Latin 
Caribbean 
 
2. 
 
Historical/Cultural 
Background 
 Historical, cultural and linguistic differences 
 
English colonisation, 
English speaking 
Primarily under Spanish rule 
pre-independence, Spanish 
speaking 
3. System of 
Government 
 Westminster 
Parliamentary system 
Presidential 
system 
4. Legal Tradition  Common law tradition Civil law tradition 
 
5. 
 
Economic 
Background 
Both small, weak, open economies; 
characterised by poor macroeconomic 
conditions and high debt burden 
  
6. External Linkages 
with world 
superpowers 
 
Both countries enveloped in dependency 
relations vis-à-vis the outside world 
 
Varied ties with the differing world powers 
 
7. 
 
Strategies for 
macro-economic 
management 
Both countries have implemented broad 
programmes of public sector reform, 
(including sectoral fiscal administrative 
reforms) that incorporate some degree 
of decentralisation of management 
decision-making 
  
 
Table 1.1: Case Selection  Major Similarities and Differences 
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 1.5.1    JAMAICA AND THE REVENUE ADMINISTRATIONS 
  
1.5.1.1   History and Demographics 
 
 
Situated south of Cuba and west of Haiti, covering an area of approximately 11,000 
sq. miles, Jamaica is the largest English-speaking island in the Caribbean Greater 
Antilles, with an estimated population of 2.8 million. Attached at Appendix 1 is a map 
of Jamaica. Over four and a half centuries of colonial experience (1494-1944), 
Jamaica evolved from a neglected Spanish holding to a plantocracy under the 
British Empire, later to a Crown colony.  Under British guidance, a period of tutelary 
democracy or limited self-government ensued between 1944, when universal adult 
suffrage was granted to the colony, and 1962, when independence was achieved 
(Hillman and DAgostino, 1992).  
1.5.1.2   Socio-Economic Background 
 
 
 
Similar to other Caribbean territories, Jamaica has an open, weak and dependent 
economy. In the decade following independence, Jamaica enjoyed strong GDP 
growth, averaging about 5% per annum. From 1973 through to the mid-1980s, 
however, such growth was followed by a sustained contraction in the economy. 
Efforts to stem the economic decline resulted in a number of structural adjustment 
programmes, a progressive adoption of market-oriented reforms, as well as the 
introduction of a systematic programme of privatisation. In the 1990s, the 
government accelerated the implementation of its reform agenda - reforms in tax 
policy and administration were initiated, with a step up in the programme of 
privatisation.  
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In 1991, following the signing of a Structural Adjustment Programme with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jamaica undertook a programme of financial 
liberalisation. Lack of accompanying prudential regulations resulted in a full-blown 
financial crisis in 1996. Government bailouts to the ailing financial sector contributed 
largely to the countrys current massive debt burden, now ranked fourth largest in 
the world per capita. Gross public debt for the financial year 2009/10 stood at 
129.3% of GDP. Jamaicas macro environment continues to be fragile with 
economic growth facing a number of challenges. For the twenty year period 1988-
2008, average real GDP growth was just 1.4%, while over the said period real per 
capita GDP grew by just 14%3, resulting in a lack of investment in economic and 
social infrastructure (Johnston and Montecino, 2011).   
 
1.5.1.3   External relations 
 
 
Focusing on macroeconomic management and deficit financing, the period 1973-
1996 witnessed a long history of near continuous agreements with the IMF. Such 
agreements were accompanied by strict conditionalities including public sector wage 
freezes and other belt tightening measures. Whilst the period after 1996 saw an end 
to repeated borrowing and the signing of standby agreements, the Fund is still 
invited to assist in oversight, evaluations and reporting on fiscal management of the 
economy. 
 
1.5.1.4   Politico-Administrative Culture  
 
 
Jamaica, as a former British dependency, operated under a Crown colony system. 
Jones (1974) opines that the period of passage in Jamaica from colonisation to 
                                               
3
 Compared to Caribbean country averages of near 3% and 54% respectively. 
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internal self-government to independence has had an impact on the machinery of 
government, with important consequences for the operation of the administrative 
system. Regarding historical structural and governance arrangements, the need to 
maintain full control over several dependencies resulted in rules, regulations and 
guidelines which not only governed the British establishment, but also covered the 
wider colonial service. It was the persistence of the colonial centralising ideology 
and the pursuant interaction processes which gave rise to certain cultural 
behaviours that carried over to the post-independence era (ibid). Such behaviours 
included a lack of decision-making at lower levels, fear of innovation, and the 
accumulation of paper to prove compliance.  
 
Mills (1970) focused in great detail on those inherited post-colonial processes of 
administration.  He notes the reluctance of some ministries and senior civil servants 
to delegate authority and functions, the failure of central governments to devolve 
authority, and the tendency to see certain operations as the preserve of the centre 
and to be handled exclusively from the top. Over-centralisation was also reflected in 
the attitudes and operations of the Ministries of Finance, which inherited some of the 
central co-ordinating functions of the Crown Colony Secretariat.  
 
Nearly four decades on, the same arguments are still being made. Characteristics of 
the system of public administration in the Commonwealth Caribbean, which followed 
the traditional Weberian pattern as modified by British colonial practice, includes: a 
professionally staffed bureaucracy; centralised controls exercised through 
hierarchical structures; the dominance of general administrators at the apex of the 
system; and an emphasis on following rules and procedures that involves 
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substantial paperwork (Sutton, 2008). Negative aspects of these characteristics 
embodied within a Commonwealth Caribbean tradition (ibid:2) have remained 
largely in place and continue to shape the context in which reform programmes 
operate.  
1.5.1.5   Structure of Government  
 
\ 
The 1962 Constitution established Jamaica as a parliamentary democracy based on 
the British Westminster model. Appendix II illustrates the structure of the 
government of Jamaica. The Head of State is the British monarch, represented by 
the Governor General. The essential business of government is distributed amongst 
three independent branches  legislative, judicial, and executive, as elaborated 
below: 
 
The Legislature 
 
 
Jamaicas bicameral Parliament comprises a 60-member House of Representatives 
elected every five years on the basis of a first-past-the-post electoral system, and an 
appointed 21-member Upper House (the Senate). At the local level are parochial 
councils exercising limited powers of local government. 
 
Since 1962, the results of general elections have led to the institutionalisation of a 
dominant 2-party system, power alternating between the Peoples National Party 
(PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP).  
 
 
The Judiciary and Legal Tradition 
 
 
Jamaicas legal and judicial systems are based on English common law and 
practice. As illustrated in Appendix II, courts operate at various levels in the judicial 
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system. The Constitution (ss. 97 & 103) establishes two separate superior courts - a 
Supreme Court, and a Court of Appeals that lies at the apex of the Jamaican court 
hierarchy. Justice is locally administered by other bodies such as the Resident 
Magistrates (RM) Courts. RM Courts deal summarily with less serious matters both 
civil and criminal. Under the 1867 Tax Collection Act, the Collector of Taxes may 
proceed for recovery of any taxes and for penalties on such taxes in a RM Court.  
 
A specialised Revenue Court was established in 1972 by the Judicature (Revenue 
Court) Act specifically to handle appeals from administrative bodies. Though 
established by statute, the Revenue Court is deemed part of the Supreme Court, 
applying the same practices and procedures. The Court hears and determines 
cases brought by aggrieved taxpayers appealing against the decisions of revenue 
Commissioners. It has jurisdiction to hear appeals under a number of Acts such as 
the Customs Act, the Income Tax Act, and the General Consumption Tax Act. 
 
 
The Executive  
 
 
Executive power in Jamaica is vested in the Cabinet, led by the Prime Minister  the 
leader of the party commanding majority support in the Lower House. The Prime 
Minister appoints Cabinet Ministers who head Ministries dealing with specific 
portfolios. Historically, the first-past-the-post system and the recurrence of single-
party majorities in the House of Representatives have favoured the concentration of 
decision-making authority in the executive. 
 
At the senior administrative level, the Financial Secretary is responsible for the 
administration of the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The Constitution provides for 
the institution of a Public Service Commission to preside over a career civil service 
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organised into administrative, professional, technical, executive, clerical and manual 
categories.  
 
 
1.5.1.6   The Inland Revenue Department 
 
 
The Inland Revenue Department (IRD) is responsible for collecting and accounting 
for all domestic taxes4, excluding stamp duty & transfer tax. Responsibilities are not 
only limited to the collection of tax revenues, but also include enforcement of 
taxpayer compliance, the provision of taxpayer services, as well as other duties 
such as motor vehicle registration. In the financial year (FY) 2007/08, the 
departments actual staffing complement stood at approximately 1300. Appendix III 
portrays the high level structure of the IRD. The department comprises 42 Business 
Units, including 28 Collectorates divided into 4 regional offices (Regions 1 to 4) 
managed by Assistant Commissioners. A tax E-Portal represents the 29th Virtual 
Collectorate.  
 
The core domestic tax system is the Integrated Computerised System for Tax 
Administration (ICTAS), with an additional nine systems to support various aspects 
of tax administration, such as the Taxpayer Registration Number (TRN) system, and 
the Integrated New Cash Remittance System (INCRS).     
 
Appendix IV(a) shows the relationship between IRD gross collections and central 
government tax revenues (CGTR) between FYs 2000/01 to 2007/08. The 
                                               
4
 Taxes include monies, properties, fines, penalties, levies etc, due to government under the 
Revenue Acts. Taxes collected are income tax (company and individual); PAYE; general 
consumption tax (a form of VAT on goods and services); special consumption tax on the 
manufacture of specific prescribed goods; Asset Tax; Education Tax; and Contractors Levy. 
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department collects on average 80% of CGTR. This demonstrates the centrality of 
domestic tax collection to central government receipts and the departments critical 
role in the socio-economic development process. Revenue projections and 
collections for the IRD from 2001 to November 2008 are shown at Appendix IV(b). 
Between the FYs 2001/02 and 2006/07, shortfalls in tax yield ranged from between -
1.9% to -10.9%.  
 
1.5.1.7   The Customs Department  
 
 
The Customs Department (CD) was established in 1985, replacing the old Collector 
Generals Office. This Office was divided to form the Inland Revenue Department 
and the Customs and Excise Department. As the countrys primary border 
management agency and second largest collector of revenues, the departments 
primary role is to process passenger goods and cargo so as to ensure national 
safety and security, to optimise revenue, and to facilitate trade and commerce.  
 
The department collects five types of duties and taxes5. Through its agency duties 
function it enforces over 160 pieces of legislation on behalf of at least twenty other 
government agencies. International trade transactions make use of a self-
assessment system, whereby importers or agents certify as to the truthfulness of 
declarations and supporting documentation, and are required to pay duties and 
taxes at the time required. For processing data, the major application is Customs 
Automated Services (CASE), with a variety of systems developed to support 
electronic manifest, payment and entry processing, as well as risk management. 
 
                                               
5
 These include import duty, stamp duty, additional stamp duty, general consumption tax, and special 
consumption tax. 
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Appendix V shows the organic structure of the Customs Department. The structure 
is decentralised, consisting of headquarters, regional as well as local offices. There 
are three Collectorates, each headed by a Collector. Headquarters is sub-divided 
into the Commissioners Office; with two broad portfolios (Corporate Service and 
Operations) each headed by a Deputy Commissioner. At the end of the FY 2006/07, 
there were 1134 approved staff positions. 
 
Customs collects nearly 30% of annual government revenue (Centre for Strategic 
Management, 1999). Revenue projections and collections for the department from 
2001 to November 2008 are shown at Appendix IV(c).  On average, total collections 
fell slightly short of revenue projections, the variance ranging from 1.3% to -5.0%. In 
2005/06, actual revenue yield increased by 16.5% from J$46b to J$53.6b in 
2006/07, before falling roughly 25% to J$40.1b in 2007/08. 
 
1.5.2    THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND THE DOMINICAN REVENUE 
AGENCIES 
 
 
 
 1.5.2.1   History and Demographics 
 
 
The Dominican Republic (DR) covers 48,730 sq. km with a total population of 
approximately 9.1 million inhabitants; and forms the eastern two-thirds of the island 
of Hispaniola. Attached at Appendix VI is a map of the DR. At various points in its 
history, the country was under the control of Spain (1492-1795; 1802-1821), France 
(1795-1802), and Haiti (1822-1844). The original declaration of independence in 
1844 and seventeen years of self governance were followed in 1861 by a four-year 
voluntary return to Spanish rule, after which independence was restored. Economic 
difficulties, ongoing internal disorders and the threat of European intervention led to 
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a U.S. occupation and the establishment of a military government from 1916 to 
1924. During the 31-year reign of Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961), the DR experienced a 
degree of authoritarianism and centralised decision making unsurpassed elsewhere 
in Latin America (Kearney, 1986). Governance of the country has often alternated 
between liberal and authoritarian rule, with democratically elected government now 
more the order of the day.  
 
1.5.2.2   Socio-Economic Background 
 
 
Operating in an open and competitive environment and heavily dependent on 
economic developments in industrialised nations (particularly the U.S.), the DR 
faces a number of economic challenges. Despite such challenges, however, the 
country had one of the fastest growing economies in the 1990s. After a decade of 
little or no growth in the 1980s, the economy boomed, expanding at an average rate 
of 7.7% per year from 1996-2000, per capita income more than doubling between 
1991 and 2000. Growth turned negative in 2003 (-0.4%) due to the effects of the 
2003 banking crisis and governments handling of major bank frauds. A dramatic 
turnaround, however, was achieved in 2004. Inflation was cut sharply and real 
growth rose to 2%. By 2006, the Dominican economy had shown clear signs of 
recovery from the effects of the 2003 financial crisis. The economy grew by 9.3% in 
2005 and 10.7% in 2006, due partly to a favourable international environment and 
also to economic reforms introduced in 2004. Even though the DRs economy 
slowed in 2008-2009 as a result of the global recession, it still remains one of the 
fastest growing in the Caribbean region.  
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1.5.2.3   External relations 
 
 
Over the years, Dominican politics have been relatively highly influenced by a 
variety of transnational actors  international agencies, and the embassies of 
countries such as the U.S.  that have played a significant role not only in 
Dominican international affairs, but also in the countrys internal affairs. According to 
Wiarda and Kryzanek (1992:56, own emphasis in italics), the relationship of the 
United States to the Dominican Republic could best be described as one of 
suprasovereignty, the term being used to convey the idea that the U.S. not only 
reacts to internal Dominican events in ways that alter the small nations politics and 
development but also makes decisions affecting the Dominican Republic as if it (the 
United States) were sovereign. In this unequal partnership they opined that the DR 
is viewed not as an independent nation, but as a satellite, with repeatedly attempts 
made by the U.S. to place its stamp on the course of Dominican history.  
 
1.5.2.4   Politico-Administrative Culture 
 
Kearney (1986:147) refers to the dogged salience of the administrative 
antecedents of the Dominican Republic, and the existence of a politico-
administrative heritage which can be traced back to early Spanish colonialism. The 
enduring legacy of Spains colonial rule is said to be still visible in many facets of 
Dominican society, including public administration. Hillman and DAgostino (1992) 
highlight the impact of the colonisation of Hispaniola which involved the transfer of a 
set of values based on absolutism, authoritarianism and a rigid social hierarchy in 
which authority and decision-making flowed from the top down. The authors speak 
of a political system traditionally characterised by a high degree of formalism. Up to 
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near the turn of the 20th Century, despite a move away from traditional 
authoritarianism and some attempt at the decentralisation of decision-making 
authority, Dominican politico-administrative decision-making was still considered as 
highly centralised (Kearney, 1986). 
 
Regarding personnel administration and staffing of the public service, apparent in 
the Dominican presidential system is the tradition of personalistic government and 
personalistic decision-making (personalismo), with power highly centralised in the 
executive branch. Since the early sixteenth century, the DR has continued to 
operate with a spoils system6, despite repeated attempts at the enactment and 
implementation of a civil service law and the establishment of a merit- and career-
based administrative infrastructure. Kearney (1986:146) noted the result of this 
spoils system being a bureaucracy that is inefficient, unstable and forgetful. Loss 
of institutional memory results in each new administration evidencing a collective 
amnesia, forgetting or ignoring the accumulated knowledge and experience of 
previous administrations. 
 
 
1.5.2.5   Structure of Government 
 
 
The Constitution, promulgated on 14 August 1994, defines the Government of the 
DR as being democratic, republican, and representative. National powers are 
distributed amongst independent legislative, judicial and executive branches. The 
structure of the Dominican government is illustrated in Appendix VII. The 
composition and functioning of each branch is discussed in turn below. 
 
                                               
6
 The spoils system involves the rewarding of government jobs to friends and party supporters resulting, quite 
often, in bureaucracies being staffed from top to bottom by the executive. 
  
45 
 
The Legislature 
 
Legislative power is exercised by a bicameral National Congress composed of two 
chambers  the Senate (32 members) and the Chamber of Deputies (178 
members7). Members of both chambers are elected by popular vote to serve four-
year terms. Since 1994, elections are held every two years alternating between 
presidential elections and congressional/municipal elections.  
Political parties and a political party system in the modern sense had a very short 
history in the DR, dating back only to the early 1960s. The three major political 
parties are the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the Dominican Revolutionary 
Party (PRD), and the Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC), with several other 
minor parties. In August 2004, Dr. Leonel Fernández of the PLD assumed the 
Presidency of the DR from Hipólito Mejia of the PRD. In the result of the 2008 
parliamentary elections, 96 of the 178 Chamber of Deputies seats and 22 of the 32 
Senate seats were controlled by the PLD. 
 
The Judiciary and Legal Tradition 
 
The Dominican Republic is a civil law jurisdiction belonging to the family of Romano-
Germanic Law. Originally based on the Spanish legal system, the present day 
system is derived, in the most part, from laws or statutes known as the French 
Napoleonic Civil Code, introduced to the country during the period of Haitian 
occupation. Upon Haitian withdrawal, the Dominican National Congress adopted the 
Code, which in 1884 was translated into Spanish and became the basis of the 
modern legal system.  
                                               
7
 The number of seats in the Lower House was increased to 183 in the last 2010 parliamentary elections. 
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The Dominican judicial system is based largely on the French judicial system of 
organisation. At the apex is the Supreme Court of Justice, which works as an 
appeals court for all judgements rendered by judicial courts. The Supreme Court is 
formed of sixteen judges appointed by the National Judicial Council, an institution 
created as part of the 1994 constitutional reform to safeguard the independence of 
the judiciary. 
Other courts in the judicial system are the Appeals Courts, Courts of First instance, 
Magistrates Courts, Justices of the Peace and Land Courts. Also in operation are 
specialised courts with jurisdiction over specific areas such as administration, labour 
and real estate. Included in this group is the Superior Administrative Tribunal, 
formed of five judges, with jurisdiction over appeals filed by private parties against 
decisions of the public administration. 
 
  The Executive 
 
Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic, together with a Vice-
President, and a Cabinet of Ministers designated by the President. As chief 
executive, the President is the head of State, government, and public administration. 
As head of the public administration machinery, the Presidents powers are 
extensive and wide-ranging. Under the Constitution, the chief executive is tasked 
with regulating all matters relating to the Customs Service. The Civil Service Act 
provides for the President to discretionally appoint individuals to a wide range of 
positions outside the normal recruiting processes. This includes directors of 
autonomous and decentralised state entities and their immediate subordinates, as 
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well as executive branch appointees who exercise high level administrative, 
managerial and consultative functions. 
 
Historically, the result of such leverage in appointments and removals has been a 
patronage-dominated public administration system. Jobs were doled out in return for 
loyalty and service rather than on the basis of merit, with staffing conducted often as 
a favour to the political supporters of winning candidates, or ministerial or agency 
appointees. This method usually resulted in wholesale staffing turnovers within 
ministries and departments with virtually every change of government.  
 
1.5.2.6   The Internal Revenue Department (DGII) 
 
 
The General Directorate of Internal Revenue (DGII) or the Internal Revenue 
Department is responsible for the administration and collection of the principal 
internal taxes within the DR. The department came into being with the enactment of 
Law 166-97 which merged the former departments of Internal Revenue and Income 
Tax. Principal taxes collected are Income Tax (Corporate and Individual), 
Inheritance and Gift taxes, Motor Vehicle Tax, Capital Gains Tax, Real Property 
Tax, and ITBIS. 
 
With regard to institutional and human resources organisation, the DGII is headed 
by a General Director assisted by four operational Sub-Directors responsible for the 
various administrative and technical areas. Attached at Appendix VIII is the pre-
reform organisational structure of the DGII. 
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Appendix IX(a) shows the contribution of the taxes collected by both focal 
organisations as a percentage of total tax revenues for the period 2000-2007. DGII 
collects on average over 40% of total tax revenues. Appendix IX(b) illustrates DGIIs 
revenue projections and collections for the financial years 2001-2006. Over most of 
the period, actual receipts slightly surpassed targeted amounts, the most impressive 
performance achieved in 2005. Comparing 2005 year end totals with those for the 
ending of 2004, the department collected 34% more, an equivalent of $RD21.1 
billion. According to senior officials in the DGII, the magnitude of the difference 
between 2005 projections and collections (almost 11%) far surpassed the 
expectations of central government authorities and international organisations that 
oversee the nation's economic performance.  
 
1.5.2.7   The Customs Department (DGA) 
  
 
In 1845, faced with the need to raise revenues and to regularise customs activities, 
a system of Customs was established in the Dominican Republic. As a result of 
large loans obtained by government in 1916, Customs was administered by the U.S. 
military occupation government. The direction and supervision of the Customs 
Service was reinstated to the Dominican Government through Act No. 429 of March 
20, 1941, when the nation had repaid the majority of its debt. 
The General Directorate of Customs (DGA) or Customs Department collects a 
number of international duties and taxes8. As at 2008, the department employed a 
                                               
8
 These include Import Tax, Selective Consumption Tax, Excise Tax, and Tax on the Transfer of Industrialised 
Goods and Services (ITBIS). The ITBIS is a value added tax applicable to the transfer and importation of most 
goods, and to most services. 
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total of 5,240 employees distributed across a central headquarters function, and 
Collectorates in charge of land, sea and airport operations.  
 
 
Whilst in the 1960s and early 1970s import duties constituted the greatest single 
source of government revenue, accounting for 4045% of the annual total tax 
revenues, figures for the new millennium indicate that the share of customs import 
duties in government tax income fell on average to below 30% (See Appendix 
IX(a)). 
 
Appendix IX(c) highlights the DGAs revenue performance for the financial years 
2004-2006. Despite a fall in revenues by 11.2 % between 2005 and 2006, 
collections in all three years surpassed targeted projections, most markedly in 2005. 
During that year, the department collected an excess of $RD6.2 billion or 12% more 
than the estimated amount. 
 
1.6    THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY 
 
 
This study contributes to the literature on autonomy in four ways. First, in most 
empirical studies, autonomy is treated as an independent variable, usually to assess 
its impact on organisational performance (See e.g Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, 2004; 
Taliercio, 2004; Joshi and Ayee, 2009). Whilst performance outcomes are certainly 
important, such studies only relay part of the story of what is happening. In this 
study, autonomy is being treated as the dependent variable, with a primary focus on 
some of the necessary pre-conditions for its actual practice.  
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Second, the work documents the experience of Caribbean countries in implementing 
NPM reforms that involve decentralisation and autonomisation. Whilst a great deal 
has been written about public sector reforms and the experiences of developed 
OECD countries, comparatively less is told of the experiences within developing 
economies, particularly countries in the Caribbean region (Ayeni, 2002). Whilst the 
Jamaica agencification programme has captured the attention of some researchers 
(Armstrong, 2001; Talbot, 2002; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004), reform outcomes in other 
Caribbean countries are scarcely documented. The research therefore attempts to 
fill this void in the literature. 
 
Third, the study extends beyond the traditional focus of examining whether the 
exercise of bureaucratic autonomy co-exists alongside efforts at political control, to 
try to understand when bureaucratic discretion is maximised (e.g agency resources, 
support of the executive).  Fourth and most importantly, the study is distinct in part 
from existing literature on autonomy in its analysis of comparative government and 
comparative legal tradition as potential influences on the exercise of administrative 
discretion. Regarding comparative government, whilst there is literature that 
addresses the issue of whether different regimes (parliamentary v. presidentialist) 
generate bureaucracies that are markedly different (see Moe and Caldwell, 1994), 
such work is theoretical; more suggestive than definitive in its treatment of the issue. 
No study, of which this author is aware, has undertaken an empirical analysis of the 
nature described. 
 
It is anticipated that the findings from the research will not only broaden 
understanding of the process and outcomes of autonomisation outside of its usual 
context, but will also deepen current knowledge of the ways in which administrative 
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discretion is enabled or constrained. Increased knowledge and understanding have 
the potential of contributing to improvements in the design and implementation of 
decentralised arrangements. 
 
1.7  STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The thesis is divided into three main parts incorporating ten chapters. Following the 
introduction; Part I, which comprises Chapters 2 and 3 reviews the relevant literature 
on the subject of study. Chapter 2 presents the main concepts, theories, and issues 
surrounding bureaucratic autonomy. The chapter highlights the challenges facing 
policymakers of granting greater managerial freedoms and maintaining political 
accountability - the so-called paradox of bureaucratic autonomy and political control. 
The chapter concludes by reviewing empirical evidence on the practice of 
autonomy. Chapter 3 presents the conditioning factors gleaned from the literature 
that are likely to impinge on the capacity of the bureaucracy to act autonomously. 
Broad environmental factors identified are grouped under three main categories  
intra-organisational factors operating at the internal level of bureaucratic functioning, 
as well as meso- and macro-institutional level factors in the organisations broader 
environment as points at which internal pressures are applied. 
  
 Part II of the thesis, Chapter 4, focuses on the methods of the study. The Chapter 
explains the framework devised to operationalise and measure the nature and 
extent of factual bureaucratic autonomy, as well as the analytical framework 
developed to guide the analysis and interpretation of potentially conditioning factors. 
Also explained is the methodology used for comparing the cases, as well as the 
manner of data analysis and reporting. 
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Part III of the study comprising Chapters 5-10 presents the studys empirical 
findings. Chapter 5 responds to the first research question by reporting, in each of 
the two cases, the rationale behind reforms as well as the choice of institutional 
forms. Addressing the second question posed in the study, Chapters 6 and 7 use 
the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 4 to analyse, along the various 
dimensions, the nature and extent of factual bureaucratic autonomy within the 
revenue administrations. In Chapters 8 and 9, the studys second analytical 
framework is used to examine and present findings on whether selected factors 
actually constrain or enlarge the flexibilities of the bureaucracy. Chapter 10 
concludes by pulling together the cursory analyses undertaken in the previous 
chapters, comparing side by side in greater detail the findings for the two cases. 
Conclusions are drawn on the main issues of study and determinations made as to 
whether or not hypotheses have been borne out.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND AUTONOMISATION: 
A SYNOPSIS OF THE KEY ISSUES 
 
2.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralisation of responsibility and authority for public services provision has, over 
the past two decades, become a familiar theme in development theory and practice, 
and an essential part of the governance reform agenda. Broadly referring to the 
process of distributing power in government, the term decentralisation covers a 
range of possible ways for government to divest its responsibilities to organisations 
operating on the fringes of the state, outside the central government apparatus 
(Yoder, 2010). The concept has several overlapping connotations9 but, as a 
component of new public management, decentralisation takes on a managerial 
dimension, with the main focus being organisational restructuring coupled with 
operational changes (Larbi, 1998). This chapter describes the process of 
administrative decentralisation and autonomisation, presenting the intellectual and 
pragmatic arguments underlying such reform efforts. After unpacking some of the 
conceptual complexities surrounding autonomy, and highlighting some of the shifts 
in thinking on the subject, the chapter concludes with an examination of the 
empirical evidence to date on the actual practice of bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
                                               
9
 A distinction is made between political decentralisation (devolution), which involves the transfer of formal 
authority to pass laws or to make policy decisions from the national government to elected bodies at the sub-
national levels; and administrative decentralisation (e.g. deconcentration, delegation) where authority is given 
to a body that is appointed rather than elected, and that is primarily managerial, administrative, or expert rather 
than political (Pollitt et al, 1998). It is the latter in which this research is interested. 
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2.2    THE DECENTRALISATION OF MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
Up until the end of the 20th century, the departmental hierarchical form served as 
the building block or primary vehicle for administering public services. Over time, a 
number of criticisms were levied against this administrative model  the centralist 
bureaucratic modality reduces flexibility, adaptability, speed and creativity 
particularly in field service delivery; increases co-ordination and managerial costs; 
and perpetuates top-down authoritarian approaches to problems requiring a genuine 
partnership approach (Wunsch, 1999). One of the possible hallmarks of the post-
modern 21st Century state has been the paradigm shift involving a disestablishment 
or dismantling of centrally regulated bureaucracies (OECD, 2002) and their 
replacement with a range of alternative mechanisms for service provision (Kaul, 
1998). Figure 2.1 illustrates the structural and operational innovations resulting from 
this type of reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A Typical Management Decentralisation Model 
 
The following two sections elaborate on each key feature. 
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2.2.1    DISAGGREGATION AND THE NEW STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Structural disaggregation is the breaking up or unbundling (Talbot, 2004a:11; 
Caulfield, 2004:229) of large-scale vertically integrated, monolithic government 
bureaucracies. The traditional bureaucratic structure is reworked so that there is a 
policy/implementation division of labour. The resulting split is a small, simplified and 
strategic policy core, with larger units hived off (Pollitt et al 2004:3) and placed at 
arms length from the departmental form. Whereas the core would be responsible for 
planning, co-ordination, consultation and monitoring; the operational units would 
execute operational tasks. The belief is that steering in terms of setting goals and 
direction, and rowing, in the form of doing and achieving results, while clearly 
related, ought in practice to be decoupled (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Thynne and 
Wettenhall, 2004). This centrifugal process of unbundling or unravelling (Flinders 
2008:3) has been nurtured in developing countries not only by international bodies 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank, but also by some of the 
leading international development consulting agencies (Madon et al, 2010). 
 
Formal breach with the departmental hierarchy can occur in several ways. Examples 
of delegated arrangements include corporatisation, the move towards 
agencification (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000:165), and the establishment of semi-
autonomous revenue authorities. 
 
Corporatisation involves converting departments, usually those engaged in business 
or commercial activities, into free-standing enterprises which are then granted a new 
legal personality with authority according to private company law.  
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Agencification is driven by two separate reform discourses  the first one stressing 
the well known elements of the NPM reform agenda10, and the second discourse 
emphasising the gradual development of a regulatory state11 (Bach and Jann, 
2010). Agencification has a long tradition in a number of European countries, 
including Finland, Sweden, the Norwegian central government, and the German 
federal administration.  
 
However, it is the 1988 British experience with Next Steps agencies which is the 
internationally best known example of this kind of development. The U.K. model has 
been emulated in virtually every continent, with differences in agency size, legal 
form, and internal governance structure. Included in the agency family are a 
number of differently named entities including Special Operating Agencies in 
Canada; Performance-Based Organisations in the U.S.; Independent Administrative 
Institutions in Japan; ZBOs12 and Agentschappen in the Netherlands; Crown Entities 
in New Zealand; and Special Purpose Vehicles in India. Programmatic creation of 
executive agencies has also been embarked upon by a number of developing and 
transitional economies, including Thailand, Latvia and Tanzania. The creation of 
executive agencies has been dubbed the pièce de résistance of public sector reform 
efforts in Jamaica (Talbot, 2004b:297).  
 
The agency model has become a popular vehicle for executing a range of public 
functions including prison administration; the promotion and evaluation of social and 
                                               
10
 Here the emphasis is on separating policy and implementation, contract steering and stronger task orientation. 
11
 The concern here is the need for some degree of independence from direct political intervention in 
government regulation. and the necessity for a long term credible commitment to government regulatory 
policies.  
12
 ZBO stands for Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan which in Dutch translates to autonomous administrative 
authority. 
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scientific activities, particularly education, health care, social security, and social 
assistance; and the regulation of social or economic affairs.  
 
Traced to the agency model is the particularly noteworthy trend involving the merger 
of customs and tax departments into semi-autonomous revenue authorities 
(SARAs). According to Fjeldstad and Moore (2009), the case for giving autonomy to 
revenue collection agencies emerged naturally from NPM thinking. Notable are the 
roles of key players such as the IMF, the World Bank, the U.K. Department for 
International Development (DFID) and a linked network of international consultants 
in nurturing and promoting the initiative particularly in Anglophone Sub-Saharan 
Africa13, Francophone Africa escaping any similar barrage of persuasive ideas. 
 
2.2.2    AUTONOMISATION AND REGULATORY REFORM  THE FOCUS ON 
OPERATIONAL CHANGES     
 
Structural changes of the type outlined above often go hand-in-hand with regulatory 
reform (Minogue, 1998), deregulation being the first step towards re-regulation 
(Talbot, 2004; Christensen et al, 2008). Focusing on de-regulation, within the 
decentralised framework, a change in the locus of control is occasioned through a 
process of autonomisation (Kickert and Verhaak, 1995:532; Pollitt et al, 2001:275), 
or the delegation of autonomy by the centre to decentralised units. Theoretically, 
managers are freed to manage through reduced controls and political interference 
over issues such as budgets, organisation and personnel. The idea underlying this 
new managerialism is that bureaucrats would make use of sound principles 
                                               
13
 SARAs exist in many Anglophone African countries - Ghana (1985); Uganda (1991); Kenya (1995); 
Tanzania (1996); Malawi (2002). In South and Latin America the trend was led by Peru (1988), followed by 
Venezuela (1994); Mexico (1997); and Guyana (1999).  
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borrowed from private sector practice to engage in hands-on professional 
management.  
 
Regarding re-regulation, the substantial risks involved in granting (greater) freedoms 
to distributed entities are well documented (see for example Ramamurti, 1987; 
Flinders, 2004). Hence repeated calls for the anchoring of such freedoms within a 
policy framework appropriate to the devolved environment, matched by bureaucratic 
ex post accountability to other parts of government, to service users, and to elected 
representatives and citizens (Devas et al, 2001; Batley and Larbi, 2004; Kidd and 
Crandall, 2006). Such a framework would need not only to satisfy policymakers 
informational needs but also to ensure that serious failures are prevented or 
promptly redressed. Accompanying autonomisation, therefore, is a new control 
system based on performance indicators and performance assessment, whereby 
focus is shifted from a priori, process-oriented and pervasive controls, towards a 
posteriori, results-oriented strategic controls (Islam, 1993). The new system employs 
various techniques such as performance budgeting, the development of steering 
dialogues, pay-for-performance systems, and performance reports as a means of 
formalising ministry/agency relations. 
 
Contrary to the idea of regulatory reforms producing what some term as the post-
bureaucratic organisation, more appropriate is to consider such change as resulting 
in a cleaned bureaucracy  i.e. one where the unnecessary detritus of layer upon 
layer of rules is cleaned away in favour of a simpler, cleaner but 
nonethelessrobust set of strategic controls (Talbot 2002:22).  
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2.3   DECENTRALISATION  THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND PRACTICAL 
UNDERPINNINGS 
 
 
 
A number of theoretical or intellectual underpinnings and pragmatic arguments 
provide the rationale for decentralisation. Regarding theoretical arguments, thinking 
in the NPM paradigm is underpinned by a number of theoretical perspectives 
incorporated under the broad heading of economic neo-institutionalism  otherwise 
referred to as new institutional economics. Included in this collective body of work 
are the public choice and principal-agent models, as well as the property rights 
theory. Highlighting the need to understand individuals and individual behaviour 
within organisations, the models posit a number of specific assumptions about 
human behaviour centred on self-interest (individuals take actions from which they 
stand to benefit), instrumentality (individuals assign relative weightings to preferred 
outcomes), and individual rationality (individuals choose the course of action that 
give the greatest satisfaction). From these models came new performance-
motivated administrative and institutional arrangements, new structural forms, and 
new managerial doctrines (OFlynn, 2007). 
 
Turning to pragmatic benefits, a number of economic and administrative cases have 
been made by governments, external actors, and the increasingly influential civil 
society lobbyists for decentralising public service delivery. While economists tend to 
focus their analysis on costs and benefits, other social scientists and practitioners 
are generally concerned with processes and the democratisation aspect. 
 
A number of studies exists linking decentralisation and autonomisation to improved 
performance (see for example, Batley and Larbi, 2004; Taliercio, 2004, Christensen 
and Lægreid, 2007). Performance is increased in areas of economy, efficiency, 
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effectiveness, quality, or a combination of these.  Improved technical or X efficiency 
is achieved through greater flexibility and cost-consciousness at the local level. 
Allocative efficiency is improved through the use of task-focused agencies working 
in specific policy/service delivery areas, providing a mix of services and expenditure 
shaped by local user preferences.  
Whilst the evidence that movement away from hierarchical forms leads to enhanced 
performance is still far from conclusive, Batley and Larbi (2004) demonstrate that 
autonomy can lead to enhanced performance when and if the conditions exist for its 
effective operation. For Grindle (1997:488), it was not autonomy per se, but rather 
the facilitating condition which it provided to organisations and their managers to 
build cultures which encouraged performance-oriented norms and behaviours. 
Likewise the argument attributing improvements in revenue collection not solely and 
directly to the creation of autonomous revenue agencies, but to the 
increasedpotential of African governments to enhance central government 
revenues by acting as a conduit for the initialisation of a range of sensible reforms in 
tax administration (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009:13). 
Disaggregating a multi-purpose ministry into a single or few-purposes agency gives 
greater focus to the task at hand, which in turn raises expertise, quality and 
efficiency. This is because the new units and the now more visible manager that 
replaces the once faceless bureaucrat can be more easily held to account (rendered 
transparent) and made responsible for their actions.  
Yet another argument focuses on decentralisation and its impact on local 
governance. Decentralising government enables more direct participation in 
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governance processes through citizens empowerment and the development of 
social partnerships (ECA, 2003). Figure 2.2 is the analytical framework devised by 
the World Bank to aid understanding of the successes and failures of centralised 
service production, and to explain new proposed institutional arrangements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Public Service Delivery - The Long vs. Short Route of Accountability 
Source - World Bank (2004:49) 
 
Identifying actors in the public service delivery chain and their relationships of power 
and accountability, the Bank refers to the frequent reliance on and oft-time failures 
of the traditional long-route accountability (World Bank, 2004:55)  clients as 
citizens influencing policymakers and policymakers influencing providers. Solving 
the problem, it argues, requires mentally and sometimes physically separating the 
policymaker from the provider and thinking of the relationship between the two as a 
compact. Invoking the short route (ibid), service is delivered by the provider (who is 
either rewarded or penalised based on performance), with citizens/client acting as 
purchasers, co-producers and monitors of the service. Mehrotra (2006) opines that, 
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if collective voice at the local level brings local decision-makers closer to the 
constituents they serve, thereby placing pressure on local functionaries to respond 
to local needs and preferences, a number of benefits can result. Benefits of this 
more nuanced approach to service delivery include improved responsiveness, 
choice and accountability; as well as the potential for greater system learning and 
innovation. It is indirectly through these factors that decentralization affects the 
quantity, quality and equity of public services (Conyers, 2007).  
 
2.4     BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY   A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW  
 
Researchers on the subject of bureaucratic autonomy speak of definitional and 
conceptual challenges which later give rise to methodological problems (Young and 
Tavares, 2004; Verhoest et al 2004). The following section defines bureaucratic 
autonomy, both in general as well as for the purpose of this study. Later discussed 
is the shift in thinking surrounding the concept. 
 
2.4.1    DEFINING AUTONOMY 
 
Despite the vast amount of literature on autonomy there is still no commonly 
accepted definition. Autonomy has been described as a complex, fuzzy political 
concept (Kidd and Crandall 2006:08), one whose meaning has become more vague 
with the passage of time, a meaning which cannot be translated into any specific 
local, procedural and organisational arrangements (Fjeldstad and Moore (2008). 
 
Autonomy derives from the Greek words for auto (self) and nomos (law), hence self-
law. The Collins English Dictionary (1999) defines autonomy as the right or state of 
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self government. The notion of self-governance, self-rule or self-direction is found 
throughout a vast amount of writing on the subject. 
 
According to Davis (1969), a local official or civil servant exercises autonomy 
whenever (s)he is free to choose among possible courses of action or inaction. This 
view is affirmed by Brooke (1984) who argues that an organisation is autonomous 
when it can take decisions on issues reserved to a higher level in comparable 
organisations; and Ringquist (1995) who suggests that an entity exercises autonomy 
when it makes judgements regarding policy actions not prescribed in detail by formal 
rules or regulation. Lying at the heart of these definitions is the central theme of 
decision-making - freedom to determine how best to achieve an objective or satisfy 
a particular preference. 
 
Such succinct and straightforward definitions, however, lose sight of other critical 
attributes of autonomy. Leddy and Pepper (1985) go one step further by stating that 
the autonomous person is capable not only of making rational and unconstrained 
decisions, but also of acting on those decisions. Gillon (1995:60) adopts a similar 
philosophical stance, defining autonomy as the capacity to think, decide, and act on 
the basis of such thought and decision freely and independently and without 
hindrance. For Carpenter (2001:3), bureaucratic autonomy comprises certain 
essential conditions including political differentiation and unique organisational 
capacities. Autonomous bureaucracies are politically differentiated from the actors 
who seek to control them. Possessing unique preferences, interests, and ideologies 
which may diverge from those of politicians and organised interests, such 
bureaucracies are able to act on such preferences  i.e. to analyse, to plan, to 
problem solve, and to create new programmes. Their unique organisational 
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capacities enable them to fashion around themselves a kind of apolitical shield that 
permits the effective and efficient advancement of programmes, while running their 
agencies (Wilson 1989:217). Explicit in these definitions is the perception of 
autonomy not only in terms of freedom to make choices, but also the ability to act 
without any impediment. 
 
Inherent within all the above definitions, however, is a misguided impression of 
unbridled freedoms, i.e. of bureaucracies operating within unobstructed 
environments. No agency head can ever achieve complete autonomy for his/her 
organisation (Harrell and Alpert, 1979; Wilson, 1989; Carruthers, 1994). Since 
politics requires accountability, no one can be wholly trusted to make choices free of 
legal and administrative constraints, without the risk of anarchy. Important therefore, 
within any definition of autonomy, is the need for an emphasis on self-governance, 
albeit within a system of principles. Hence a better and more appropriate definition 
of autonomy would be the freedom for management to evolve its policy and [to] 
execute it within the framework of broad objectives determined by government 
(Mascarenhas 1972:66). Such a definition aptly captures all three important 
attributes of autonomy - independent decision-making, capacity to act, as well as 
imposed limitations or constraints on action. 
 
In the case of this research, it is important first to indicate to the reader the studys 
loci of autonomy (Cribb and Gewirtz, 2007:203), i.e. to identify whose autonomy it 
is that is being brought into question, and to provide a working definition of the 
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concept of autonomy. For the purpose of this study, bureaucratic14 autonomy being 
investigated within the focal organisations refers to the constrained freedom of the 
tax administration to take decisions and to implement tax policies and legislation, 
within a broad framework or system of principles. Autonomy of the institution is 
viewed vis-à-vis state and societal actors (e.g. political leaders, government, interest 
groups, and international organisations). Key issues under investigation here are the 
domains and modes (ibid) of autonomy, meaning those spheres over which 
autonomy is being exercised, and how it is being practised.  
 
2.4.2    TRADITIONAL vs. CONTEMPORARY THEORISING 
 
 
Over time, thinking on autonomy has shifted from a very narrow and myopic 
perspective to more expansive conceptualisations that have allowed for a better 
understanding of the different forms and functioning of decentralised institutions.  
 
One area where there clearly has been agreement is the perception of autonomy as 
a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. Since freedom is not absolute, we 
refer to relative degrees of autonomy, with agencies being autonomous relative to 
other organisations and to the parent ministry.  Hence we can array entities along a 
spectrum (ter Bogt, 1999; Kidd and Crandall, 2006), or on an autonomy-
integration/autonomy-centralisation continuum (Brooke, 1984; Halligan, 2004; 
Thynne and Wettenhall 2004:619, Bach and Jann, 2010:449). At one end are 
agencies fully integrated into the departmental hierarchy bounded by conditions over 
which they have little control (determinism); and at the other, are organisations 
                                               
14
 Despite the opprobrious or negative connotations usually attached to this word in the public administration 
literature, implying waste, red tape and inefficiency, the term is being applied throughout this study in a neutral 
sense as a synonym for the words organisational, agency, or administrative. 
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positioned at high degrees of arms-length operating according to almost unrestricted 
choice (voluntarism) (Lundquist, 1987).  
 
According to Christensen (1999), looking at autonomy in this manner is the only way 
in which it is possible to grasp the rich empirical variation in Western European 
public administration. Similarly the argument about the need to move away from and 
reject implicitly binary classifications that seek to label organisational forms in terms 
of being, for example, centralised/decentralised, dependent/autonomous, and 
instead try to tease apart the specific meanings and connotations of these terms, 
and by so doing develop an awareness of the existence of gradations or levels, and 
any potential pathologies (Flinders 2008:7). Of importance, therefore, is not only the 
presence/absence of autonomy, but also the shape of bureaucratic autonomy that 
matters (Beblavý, 2009).  
 
Traditionally, autonomy was viewed as uni-dimensional, with the focus centred 
solely on formal legal status. Writing on central bank independence, Cukierman 
(1995:371) notes the importance of legal status as an indicator of the degree of 
independence which legislators meant to confer on the institution, i.e. the type of 
decisions the executive leadership is entitled to take and to whom it is to report on 
such matters. Mascarenhas (1972:71) referred to this as the agencys ascribed 
autonomy, the initial delineation of the domain of action, the boundary or points at 
which the organisation and the government would interact, as spelled out in statutes 
or articles of association.  
 
But formal measures of autonomy only tell part of the story. Not only does such a 
focus ignore the multi-dimensional character of this phenomenon, it also overlooks 
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the existence of a temporal dimension. In addition, it erroneously presents as 
axiomatic a correspondence between formal bureaucratic autonomy granted to 
agencies and the real autonomy exercised by these entities in practice. This 
warrants the need for a broadening of our conceptual thinking from this coarse-
grained to a more fine-grained perspective on autonomy (Young and Tavares, 
2004:231).  
 
Not surprising, therefore, is the more recent shift in contemporary thinking. On the 
subject of dimensions, a number of typologies of bureaucratic/institutional autonomy 
have emerged (see e.g. Berdhal, 1990; Bresser-Pereira, 2004; Christensen, 1999; 
Kohtamaki, 2003; McGrath, 2001). Such typologies distinguish between dimensions 
such as legal, financial, strategic and operational autonomy. In one of the most 
developed typologies to date, Verhoest et al (2004) distinguish between six non-
overlapping dimensions of autonomy (legal, structural, financial, policy, managerial 
and interventional), grouped according to those factors which provide an 
organisation with its decision-making competencies, and those which serve to shield 
or exempt the organisation from constraints on the actual use of such competencies. 
 
Some researchers have also attempted to identify which of these dimensions are 
the most germane to improved organisational performance. Financial autonomy is 
often cited as carrying relatively more weight in permitting the organisation to 
achieve its goals and objectives (Mascarenhas, 1972; Kidd and Crandall, 2006). 
Giving managers the scope to experiment with resource allocation and financing 
might help ease the problems associated with fiscal centralisation, such as the 
irregularity of budgetary transfers and associated disruptions in paying suppliers 
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(Khaleghian and Das Gupta, 2005). Also added as being critical to the autonomy 
profile are other dimensions of personnel autonomy and governance mechanisms. 
By helping organisations to rise above public sector norms (ibid) and managers to 
develop a positive organisational climate (Grindle,1997), a certain degree of 
autonomy in personnel matters is an important precondition for performance 
improvement. 
 
Also important in the autonomy discourse is the issue of temporal dimension  
autonomy is not static but dynamic in its operation. Moe (1995:146) contends that 
choices made in the formative round of decision-making can be reversed or 
modified  [b]attles lost today can be won tomorrow, and vice versa. Likewise there 
is the argument about the tendency to view the process of decentralisation as a one-
off event that transfers power at one time and in one quantity to the new institutional 
location (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002). Failure to take into account these real life 
changes that occur over time results in a masking of the dynamic relationship of 
changing powers between the centre and the periphery. 
 
Equally noteworthy is the understanding that autonomy is not so much a legal 
characteristic as a real practice (Batley, 1999). Commanding recent and even more 
widespread attention is the issue of potential dissimilarities between the formal 
theoretical autonomy granted by law and the agencies practical/real/(f)actual 
(Yesilkagit, 2004; Bouckaert and Peters, 2004; Bach and Jann, 2010) exercise of 
autonomy. In their study of semi-autonomous public sector organisations, Yesilkagit 
and van Thiel (2008) found no linear relationship between the organisations formal 
and de facto autonomy. Understanding of the law and observation of legal 
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functioning leads us to the realisation that even though laws are explicit, they are 
incomplete. Laws are incapable of specifying, under all contingencies, the limits of 
authority between central/political authorities and the bureaucracy.Given that 
autonomy enhancing elements have proven far easier to legislate than to realise in 
practice (Joshi and Ayee, 2009), this distinction between formal and factual 
autonomy is an important aspect (Ziegele: 1998:2). 
 
In their examination of state cultural policy executed by the autonomous Swedish 
Foundation Culture of the Future (FCF), Predelli and Baklien (2003) vividly capture 
the essence of the interplay between formal autonomy and institutional constraints, 
and the resulting factual autonomy that emerges from such interaction. Figure 2.3 is 
a modified version of their graphic illustration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Autonomy/State Dependence Field of Tension 
 
Source: Adapted from Predelli and Baklien, 2003:p.302 
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The authors speak of a field of tension (ibid:203) resulting from mixed pressures 
created by forces pulling in the opposite direction of political independence and 
institutional autonomy on the one hand, and political control and state dependence 
on the other. Such forces, they argue, work to reduce FCFs actual institutional 
autonomy in formulating and implementing cultural goals. Predelli and Baklien draw 
our attention to the fact that, even though these forces can serve as potential 
constraints, they can under different circumstances provide opportunities for action. 
Constraints arise, for example, when central government takes decisions in matters 
which it has previously delegated.  
 
Note, however, the argument presented by Rhodes (1999) that constraints can be 
self-imposed. A party may not realise it has room for manoeuvre or, it may decide 
not to take advantage of whatever discretion it has. This idea Elsig (2011) aptly 
captures in his argument that while autonomy differs, it is important to assess how 
agents read their mandate and define their role. Understanding the reading of the 
role is pivotal in order to explain the different approaches chosen by agents to 
exercise their autonomy. Also important is the argument that what matters is not 
always autonomy as such, but the way in which autonomy is perceived. Lægreid et 
al (2008) opine that, even if managers perceived autonomy does not accurately 
reflect the actual level, perceptions matter because they guide the managers 
actions and because they have a symbolic function. Such assessments may result, 
for example, in the agencys use of certain non-legal powers and its exercise of 
informal autonomy. Researchers refer to such informal means as achieved 
autonomy (Mascarenhas, 1972) or assumed autonomy (Young and Tavares, 2004). 
Carpenter (2001:4) contends that bureaucratic autonomy lies less in fiat than in 
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leverage. Organisations have several avenues for enlarging their scope for decision-
making, through for example, access to channels of political power, 
image/reputation, leadership capabilities, technical capacity, or control over crucial 
information (Hanf, 1978). 
 
These developments in conceptual thinking have allowed for a much broader 
analysis that focuses on autonomy not only in terms of formal legal status, but also 
in terms of the multidimensional, dynamic, factual and informal aspects of this 
phenomenon. Mere form, in other words, can be separated from real substance. 
 
2.5    AUTONOMY AND CONTROL  CONTRADICTION OR TRUISM? 
 
Previously highlighted were the types of regulatory reforms that usually accompany 
operational changes involving an empowerment of the bureaucracy. Operating 
maxims of let managers manage, sitting alongside stronger central control 
characterised by a trajectory of more rules and a strengthening of frame steering  
is currently one of the main governance paradoxes facing public administration and 
modern bureaucracy (Polidano and Hulme, 1999; Goddard and Mannion, 2006; 
Helgoy et al, 2007; Borzillo, 2008; Carboni, 2010). The paradox of managerialism 
(Maor, 1999:5) results in political executives investing in the public administrations 
managerial capital (letting managers manage) and their disinvesting in its political 
capital (i.e giving ministers greater capacity for setting strategic direction and 
strategic priorities). Oft time the outcome is managerial discretion either being 
strangled at birth so that not much autonomy is ever established, or administrative 
freedoms being ceded, but in practice being ambiguous or whittled away over time. 
Hence the argument of this duality of autonomy and control seeming logical when 
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considered in isolation, but irrational, inconsistent and absurd when juxtaposed 
(Gilbert and Sutherland, 2013). 
 
For autonomy to prevail, the issue therefore seems to remain one of achieving 
balance  balancing the control necessary for a united strategy with sufficient 
autonomy to foster initiative and responsiveness.  Denton and Flinders (2006:66) 
argue that, from a political perspective, the main issue revolves around how to 
reconcile the centrifugal pressures of delegated governance with the centripetal and 
in many ways centralising logic of ministerial responsibility. Likewise, for Lægreid et 
al (2008), the challenge is to find ways of making agency autonomy and democratic 
accountability complementary and mutually reinforcing, rather than competing 
values. It is about how to make agency independent and at the same time 
accountable both upwards to politicians, horizontally to other agencies and 
downwards to clients and citizens. Achieving such a balance can be difficult and 
ambiguous, particularly if the issue has a redistributive character (Lægreid et al, 
2005). 
 
Focusing on the applicability of autonomy within the various policy areas, each type 
of service, it is argued, will have its own balance (Khaleghian and Das Gupta, 2005). 
For some, such as law enforcement and licensing, where conformity and 
consistency are essential, managerial autonomy may need to be circumscribed. But 
for others, e.g. investigating health hazards, providing health education and 
mobilising community partnerships, moderately widening the scope of authority can 
promote the adaptation of services to local circumstances, without compromising the 
essential integrity of the function or impeding the need for consistency in these 
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areas. Similarly the type of argument advanced by Caulfield et al (2006:2, emphasis 
added):  
 
high levels of organisational autonomy may work well for the economic 
activities of the government, including revenue collection, while some 
traditional public services in the public sector, such as police and regulation, 
are perhaps less amenable to that degree of autonomy. 
 
 
A quick examination of some empirical evidence will help shed light on outcomes in 
some of the policy areas where reforms were undertaken.  
 
2.6    AUTONOMY AND CONTROL  SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO DATE  
  
Research findings on the capacity of agencies to exercise ascribed powers to act 
autonomously have shown mixed results. Managers within Norwegian regulatory 
agencies perceived that, relative to other agencies, they were subjected to stronger 
controls and audit by both executive and legislative bodies such as their parent 
Ministry, the Finance Ministry, parliaments ombudsman, and the mass media 
(Lægreid et al, 2005). In Hong Kong likewise, regulatory agencies have shown no 
tendency towards factual autonomisation. Public order and safety type work (police, 
immigration, fire service) was found to be negatively and significantly associated 
with managerial autonomy (Painter and Yee (2011). Hong Kongs local context and 
its colonial legacy, where the police played a pivotal role in quelling anti-government 
riots, has contributed to the need for political executives to maintain tight control 
over state security affairs. Turning to fiscal administrative reforms in Anglophone 
Africa and operations within semi-autonomous revenue authorities, there is a strong 
tendency to an absence of factual autonomy. Despite the rhetoric and debate about 
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autonomy, there has been very little loosening of the political and bureaucratic grip 
of central executives over revenue collectors, with Presidents and Ministers of 
Finance still being very much in control (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008:1) 
 
But empirical evidence also reveal cases where freedom to manage is more a 
reality. Talbot and Caulfield (2002) in their preliminary evaluation of the outcomes of 
agency type reforms in the developing and transitional economies of Jamaica, 
Tanzania, and Latvia found evidence of high levels of autonomy within executive 
agencies. Latvian agencies experienced wide-ranging freedoms to operate in a 
businesslike way, even though such freedoms were hardly ever anchored within any 
firm policy or performance framework. In Tanzania, agencies were far more 
autonomous than either the legislation or the textbooks prescribed. Highlighted was 
the case of TANROADS whose use of its ability to make various allocative decisions 
subsequent to its change in legal status led to a ruffling of some feathers in some 
political parts of the government machinery. Similarly in Jamaica, despite autonomy 
in financial management proving problematic and with complaints of the Finance 
Ministrys interference in operational matters, human resource management 
freedoms were extensive, with the Public Service Commission adopting a hands-off, 
light touch approach to agency regulation. 
 
Analysing the case of the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
Almeida and Klinger (2008) concluded that the innovation and entrepreneurship this 
agency demonstrated during the period 1993-2001 under the leadership of James 
Witt clearly met the criteria for bureaucratic autonomy. Rather than confining itself 
to acting only in those areas approved in advance, FEMAs practice of informal 
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autonomy resulted in its setting aside bureaucratic hurdles to do what needed to be 
done. This included performing other non-assigned tasks, as long as these were not 
restricted or prohibited. 
 
In Germany, a survey of 122 federal agencies showed that overall agencies 
perceived that they had a lot of bureaucratic discretion, particularly with regard to 
implementation autonomy. Where agencies felt substantial constraints was with 
regard to administrative decisions (financial and human resources management) 
caused by budgetary law and public service regulations. Agencies were therefore 
generally more autonomous regarding policy implementation (outputs) compared to 
administrative processes (inputs and throughputs) (Bach and Jann, 2010). 
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter focused on administrative decentralisation and autonomisation as part 
of the new public management approach to public sector reform. Presented were 
pertinent theoretical models that help us to understand the dilemmas inherent in 
public sector hierarchical relationships and the issues which need to be confronted.  
Structural and operational changes undertaken in the interest of efficiency and 
quality service delivery, coupled with the need to maintain political accountability 
create a dilemma for policymakers, the manner of resolve resulting in autonomy and 
control simultaneously co-existing within a single administrative space. A crucial 
question which one might ask therefore, to what extent is it possible to achieve a 
plus sum game? Is autonomy real and substantial, or is it merely superficial and 
rhetorical? 
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Empirical evidence show that whilst in some cases it has been possible to find 
balance between what might appear to be two mutually exclusive variables, in 
others the feat is one not so easily accomplished. What of the case of fiscal 
administrative reforms within revenue agencies? The research makes use of a few 
analytical frameworks to explore a number of the issues highlighted in the chapter, 
including the nature and extent of factual autonomy, the relative importance of the 
various dimensions of autonomy being exercised in practice, as well as the amount 
of leverage achieved through practice of informal autonomy. Conclusions can then 
be drawn on the extent to which these two maxims are able to sit side by side within 
the context of revenue administration. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INFLUENCES ON BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 
 
3.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the so-called paradox of managerialism - the inherent tension 
between delegation and control resulting, in some cases, in a rhetoric of 
administrative discretion and a reality of limited autonomy. If we assume, and both 
the theoretical literature and empirical evidence presented so far makes this 
assumption plausible, that actual autonomy does not necessarily equate with 
formally delegated powers, then the interesting question centres around this 
disconnect between de jure and de facto autonomy. Empirical research would 
provide a set of variables that help to explain why some organisations are more 
autonomous than others. Are differences to be explained by enterprise-specific 
characteristics intrinsic to an organisation, or rather on the basis of extrinsic 
environmental factors? Is it a case of both internal as well as external factors at 
play?  
 
Various researchers argue the dangers of approaching the issue of organisational 
change and the impact of organisational change initiatives purely from an internal 
perspective (Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Friedlander and Pickle, 1968; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Kotter, 1979; Grindle, 1997, Wunsch, 1999). The model of the lonely 
organisation that determines and implements policy in isolation is obsolete 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004), if indeed it ever existed. Organisations do not exist in a 
vacuum; they are created in an institutional order that is already in place (Hall and 
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Taylor, 1996; Yesilkagit, 2004). Their embeddedness within superordinate and 
ongoing systems of social relations (Granovetter 1992) means that their ability to 
function is affected by the broader contexts within which they operate. There is thus 
a need to look outside the box, beyond organisational boundaries to analyse 
important contextual factors. 
 
Any analysis of change, such as structural disaggregation and autonomisation, must 
therefore take account of the environment of the organisation by including as part of 
its focus various contextual and institutional factors. This study will therefore adopt 
an institutional approach to the subject of influences on the practice of bureaucratic 
autonomy, drawing on both resource dependency theory and institutional theory. An 
institutional analysis lends itself well to capturing the dynamics of politico-
administrative relationships. The rationale for combining two different theories stems 
from this authors agreement with the argument that organisational phenomena is 
far too complex to be described adequately by any single theoretical approach, and 
that current studies on organisation stand to benefit from a combination of 
perspectives that provide more complete explanations of the behaviours under study 
(Tolbert, 1985). 
 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature on these issues. 
 
3.2  CONCEPTUALISING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
During late 1970s, a revolutionary change occurred in thinking about organisations. 
The traditional closed system model regarded the organisation as sufficiently 
independent to allow most of its problems to be analysed with reference to its 
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internal structure and without reference to its external environment (Emery and Trist 
1981:322-323). Open systems thinking directs our attention to the fact that all 
organisations are incomplete and depend on a throughput of resources from the 
external environment as a condition for system survival. The relation between 
organisations and their environments is part of a well-established literature on inter-
organisational analysis and inter-governmental relations (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Aldrich, 1979; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Rhodes, 
1988, 1999; Meyer and Scott, 1983).  
 
Several early models were developed to specify the boundaries of organisational 
environments. In one conceptualisation known as the organisational set (Evan, 
1966; Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), the environment is viewed in 
terms of other organisations with which the organisation engages in direct exchange 
relations. The organisation that is the point of reference is the focal organisation.  
The resource dependence model is commonly used to describe the nature of 
exchanges within this unit of analysis. In another form of delineation, the inter-
organisational field (Warren, 1967; Turk, 1970) consists of an aggregate of 
organisations forming networks of relations. The model focuses on horizontal 
linkages that arise among a diverse set of organisations sharing a common 
geographical locality such as a metropolitan area or an urban community. 
Propositions from exchange theory and network theory are commonly employed 
when focusing on this level of analysis.  
 
 
Later models have also emerged to define the boundaries of environments (see e.g. 
Di Maggio and Powel, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1991). The organisational field of 
DiMaggio and Powel (ibid:148), for example, includes those organisations that, in 
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the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organisations that 
produce similar services or products.  
 
Proceeding past the definitional boundaries of an organisation, researchers also 
sought to develop concepts which capture the ways in which the environment 
impacts on the different facets of organisational functioning. One dimension, the 
technical environment or task network (Dess and Beard, 1984; Grindle and 
Hilderbrand, 1995: Larbi, 2005), focusing at the meso-level of organisational 
functioning, encompasses those issues and actors involved in the completion of 
organisational tasks. A second dimension, the institutional environment (Rowan, 
1982; Tolbert, 1985; Carroll and Huo, 1986; Scott, 2003), focused at the macro level 
of organisational functioning, involves strategic issues largely unrelated to task 
completion and task performance.  
 
The following sections review the literature on the technical and institutional 
environments of organisations and the theories related to these concepts. 
 
3.3  THE TASK NETWORK (TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT) AND RESOURCE 
DEPENDENCY THEORY 
 
 
The concept of a task environment, used to describe factors directly related to the 
work of the organisation was defined by Dill (1958:410) in his seminal article as that 
part of the total environment potentially relevant to goal setting and goal 
attainment. Special emphasis is placed on variables characterising elements or 
dimensions of the input and output streams of the work flow process. 
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Within empirical research, the task environment (Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995; 
Larbi, 2005) is conceptualised from the perspective of a focal organisation, focusing 
on those organisations which make a difference to the organisation in question. In 
his study of environmental influences on two Norwegian business firms, Dill (1958) 
described the task environment of the organisations as comprising four major 
elements: customers (both distributors and users), suppliers (of materials, labour, 
equipment, capital, and work space), competitors (for both markets and resources) 
and regulatory groups (government agencies, unions, and inter-firm associations). 
The task environment itself was treated as the flow of information perceived by 
organisational members.  
 
No two task environments are identical. Factors such as the requirements of the 
technology, the boundaries of the domain, and the composition of the larger 
environment, are all important in determining which individuals or which aggregate 
of organisations constitute the task environment for a particular organisation 
(Thompson (1967). Thompson further argues that the task environments of complex 
organisations are usually multifaceted and pluralistic. Pluralism arises because 
several kinds of inputs required for task completion come under the jurisdiction of 
different state agencies, and from the fact that there exist alternative places for 
output disposal. As a consequence, such organisations are involved in exchanges 
with not one, but several elements within its task environment. 
 
Concepts similar to task environment have been used to describe this dimension of 
the organisations environment. Distinguishing between technical and institutional 
environments, Scott and Meyer (1991) argue that some organisations depend more 
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on achieving high standards of efficient internal production than meeting external 
standards. The environment of such organisations, which are viewed primarily as 
technical production systems, includes various material resource-based features 
such as sources of information and stocks of resources needed for task completion.  
 
Focusing on the technical or task environment and linked to this notion of the 
criticality of inputs into the production function, the resource dependency model 
(Levine and White, 1961; Thompson, 1967; Aldrich 1976, 1979; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Salancik, 1979) explains organisational behaviour in situations of dependency 
and the exchange of scarce resources. The model proceeds from the premise that 
increased differentiation and specialisation has lessened the possibility of 
organisational self-sufficiency and increased inter-organisational dependencies. 
Rhodes (1988) argues that governments are more and more confronted with tasks 
where both the problems and their solutions tend to cut across boundaries of 
separate authorities and functional jurisdictions. Organisations become dependent 
upon each other because their paradigms are connected in some way - dependence 
growing out of domain intersection. Given this state of interconnectedness and 
dependency, organisations are therefore forced to enter into transactions and 
relations with other elements in the environment to supply necessary resources. The 
organisations primary function establishes its need for exchange elements, as well 
as its capacity to make certain kinds of elements available to other organisations. 
 
The fact that organisations are dependent on their environment is not in itself the 
problem (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Were all essential elements in infinite supply 
and continually available, there would be no cause for concern. The problem 
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emerges from the uncertainty and unpredictability of the environment, caused by 
multiple and competing demands on scarce and valuable resources. 
 
The nature of the resources required by organisations are variously described in the 
literature. For Benson (1975), two basic types of resource, money and authority, are 
central to organisational functioning. Money is important for running programmes, 
the recruitment and retention of personnel and the purchase of capital equipment. 
Authority refers to the legitimisation of activities, and the right and responsibility to 
carry out various programmes. Given money and authority, other needed 
commodities can be acquired. Rhodes (1999) suggests a more differentiated list of 
five types of resource underpinning central-local government interactions  
constitutional legal resources (powers allocated by statute and constitutional 
convention), financial resources, political resources (access to decision making in 
other government units), informational resources (information and expertise 
possessed by actors), and hierarchical resources (the authority to issue commands 
and to require compliance). Gill (2003) advances a similar list. The resources of an 
organisation include capital, people, infrastructure, technology, information, legal 
authority and goodwill. The actors who mediate these resources make up the 
ecological niche surrounding the organisation (Jacobs 1974: 46), which has been 
collectively referred to as the organisations enabling system (Mascarenhas, 
1972:66).  
 
No two firms will have the exact same pattern of resource flows (Scott, 1991). 
Dependency is not necessarily symmetrical or unidirectional. The reciprocal nature 
of dependence is reflected in resource elements flowing from one organisation to 
another, in exchange for other resources. Scharpf (1978) argues that in the real 
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world, unilateral dependence may be less frequent, and mutual dependence more 
the case, than an inspection of formal hierarchical authority or even of material 
resource flows might suggest.  
 
Thompson (1967:30) argued that an organisation is dependent on some element of 
its task environment 1) in proportion to the organisations need for resources or 
performance which that element can provide, and 2) in inverse proportion to the 
ability of other elements to provide the same resources or performance. Based on 
these definitions, we can establish those factors which determine the degree of 
dependence or vulnerability of an organisation. These include the discretion over 
resource allocation and use by another actor; the importance of the resource (its 
criticality to input or output flows, its substitutability, as well as the magnitude of the 
exchange); the concentration of the resource control (the availability of alternate 
suppliers plus the cost of switching); as well as the level of resource dependence in 
the other direction (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These factors together determine 
the dependence of an organisation on any given group or organisation.  
 
 
3.4    THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
 
Up to the mid-1970s the task network or technical environment continued to 
command the attention of researchers. Recognition that organisations were not just 
technical but also political, social and cultural systems called attention to the 
importance of the institutional environment of organisations (Scott 2003).  
 
According to North (1990), institutions are human devised constraints, rules of the 
game, that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both 
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formal constraints (constitutions, laws, rules), informal constraints (norms of 
behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. The concept of the institutional environment refers to those 
institutional elements which invariably, come from outside of the organisation, and 
which usually causes change within the origanisation. Zucker (1987) argues that 
positions, policies, programmes, and procedures of modern organisations are 
manifestations of powerful institutional rules. Organisations become a passive 
audience for institutional knowledge, because the rules are formed in the state or 
even world system, external and hierarchically superior to the organisation 
(ibid:450). Much broader in scope therefore than the technical environment, the 
institutional environment articulates the whole organisation in the broader society 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984).  Institutional environments can therefore constrain or 
facilitate the accomplishment of particular tasks (Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995).  
 
Scott (1991) warns of the dangers of viewing technical and institutional 
environments as dichotomous alternatives. The distinction, he argues, is at best 
analytic, and at worst misleading. Institutional features shape and frame several 
aspects of technical components. Although technical forces were the obvious focus 
of attention in earlier periods, it is not the case that such forces have given way to 
institutional forces. Both institutional and technical forces appear across 
contemporary organisational domains (Scott, 2003). All organisations, to one degree 
or another, are embedded within both relational and institutional context.  Thus we 
can conceive of a continuum along which organisations can be ordered (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
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Pharmaceuticals 
General Manufacturing 
Restaurants 
Health Clubs 
Child Care 
Mental health clinics 
Schools; Legal Agencies 
Churches 
Utilities 
Banks 
General Hospitals 
Revenue Authorities 
  
 
Stronger 
 
  Technical 
  Controls 
       
 
Weaker 
 
Institutional Controls 
 
       Stronger   Weaker 
Scott (1992) cross-classified the two dimensions, technical and institutional, 
according to the strength and weakness of each environment, and provided 
illustrations of types of organisations according to the varying degrees of technical 
and institutional controls. Figure 3.1 is an adapted version of Scotts classification. 
Most manufacturing and other commercial organisations operate in environments 
characterised by strong technical but weak institutional controls. Whilst they confront 
pressures such as health and safety requirements and other regulatory controls, the 
majority of pressures stem from the need to compete effectively on the basis of 
criteria such as price and quality. General hospitals operate within both strong 
technical and institutional environments, having to respond to demands for cost 
containment, improved outputs and outcomes, along with strong institutional 
pressures from outside professional bodies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3.1: Classifying Organisations according to Environments 
          Source: Adapted from Scott 1992:133 
 
 
Schools systems operate in weaker technical but stronger institutional environments 
because of their sensitivity to normative standards developed externally (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977, Rowan 1982). However, given the more recent developments within 
the education sector, this characterisation of schools is seen as no longer accurate 
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(Kelly, 1998). Kelly argues that an evolutionary metamorphosis is taking place within 
school systems as a result of public demands for schools to be more technically 
productive and more accountable. Technical productivity is assessed based on 
outputs of student learning and competitive student success  
 
This author posits that revenue authorities operate within both strong technical and 
institutional environments. As organisations which combine complex technologies 
with a strong public good component (revenue collection and law enforcement), 
these organisations face demands to collect government duties and taxes efficiently 
and effectively, and at the same time are subject to a range of normative pressures 
from external referents or stakeholders (A fuller description of such pressures is 
provided at Section 3.8). Figure 3.1 was therefore modified to show where the 
revenue authority is felt to be situated within this classification scheme. 
 
Attending to deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure, institutional 
theoretical claims therefore emphasise the point that something identified at a higher 
level is used to explain processes and outcomes at a lower level of analysis 
(Amenta and Ramsay, 2010). Institutional theories, despite differing focal areas, 
seek to provide answers not only to questions of how and why institutions originate, 
but equally important how they persist, change or perish over time. 
 
3.5 THE ORGANISATIONS INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Whilst both technical and institutional environments have been shown as important 
issues for consideration in analyses of organisational functioning, this author 
proposes another dimension of environment  the internal organisational 
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environment  as likewise worthy of examination. The importance of organisational 
factors and their influence on bureaucratic autonomy cannot be denied. Internal 
factors were found to be the most important of all the hypothesized variables as the 
main source of subsidiary strength in a study of Danish foreign-owned companies 
(Forsgren et al, 1999). Figure 3.2 provides some indication of the environment of the 
organisation as defined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The Internal Organisational Environment 
                                              Source: Scott 1992:16 
 
Included within the organisational environment are factors such as the social 
structure or aspects of the relationships that exist between individuals as 
participants within the organisation, organisational goals as well as the technologies 
used for the completion of organisational tasks.  This dimension, along with the 
technical and institutional environments all create a unified environmental system 
within which the organisation operates. Figure 3.3 is the authors conceptualisation 
of this environment as explained. To briefly summarise, at the centre is the internal 
environment of the organisation incorporating a set of elements such as its 
structures and systems, resource availability, as well as knowledge and expertise 
which result in its overall internal capacity. Immediately surrounding this core is the 
task network or technical environment where resource dependency plays a critical 
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role. These two sub-elements are immersed within a broader institutional 
environment, which includes factors both at the national and supranational levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The Institutional Environment of the Organisation 
 
Having reviewed the literature, and presented the arguments, the relevant research 
questions posed at the end of Chapter 1 can again be restated: 
 
RQ1: What are the factors that condition15 levels of bureaucratic autonomy? 
Based on the arguments presented, the following hypothesis is advanced: 
 
H1: Factors within the agencys broader institutional environment are more likely to 
condition levels of autonomy than factors within its internal or task network 
environments. 
 
                                               
15
 The term condition is used to connote the potential for a factor to act as a constraint or as an opportunity for 
action in the exercise of bureaucratic discretion. 
* Internal factors bundle to collectively give the organisation its source of strength or overall capability. 
BROADER INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
   ORGANISATIONS INTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT / 
TASK NETWORK 
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Focusing on each of these environments in turn  technical, institutional and internal 
 the remainder of this chapter presents those conditioning factors to be 
investigated as part of the study. The factors which have been selected as relevant 
to this study and discussed in the following three sections have been gleaned from a 
wide and varied literature (Mascarenhas, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Sexty, 
1980; Rourke, 1984: Lioukas et al, 1993; Ziegele, 1998; Larbi, 2005; Christensen, 
1999; Taggart and Hood, 1999; Carpenter, 2001; Gill, 2003; Ordorika, 2003; Pollitt 
et al, 2004; Cribb and Gewirtz, 2007; dAlmeida and Klinger, 2008; Bach and Jann, 
2010; Carboni, 2010). 
 
3.6  CONDITIONING FACTORS WITHIN THE INTERNAL ORGANISATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Limitations on bureaucratic autonomy stem from factors related to the way in which 
organisations operate and bureaucrats behave within their own habitat (Rourke, 
1984). Several factors exist within the internal life of the bureaucracy itself which 
have the potential to impact on levels of autonomy. This section examines some of 
those factors, namely the organisations structures and processes and its control 
over resources. 
 
 3.6.1    STRUCTURES & SYSTEMS  
 
Managing a performance-based contract system is very different from managing a 
more traditional authority-based system (Kettl, 1997). Operating within a 
decentralised environment with delegated roles and responsibilities, organisations 
must therefore have in place proper structures and systems to enable it to function 
as an autonomous unit. Larbi (1998a) emphasises the importance of planning, 
  
92 
 
budgeting, management, and administrative systems. These will include, for 
example, strategic planning and strategic management systems, financial 
information and control systems, as well as systems for measuring, monitoring and 
evaluating performance. There will also be a need for appropriate technologies to 
support the functioning of the various systems. Failure to demonstrate capacity in 
crucial areas of the organisations functioning may result in external attempts at 
control and a subsequent loss of organisational autonomy.  
 
At the level of the organisation is the required capacity for undertaking new roles 
such as financial management (including procurement, contract management and 
asset management), human resources management, as well as performance 
management. The weak capacity for financial management and accountability was 
shown to exist within decentralised units such as the teaching hospitals in the 
Ghana health system (Larbi, 1998b).  
 
 3.6.2    CONTROL OVER RESOURCES  
 
The capacity of an organisation to act autonomously is partly a function of the 
degree of immediate control over its resources. The availability, adequacy, 
timeliness and continuity of resource flows will allow for organisational flexibility to 
actually use its powers of discretion.  
 
Carruthers (1994) argues that insofar as an organisation depends on a single 
uncertain source for critical resources, it lacks autonomy and its actions can be 
constrained. Conversely, if direct control over critical resources is established, an 
organisation can increase its autonomy. Hence, where decentralised units are 
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forced to rely on government funds, either through direct payments (parliamentary 
appropriations using the public expenditure management and budget decision 
process of government), or through subsidisation, there is a reduced likelihood of 
organisational independence. Conversely, organisations that operate on user fees, 
or money from trust funds may enjoy greater freedom than those organisations 
which operate through government funding. The same argument may hold for 
organisations, such as public corporations, which have authority to raise financial 
resources, or to borrow on the financial market without the need for government 
guarantees. Proponents of percentage-of-collection funding for revenue authorities 
argue that such methods of financing insulate the authorities from the vagaries of a 
sub-optimal budgeting process, wherever such inefficiencies exist (Gill, 2003). 
Rourke (1984) sums up the argument nicely. No matter how broad an agencys 
formal authority, its real power ultimately turns on its fiscal resources. The range of 
services any agency can provide is ultimately determined by the money which it is 
allocated and authorised to spend.  
 
Where organisations have a greater degree of control over their HR regime 
(establishment of posts, staffing, pay and grading, promotions and dismissals), their 
dependence on other central co-ordinating agencies will be reduced and their 
powers to accomplish identified goals greatly enhanced. Not only does direct control 
over resources increase the potential for bureaucratic autonomy, organisations will 
be even less constrained where they have the authority to reconfigure resources as 
appropriate, for example by altering the resource mix in response to emerging 
priorities.  
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3.6.3    ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY   
 
Factors such as efficient and effective internal structures and processes, power over 
resource acquisition and resource allocation, all provide the organisation with an 
overall internal capacity to function autonomously. Forsgren et al (1999) argue that 
such productive bundles of routines of a highly tacit and social nature can be 
labelled organisational capabilities and serve as sources of organisational strength. 
Within a public sector setting, such capabilities may be a source of bureaucratic 
strength as well as an explanatory variable which explains relative levels of 
bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
3.7  CONDITIONING FACTORS WITHIN THE TASK NETWORK (TECHNICAL) 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
This section discusses factors within the task network or technical environment of 
the focal organisations which may serve to condition the practice of autonomy. 
 
3.7.1    RESOURCE DEPENDENCE   
 
Decentralised units depend on other actors within the task network or enabling 
environment for resources (revenue, staff appointments, political legitimacy) to 
facilitate task accomplishment. Without access to adequate and continuous 
resources agencies will find it difficult to accomplish organisational objectives. 
Section 3.3 examined the linkages between power, dependence and resource flows. 
Insofar as the organisation depends on a single uncertain source within the 
technical environment for critical and non-substitutable resources, its powers of self-
determination can be constrained depending on the behaviours of the source(s) of 
resource flows.  
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Various researchers have written about the common fate of the focal organisation in 
the face of financial dependence. Wunsch (2001:279) refers to the repetitive 
budgeting game, a strategy pursued by the national Ministry of Finance and 
Treasury in most less developed countries in order to keep control of spending. The 
process is characterised by repeated approval of expenditures, arbitrary denial of 
access to already authorised and approved funds, as well as delays in the release of 
funding. Such practices impact negatively on the capacity of the focal organisation 
to act. Public expenditure management systems within the Caribbean region are 
projected in the same light, typified by erratic and uncertain resource flows (World 
Bank, 1996). Despite the amounts agreed for spending in annual estimates of 
expenditure, actual spending patterns fail to match negotiated amounts. Likewise, in 
Africa and Latin America, more often than not, semi-autonomous revenue 
authorities receive less than the due statutory funding level (Taliercio, 2004). 
 
Section 3.3 also highlighted the danger of examining the power-dependence 
relationship from the viewpoint solely of the focal organisation. Rhodes (1988), 
writing on central-local government relations, advances a valid argument on the 
issue of dependence which is equally applicable to centre-peripheral relations within 
decentralised arrangements. The centre has a monopoly of legal resources and, if 
not a monopoly, then the preponderant share of financial and political resources. 
The non-financial controls of the centre include direction, as well as inspection and 
political controls over the way sub-central government conducts its affairs.  
 
In some instances, instead of a relationship with the government as a single unified 
entity, the principal becomes fragmented and the organisation is confronted with a 
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diverse set of influences. Splitting authority among several principals is of little 
consequence if the principals objectives are all aligned (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). 
However, this is often not the case, as multiple principals, many if not all with claims 
of political legitimacy (Waterman and Meier, 1998), compete to extend their area of 
influence into the workings of the organisation (Mascarenhas, 1972). For the 
Finance Ministry and the Treasury, as key actors in the macro management of the 
economy, major concerns will centre on the scarcity of government resources, their 
allocation and the monitoring of their use.  Some decentralised organisations may 
be able to mitigate network difficulties and shield themselves from  interventions by 
these various central principals (Larbi, 2005). Agency autonomy may therefore be 
enhanced or reduced by the multiplicity of principals.  
 
3.7.2    CAPACITY OF THE CENTRE 
 
 Certain behavioural and psychological conditions are needed to support successful 
decentralisation (Rondinelli, 1981). The ability of agencies to function as semi-
autonomous bodies will involve parent departments and central agencies 
undertaking new roles and their building the necessary capacities to fill such roles. 
Adoption of the New Public Management approach would involve a shift away from 
attitudes and behaviours that are centrist, control-oriented and paternalistic, towards 
those that support and facilitate the exercise of administrative discretion. Whilst 
vertical control linkages will include mechanisms for regulating and monitoring, 
support linkages will focus on the provision of necessary planning, programming, 
logistical, personnel and budget resources needed by the decentralised units.  
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Reorientation into these more supportive roles requires the building of necessary 
capacities to fill these roles. As a parent to a new agency, a ministry needs to 
possess certain capacities and to use those capacities to take certain specific 
actions (Pollitt, 2002: 15). Larbi (1998b) identifies some of these capacities required 
by parent departments, namely the capacity to manage central support services, the 
capacity for resource allocation, as well as the capacity to develop performance 
agreements and monitoring systems.  
 
Changes in attitudes and behaviours on the part of central government officials can 
sometimes, however, be difficult to achieve. Where administrative linkages do exist, 
they tend to be predominantly top-down control processes rather than channels of 
mutually beneficial, co-operative and reciprocal interaction (Rondinelli, 1981). The 
inadequacy of public expenditure management systems in many countries and the 
impact of lack of stable resource flows on the autonomous functioning of the 
bureaucracy is repeatedly highlighted (Taliercio, 2004a; Gill, 2000). Metcalfe and 
Richards (1998) comment on the behaviours of parent departments. Too many 
resources which should be at the disposal of line management have been deployed 
by the centre to monitor departmental compliance with centrally defined standards. 
Dominated by its need to control inputs, the Treasury is criticised for concerning 
itself with too many aspects of agency operations, inhibiting their freedom of action 
and spirit of enterprise (Pliatzsky, 1992:562). What is therefore required of central 
actors is the development of an enabling technical environment that allows 
managers the actual freedom to manage by making full use of their formal 
autonomous powers (Batley and Larbi, 2004). 
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3.8    CONDITIONING FACTORS WITHIN THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
This section focuses on factors at both the national and international levels within 
the broader institutional environment which serve as potential opportunities or 
constraints for the exercise of bureaucratic discretion. Examined are the factors of 
interest group participation, the legal-administrative framework, legal tradition, and 
system of government. The comparatively more detailed treatment of the latter two 
factors serves to lay the groundwork for an ensuing analysis that is intended to 
advance current knowledge on two areas that are currently under-researched in 
current discourse on bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
 
3.8.1    INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION 
 
 The actions of government bureaucracies usually affect several people who, as 
principals, are in a position to influence the organisation.  Many external constituents 
have genuine interests in the functioning of the organisation and will attempt to 
advocate, and if possible, impose their own effectiveness criteria on the organisation 
(Scott, 2003).  
 
Various researchers have examined the influences of specific interest groups on a 
government bureaus exercise of autonomy. Labour unions are important actors for 
many public bureaucracies. By demanding better terms and conditions, including job 
security, generous wages and fringe benefits, unions have the potential to influence 
organisational inputs as well as methods of operation. Strong, hostile, change-
resistant unions can cause serious disruptions in agency operations through their 
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interference in operational human resource issues and their attempts to block 
institutional strengthening initiatives which involves computerisation (Gill, 2000).  
 
The role of donors and their involvement in reform initiatives is an issue often 
highlighted for the pressures which they exert in the furtherance of their interests. 
Whilst international linkages through donor assistance can serve as a resource 
(Egeberg, 1998), they may also act as constraints on organisational functioning. 
Corkery et al (1998) note the marked difference between the role of donor agencies 
in developing agencies and that which they play in developed countries. In the latter, 
external actors are generally invited in by governments as consultants or advisers, 
and government reserves the right to accept or reject their recommendations. In 
developing countries, however, their financing of reform programmes often gives 
them a strong influence on the internal process of change and weakens the power 
of the local managing agency to determine the course and pace of the reform 
programme (ibid: 19). Similarly the argument of Fjeldstad (2005:16) on the issue of 
donor-supported tax administrative reform programmes: 
 
The power of the purse, added with quite definite ideas regarding what sort of 
institutional reforms are desirable, has led donor agencies to take the centre stage 
in the tax administrative reforms in a number of the poorest countries. In theory, 
donors respond to needs identified by client governments, but in practice they 
often identify client needs for them. This was the case when the Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA) was set up by external consultants who arrived with a pre-
fabricated blue-print for tax administrative reforms. 
 
Egeberg (1998) argues that the actual amount of bureaucratic autonomy may 
depend on the nature and extent of corporatist arrangements and the degree to 
which interest groups are accepted as legitimate participants in the policy process. 
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In Norway, up to around 1980, the collegial system of governance resulted in high 
levels of involvement of interest groups in collegial committees. During the 1980s, 
corporatism was to come under pressure as non-socialist governments, influenced 
by New Public Management ideas and neo-liberalism, became highly critical about 
the role of interest organisations in public policy-making, largely because of their 
contribution to public expenditure growth. In terms of the influence of interest 
groups, Egebergs research findings showed that during the period 1976-1996, 
though the views of civil servant unions were not generally considered in areas such 
as planning, budgeting, or co-ordination, a large proportion of central administrators 
considered unions to be important when decisions were being made on personnel 
and organisational issues.  Of greater importance was the significant increase in the 
importance attached to the views of international actors. In fact, with regard to the 
drafting of new legislation, the international environments, in addition to the political 
leadership, imposed the most salient constraints on bureaucratic action. 
 
Dealing with multiple principals and the attempts of various interest groups trying to 
influence the functioning of the organisation, managers will be faced with the task of 
insulating the bureaucracy from these external interests in order to safeguard its 
level of autonomy. 
 
3.8.2   LEGAL-ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Despite their structural autonomy, semi-autonomous bodies may function as part of 
the wider public sector. General public service rules and practices relating to 
planning, budgeting, financial management and accountability are likely to be 
followed by these entities. These rules are the property (Talbot 2002:30) of several 
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actors or central control agencies, including parliaments, supreme audit bodies, 
personnel regulatory bodies (such as Public Service Commissions) as well as 
government itself (for example the Treasury and Finance Ministries).  
 
The World Bank (1996) outlines traditional arrangements within Commonwealth 
Caribbean countries, whereby the Constitutions of these countries establish the 
framework for public financial management. Responsibility and accountability for the 
preparation and macro management of the national budget are placed with the 
minister of finance. In principle, the regular reports of the Accountant General, 
combined with the independent evaluations of the Auditor-General, and the 
oversight of the parliamentary Finance or Accounts Committees could form a 
powerful force for scrutinising and controlling government spending. Constitutions 
also make provision for at least one Public Service Commission (PSC), though 
some countries also have separate Commissions for the police, educational, or 
judicial service. The nature and functioning of the various rules as vested within the 
different central authorities have implications for the exercise of autonomy.  
 
Laws and regulations can also act as potential straitjackets (Blau, 1970) for semi-
autonomous organisations. Central controls over finance and human resource (HR) 
matters may result in organisations being constrained in their ability to procure 
goods and services, to manage finances, to recruit qualified people for critical 
positions and to pay adequate salaries, to adjust HR complements to emerging 
needs and to discipline or dismiss staff. Public service legal provisions and 
governance frameworks were found to have had a negative impact on the 
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operational autonomy of the teaching hospitals in Ghana and the Ghana Water and 
Sewerage Corporation (Larbi, 1998a; 1998b). 
 
 
Gill (2003) highlights the special case of revenue authorities (RAs) which are not 
only affected by wider public service regulations, but also by wider non-tax laws 
within respective national legal systems. Banking laws often prohibit the RA from 
collecting information about financial transactions that may contain evidence of tax 
evasion.  
 
In addition to non-tax laws is the incidence of supranational legislation superimposed 
on top of national laws. Djelic and Quack (2007:180) make reference to national 
systems which, due to their openness, are increasingly nested within higher order 
transnational institutional frameworks, with transnational rule-setting bodies and 
transnational rulemaking shaking and shaping national institutional trajectories. 
National decisions to enter into various agreements or to adhere to certain standards 
might therefore also have implications for autonomous bureaucratic functioning. 
 
The above arguments serve to show that within the wider public sector 
legal/administrative framework, the effectiveness of laws and regulations in terms of 
their clarity in defining roles and facilitating action, as well as their congruence with 
other systems, will affect organisations in their exercise of administrative discretion. 
Not only is it a case of abiding by a set of externally imposed controls; also at issue 
are the consequences of operating within an environment characterised by multiple 
and potentially opposing principals.  
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3.8.3    LEGAL TRADITION 
 
 In every established legal system, the legal past is central to the legal present. Just 
as biological and social processes are constrained by history, the fact that law takes 
different forms and plays different roles across different jurisdictions is largely 
explained by its origin in different legal families or legal traditions (La Porta el al 
1998; Hathaway, 2003). By adding the force of obligation to particular primary rules 
of conduct, traditions may have permanent effects on the rules of the game (Chong 
and Zanforlin, 2000), thereby shaping the aims, measures, interpretations and 
outcomes of public sector reform (Rhodes, 1999). Such arguments suggest that a 
true understanding of the law and its effect on bureaucratic functioning and 
bureaucratic autonomy requires a focus not only on the time free staples of 
modern jurisprudence (Krygier 1986: 239), where the law is viewed solely in terms 
of specific legal outcomes, but also on legal tradition and how this influences law as 
a process or activity. 
 
The issue of legal tradition is often researched from a macro perspective, within the 
field of comparative institutional economics. Current studies focus primarily on the 
impact of legal tradition on economic development; investigating the relationship 
between law, financial development and economic growth16. No research to date, at 
least of which this author is aware, attempts to empirically test at the meso or micro 
levels the impact of legal traditions on bureaucratic functioning and bureaucratic 
autonomy. 
 
                                               
16
 See for example, La Porta et al. 1998, 1999; Chong and Zanforlin, 2000; Beck et al, 2001; Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2002; Ogus, 2004; Hadfield, 2006). 
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Merryman (1985:2) makes a distinction between a legal system and a legal tradition. 
Whereas the former comprises an operating set of legal institutions, procedures and 
rules, the latter he defines as: 
 
a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of 
law, about the role of law in society and the polity, about the proper organization 
and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, 
applied, studied, perfected and taught. 
 
Legal traditions of the world have been classified into three main families, the two 
major being the Romano-Germanic civil law (or civilian) tradition17, and the common 
law tradition. Analyses of the salient differences between these two families 
commonly make use of criteria such as historical origins, the hierarchical source of 
law and treatment of legal materials, legal ideology or philosophy, institutional 
arrangements, legal drafting style, as well as methods of legal reasoning or 
interpretation. After briefly describing the origin and source of law of these traditions, 
the section discusses in greater detail the two areas of legal drafting style, and 
statutory interpretation (part of the wider function of legal reasoning).  
 
These two areas have been singled out for discussion and subsequent empirical 
testing largely because of theoretical arguments which link administrative 
functioning and administrative discretion to factors such as the process of 
rulemaking (OMB Watch, 2009) and the manner of interpretation of legislation 
((Vanistendael, 1996; Lonnquist, 2003). In addition, such factors are relatively more 
amenable to objective data collection than ideological or philosophical factors. 
                                               
17
 Even within the Romano-Germanic tradition, scholars distinguish between the French, German and Nordic 
(Scandinavian) civil law traditions. 
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Before such discussion however, Table 3.1 is used to provide a preview of the major 
differences under the specified categories.  
 
Characteristic Civil Law Common Law 
 
Origin of the Law 
 
Civil Juris 
 
English Common Law 
 
Hierarchical Source of Law Codes at the apex -  precedents of less importance 
Precedents at the apex, plus 
doctrine of stare decisis 
 
 
Legal Philosophy 
 
Supremacy of the State 
 
 
Focus on individual rights 
 
 
Legal Drafting 
 
Fuzzy law (Broad legal 
principles establishing the basic 
framework) 
Fussy Law (Precise details; 
enumeration of specific 
applications/exceptions) 
 
 
Legal Reasoning/Legal 
Interpretation 
Purposive approach to 
interpretation; focus on 
legislative intent/social or 
economic objectives 
 
Adherence to literalism; 
strict/grammatical approach to 
interpretation 
 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Key Distinguishing Characteristics and Differences  
between the Civil and Common Law 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Lee 2005: 240 
 
 
 
3.8.3.1   Origin and Uptake of the Law 
 
Civil or Romano-Germanic law derives from ancient Roman law as codified in the 
Corpus Juris Civilis18 (CJC) of the Byzantine emperor Justinian. With the expansion 
of the Roman Empire and the challenge of governing a diverse population, the need 
arose for a unification of the various far-flung territories. In the 6th century, Justinian 
formed a commission of jurists to compile all existing Roman law into one body that 
would serve to convey the historical tradition, culture and language of Roman law 
throughout the Empire  the result of this enterprise being the CJC.  
 
                                               
18
 The Corpus Juris Civilis, a four-part compilation, included originally the Digest (writings of the classical 
jurists); the Code (early imperial legislation, including laws, decrees and pronouncements); the Institutes (a 
summary of the Digest) and later the Novels (Justinian´s legislation). 
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The English common law tradition dates as far back as the 1066 Norman Conquest 
of England. Prior to this date, judges of the royal court travelled all over the country 
deciding cases which affected the Crown in accordance with the custom of the 
locality from whence the case emanated. Soon after the Conquest, the replacement 
of these local county courts with a centralised system of royal courts at Westminster 
resulted in the unification of English law and a centralisation of justice whereby 
gradually similar cases were decided in a similar way irrespective of differences 
between the local customs involved.  The emergence of a set of legal norms (judge-
made or case law based on precedents) applicable to all parts of the country helped 
lay the foundations for a new comprehensive jurisprudence that replaced the old 
patchwork feudal law of local areas, giving birth to the common law system. 
 
Both traditions have spread throughout the world primarily through conquest or 
colonisation, but also as a result of borrowing or more subtle imitation. Civil law, the 
more widely distributed of the two, is the dominant tradition in most of Western 
Europe. Through colonisation, French civil law was exported to northern and Sub-
Saharan Africa, parts of the near East, Indochina, French Guiana, and the French 
Caribbean Islands. Apart from colonisation, several major jurisdictions, notably 
China, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand, where the need for modernisation or the 
desire to westernise has led to the penetration of European ideas (David and 
Brierley, 1985:73), have adopted systems based either purely or predominantly on 
civil law. Even in some discrete areas of the common law world, for example, 
Louisiana, Quebec and Puerto Rico, the civil law tradition is practised.  English 
common law was initially transplanted from England to many countries around the 
world as a result of colonisation and the dominance of the British Empire during vital 
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periods in world history. Such colonies included the U.S., Canada, Australia, India, 
New Zealand, various countries in Africa, as well as Asia. 
 
 3.8.3.2   Source of Law 
 
In common law countries, case law, a body of principles derived from court 
decisions regulated by the doctrine of precedent (stare decisis), is traditionally 
considered to be the primary source of law. Answers to legal problems are not only 
sought in reported cases analogous with the particular situation at hand, but also the 
rule of stare decisis compels that the decisions of higher courts are legally binding 
on all inferior courts within the same jurisdiction. According to classic theory, 
secondary sources of common law are legislation and custom. Despite such theory, 
however, Sauveplanne (1982:22) argues that statutory law19, by acquiring in more 
recent times the function of stating the aims and objectives of social and economic 
policy and organising their implementation has, to a considerable extent, 
penetrated several areas in systems based upon judge-made law.  
 
In civil law systems, legislative enactments are the primary20 sources of law, 
particularly Civil Codes governing mainly areas of private law and Statutes 
predominately governing public matters. It is primarily on the provisions embodied 
within these enactments from which solutions in particular cases are derived and on 
which the courts base their judgements. Theoretically, jurisprudence plays only a 
minor role within the civilian tradition, as there exists no legal doctrine or principle of 
stare decisis. Whatever the similarities of fact situations, judges are not obliged to 
                                               
19
 Statutory law includes both Statutes or Acts of Parliament, as well as delegated or subordinate legislation, i.e 
rules and regulations made in execution of legislation by different authorities. 
20
 Legislative enactments include the Civil Codes, statutes, decrees of the Executive Power, and administrative 
regulations. 
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render decisions based on preceding cases. In actuality, however, the role and 
influence of judicial precedent in recent times has increased (Merryman 1985, 
Tetley, 99/00). 
 
 3.8.3.3   Legal Drafting Style 
 
It is possible to discern a marked difference in the style of legal drafting used within 
the two traditions. In civilian systems, comprehensive codes covering every area of 
the law and written at a high level of abstraction are complemented by statutes 
drafted in the form of broad or general statements of principles. Civilian practice of 
fuzzy law (Campbell, 1996:1) results in legislation that establishes the mere 
framework of the law, leaving details or the application of general principles to 
specific cases for other mechanisms such as the bureaucracy and the courts to fill 
in.  
 
Common law statutes, on the other hand, tend to be much more detailed and 
elaborate. In common law countries where certainty and precision is prized above all 
else, the use of fussy law (ibid) results in various rules of a statute setting out 
lengthy enumerations of specific applications or exceptions. This incentive to 
micromanage policymaking via legislative statutes is said to stem from one major 
factor  the rule of precedent. The practice of stare decisis and the enlarged scope 
for judicial lawmaking result in great cause for fear on the part of the legislature of 
the enduring effect of judicial decisions on policy. The embedding of policy and 
administrative details in statutes is therefore aimed at tying the hands of judges by 
controlling judicial construction of legislative enactments (Campbell 1996; Huber and 
Shipan, 2002). 
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Whilst difference in drafting style is portrayed here as no superficial matter, it must 
be emphasised that such characterisations are only ideal types. Factors such as the 
politics and practices within a specific country (e.g. legislative attitude towards the 
delegation of lawmaking authority, as well as the nature of the activity and the type 
of people one is seeking to regulate) have given rise to variation within traditions 
and even across policy areas (Campbell, 1996; Thuronyi, 1996; Mikuriya, 2005). 
Sauveplanne (1982), for example, describes the aversion of Latin American 
lawmakers to legislating in broad, general terms. In situations, which in other 
jurisdictions would typically be left to administrators or the judiciary to work out on a 
case-by-case basis, legislators seemingly try to attempt to pre-regulate all possible 
foreseeable aspects of behaviour with detailed and comprehensive laws or decrees. 
 
But is there one best style of legislative drafting? Campbell (1996) argues that 
whereas broad principles or ´fuzzy law´ might be more appropriate to govern private 
relations where there is a high degree of trust, or where there is a clear context and 
a fair degree of consensus on appropriate standards of conduct, detailed ´fussy law´ 
could be retained for fiscal and other public law statutes where it is anticipated that 
attempts might be made to manipulate or evade the law. And what of the 
implications for bureaucratic functioning? Whilst civilian ´fuzzy´ provisions and 
abstract principles provide functionaries with a fair amount of discretion, in cases of 
adjudication, these said principles also provide scope for different judicial 
interpretations. In such instances, bureaucrats may very well emerge the losers 
during reviews of their administrative actions. Under ´fussy´ common law, though 
bureaucrats have little flexibility to manoeuvre as a result of detailed legislation 
which directly determines or affects operational autonomy, prime advantages of 
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specifying in detail the legal rights and duties of citizens, factual circumstances and 
their legal implications, are certainty and foreseeability in the great majority of cases 
(Campbell, 1996). Provided that the law is clear and bureaucrats follow the letter of 
the law, it is hypothesised that most cases are likely to be resolved in their favour. 
Only in circumstances of ambiguity or absence of provisions in the law, 
necessitating judicial discretion and application of the doctrine of stare decisis, will 
bureaucrats in common law systems be put in the same situation as their civilian 
counterparts. 
 
 3.8.3.4   Statutory Interpretation 
 
Legislation is an important source of law in both civil and common law jurisdictions. 
The primordial role attributed to written law (codes and statutes) in countries of the 
Romano-Germanic family was already highlighted. Likewise in the common law 
tradition, there are [now] vast areas of social activity for which the very principles of 
the legal order are to be looked for in legislation (David and Brierley,1985:392).  
 
The problem with legislation is that, despite the need for laws which are clear, 
complete and coherent, legislative practice often falls short of this objective. 
According to Merryman (1985), hardly an article in a typical civil code has escaped 
the need for judicial interpretation to supply a meaning that was unclear to the 
parties, to their counsel, or to the judges themselves. So too in the common law 
tradition judges are not relieved by clear, complete, prescient legislation from the 
necessity of statutory interpretation. The question therefore, is no longer whether 
judges interpret law, but rather how they do so, and whether styles of statutory 
interpretation differ between common law and civil law countries. Even more 
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important, given the nature of this study, is the question as it relates to the 
interpretation of taxing legislation. Are tax statutes interpreted differently within the 
two traditions? If so, what are the implications for the bureaucracy and bureaucratic 
functioning? 
 
Examining the range of options for interpreting legislation, a number of approaches 
are open to the judiciary. Courts may make use of rules of interpretation21, or may 
adopt one of two common and competing approaches - the literal or the purposive 
rules of interpretation. Whereas the literal approach seeks the intention of the 
legislature through an examination of the language or words according to their plain 
or literal meaning, the purposive approach seeks to unearth the overall result sought 
by the legislature. Here a distinction is made between the exegetic method where 
the court examines the travaux préparatoires or legislative history22 to discover 
legislative intent, and the teleological method where the focus is not on the 
intention of the draftsman or the texts historical origin, but on the social objective of 
the piece of legislation, in order to derive a meaning which, at the time, satisfies the 
then current sense of justice. 
 
Under the common law, judges generally follow a textualist approach where the 
meaning of statutes is constructed in a very strict and literal way (Mechlem, 2000; 
Mikuriya, 2005). If the court finds a gap in the statute then recourse is taken to case 
law or decisions applying the provisions of the statute. In several common law 
                                               
21
 A rule may state, for example, that an enactment must be read as a whole, and that special provisions will 
control general provisions. 
22
 In order to discover the legislative history of a law, courts make use of documents such as governments 
statement of reasons for the passage of a Bill; floor debates in the Upper and Lower Houses; as well as the 
Reports of successive examinations of the legislation, with amendments proposed and rejected by 
Parliamentary Committees. 
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jurisdictions such as Australia and New Zealand, the literal approach has garnered 
widespread support in relation to all types of legislation. In Australia, one oft cited 
ruling in support of the literal approach is the case of Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd 23 where Higgins J stated: 
 
The fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is 
that a statute is to be expounded according to the intention of Parliament that 
made it; and that intention has to be found by an examination of the language 
used in the statute as a whole. The question is, what does the language mean; 
and when we find what the language means, in its ordinary and natural sense, 
it is our duty to obey that meaning, even if we think the result to be 
inconvenient or impolitic or improbable. 
 
 
This penchant for the grammatical approach to interpretation by common law judges 
may be contrasted with the approach used within civil law countries, where the 
teleological method has priority over literal interpretation (Mechlem, 2000).  In 
France, the highest courts  the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil dEtat  make 
use of the teleological interpretation method in their consideration not only of the 
language of the Act but also the social end that rendered the statute necessary. 
Likewise, German courts have, as a rule given broad and liberal interpretations to 
the provisions of the Civil Code (Sauveplanne, 1982). Use of the purposive 
approach is also nothing novel in the civil law jurisdictions of Canada. 
 
It should be noted, however, that despite the association of certain styles of 
interpretation with particular traditions, there exist some anomalies. In English 
common law, a more recent trend away from the strict literal approach is detected.24 
                                               
23
 (1920) 28 CLR 129 at 161-162. 
24
 See, for example, the  ruling of Lord Griffiths in Pepper (inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [993] AC 593 at 617. 
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In the U.S., judges have as a rule, given less weight to the wording of a specific 
statute and laid more emphasis on the intention of the legislator and the statutory 
purpose (ibid). In civilian Latin America, many analysts of the Constitutions and laws 
of the region stress the existence of legal systems based on strict interpretation of 
extensive legal codes (Vanden and Prevost, 2002). Despite some countries, for 
example Argentina, tending towards a progressive construction of statutes as Latin 
America becomes more democratic and U.S. legal precepts are incorporated in 
Latin American law, traditional methods have not lost their place (David and Brierley, 
1985; Lewis, 2006).  
 
But what of taxing legislation? According to Vanistendael (1996), two competing 
principles are of overriding importance in the interpretation of tax law - the principle 
of legality, under which no tax can be imposed except on the basis of law, and which 
provides the basic argument for the support of the literal interpretation of tax laws; 
and the countervailing principle that in enacting a tax law the legislature intends that 
it be effective, that is, that it not be circumventable through artificial manoeuvres.  
The way in which courts in a particular jurisdiction interpret tax statutes will depend 
to a large extent on the way in which the laws there are interpreted in general (ibid).  
 
This argument is to a large extent borne out when examining trends within common 
and civil law countries. In a number of common law countries, as a general rule, tax 
statutes are interpreted in a narrow and strict manner. In the U.K., the principle that 
taxation legislation should be subject to a strict literal interpretation was advocated 
as far back as 1869 by Lord Cairns who argued that in order to tax, the Crown must 
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be able to bring the subject within the letter of the law.25  In Cape Brandy Syndicate 
v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, the leading and probably the most cited case in 
English jurisprudence for the restrictive approach to interpreting tax statutes, 
Rowlatt J stated: 
 
[I]n a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for 
any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is 
to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.26 
 
Common law courts have even extended its use of the grammatical approach to 
cover cases involving various modern and complicated tax planning schemes aimed 
at tax avoidance.27 In Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westminster 
(Duke), another leading U.K. case, Lord Tomlin expressed the view that every man 
is entitled if he can, to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be.28 
 
In Australia, interpretation of tax statutes was for a long time dominated by literal 
and restrictive interpretation along the lines of Duke. In Investment and Merchant 
Finance Corp. Ltd v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, a case involving the 
practice of dividend stripping for the purpose of a tax rebate, the court, on the basis 
of the principle of legality adopted the literal approach in its advancement of the 
following argument: 
 
                                               
25
 Partington v. Attorney General, [1869] LR 4 E & I App HL 100 at 122. 
26
 [1921] 1 K.B. 64, 71, 132 T.C. 358, 366. 
27
 Tax avoidance refers to cases where taxpayers structure transactions in a peculiar legal form so as to obtain a 
benefit unintended by the tax law. A lesser tax burden may result, for example, from a legal construction or 
transaction that uses a gap or loophole in the law to place the taxpayer outside the reach of the law or within the 
reach of a statutory provision providing for a lesser tax burden.  
28
 [1936] App. Cas. 1 at 24-25 
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[I]f it be thought that this is a practice that should be checked, it is to that section 
that Parliament may choose to direct some of its attention. It is not for the courts, 
however, to depart from Parliaments clear statement29 
 
 
The literal approach to revenue statutes reached its height in Australia in the early 
1980s under the courts of Barwick CJ, an advocate for liberalism and commercial 
enterprise (Lonnquist, 2003). His views on taxation legislation were most clearly 
expressed in the case Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Westraders Pty Ltd: 
 
It is for Parliament to specify, and to do so, in my opinion, as far as language will 
permit, with unambiguous clarity, the circumstances which will attract an 
obligation on the part of the citizen to pay tax. The function of the court is to 
interpret and apply the language in which Parliament has specified those 
circumstances. The court is to do so by determining the meaning of the words 
employed by Parliament according to the intention of Parliament which is 
discoverable from the language used by Parliament. It is not for the court to 
mould or to attempt to mould the language of the statute so as to produce some 
result which it might be thought the Parliament may have intended to achieve, 
though not expressed in the actual language employed.30 
 
 
Courts in other common law jurisdictions such as New Zealand and India have also 
hewed to the strict approach, even going as far as to acknowledge that in the case 
of an ambiguous provision with two possible interpretations, the construction most 
beneficial to the subject is to be adopted.31 
 
The common law approach of adoption of the literal rule in tax statute interpretation 
can be contrasted with the approach used by countries within the civilian tradition. In 
line with the general style of civil law statutory interpretation, a number of European 
                                               
29
 [1971] 125 CLR 249, 265. 
30
 [1980] 144 CLR 55 at 60. 
31
 For New Zealand, Plimmer v CIR [1958] NZLR 147 at 151; for India, CIT v. Shahzada Nand and Sons 
[1966] 60 ITR 392 (SC). 
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countries now show clear signs of heading towards a purposive interpretation 
system with regard to taxing legislation.  
 
Traditionally, countries such as France and Belgium adopted the literal approach as 
a consequence of the legality principle enshrined within their Constitutions. Despite 
the traditional strict rule however, French courts have always recognised the 
authority of the tax administration to submit evidence about the real nature of a 
transaction, so that it could be re-characterised or re-qualified for tax purposes 
(Vanistandael, 1996). In line with the USAs general purposive style of statutory 
interpretation, common law courts there also use this approach in the interpretation 
of its tax laws. Here, courts have developed a practice of setting aside certain legal 
constructions that do not have a business purpose but are aimed purely towards the 
avoidance of tax. 
 
The foregoing illustrates how the tension between the two approaches to statutory 
interpretation in general, and the interpreting of tax laws in particular, have been 
resolved in different ways across the two traditions. The literature argues a trend 
towards the use of strict literal interpretation within common law countries and the 
use of a purposive approach within the civilian tradition. Despite the noticeable 
trends, also evident are some deviations from the norm, such deviations resulting in 
variation even within traditions.  
 
Focusing on taxing legislation and the implications of judicial interpretation for 
bureaucratic functioning, some argue that jurisprudence which follows the literal 
approach favours and provides a high degree of legal security for the taxpayer 
(Vanistendael, 1996; Lonnquist, 2003). One major concern is that the adoption of 
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this rule permits taxpayers to arrange their affairs so as to avoid or pay a lesser tax 
by taking advantage of loopholes and weaknesses in tax laws. In such 
circumstances, the bureaucracy is subject to ongoing challenges to decisions made 
in the application of tax and revenue laws and potential reversal of such decisions 
by the courts.  
 
On the contrary, applying the purposive approach involves a search for answers by 
the court - for example on whether or not legal form should take precedence over 
the substance of a transaction; or whether the law should be subject to some kind of 
economic consideration. Judges answer these sorts of issues differently according 
to the case law of various countries; hence there is a degree of uncertainty for all 
parties involved in litigation. Nevertheless, Lonnquist (2003) argues that this 
approach tends to favour the revenue, for example, by making it harder for 
taxpayers to avoid paying taxes because judges will not be constrained by the 
words of a taxing provision and will look beyond to the underlying purpose.  
 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this author reasons that, compared with the 
strict literal approach, the bureaucracy stands a stronger chance in the exercise of 
its autonomy where there is a style of statutory interpretation which makes use of 
the purposive approach. 
 
3.8.4    SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
  One of the critical roles of government is making public policy  a function that 
involves different branches of government, comprising multiple actors with diverse 
time horizons, powers and incentives. Since the early 20th century, trends towards 
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statism, public interventionism, and a growing use of redistributive and regulatory 
policies has resulted in an increase in the scope and complexity of government. 
Greater delegation of policymaking to deal with such complexities has given rise to a 
bureaucratic rulemaking revolution (West and Cooper 1989/1990:582) that has 
made the administrative process a primary arena for competition. With the 
bureaucracy having its own agenda, its own interests, and its own view surrounding 
agency programmes, bureaucratic autonomy presents political principals with the 
problem of effective control over an unelected fourth branch (Moe 1985:12). 
Because the political environment and behaviour of the bureaucracy are partly 
shaped by the actions of actors in institutions within the political system, it is these 
institutions which help to provide the context for understanding bureaucratic 
functioning. Political institutions therefore become central to our understanding of 
autonomy in practice.  
 
Examining the bureaucratic control game, there are certain key questions that would 
assist us on the road to our search for answers. Which political institutions have 
sovereignty over the activities and decisions of the bureaucracy? What type of 
public structures do these different institutions seek to build? How is bureaucratic 
behaviour brought into alignment with the preferences of political principals? 
Analysis of the activity of a particular institution may reveal that it actually has more 
influence than a concrete reading of the Constitution or any laws would suggest. 
That each institution has numerous informal powers makes our understanding and 
analysis of the issues even more difficult (Hammond and Knott: 1996). 
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Answers to the questions raised above will require first and foremost an 
identification of the key state institutions with potential for influencing bureaucratic 
autonomy. An analysis of the role of interests and preferences in determining 
structural choices, the strategies and mechanisms used for political control, and the 
resulting impact on the exercise of administrative discretion are all important issues 
in the advancement of our understanding.  
 
A theory of the effect of the system of government on the exercise of bureaucratic 
autonomy also stands much to gain from an analysis which takes into account 
possible differences between different constitutional systems or regime types. In a 
presidential or separation of powers system, policymaking is divided between two 
separately elected bodies (the legislature and the president) that are independent of 
each other. Cabinet members are not members of the legislature and are selected 
for reasons other than their legislative support. In parliamentary systems, the prime 
minister is elected to the legislature in the same manner as all other members. 
Because executive authority, or cabinet, is derived from the legislature, 
parliamentary systems are typified by a fusion of powers between the legislative and 
executive branches.  
 
Does a presidential system generate a bureaucracy which is markedly different from 
that within parliamentary government? Moe (1990) opines that the politics of 
structural choice is very different in a parliamentary than in a separation of powers 
system and as a result, the two should have very different public bureaucracies. 
Eaton (2003) rationalizes such outcomes as resulting from the consistent 
differences in the incentives and constraints that face policymakers within the two 
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systems. More in-depth is the argument which takes a holistic view of constitutional 
systems as package deals which come with their own baggage:  
 
When nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, they are 
choosing a whole system, whose various properties arise 
endogenouslyout of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets 
in motion (Moe and Caldwell 1994: 172). 
 
Each system, according to these authors, has a distinctive politics of structural 
choice that propels the development of government. 
 
In a text examining the politics of policies in Latin America, Stein et al (2006) note 
that the processes of discussing, negotiating, approving and implementing policies 
may be as important as the content of the policies themselves. Since diverse rules 
of engagement (ibid:18) can impact on the way in which the game is played, it will 
be important to focus on the various actors (with their diverse powers and 
incentives), as well as on the different political institutions and their impact on policy 
outcomes. Whilst there is utility in examining certain institutional characteristics such 
as presidential and parliamentary systems, a systemic view can only be 
accomplished by a study which takes into account key institutions and their 
interactions. 
 
The remainder of this section examines key political institutions of government and 
the different mechanisms and strategies used by such institutions to exert control 
over the bureaucracy. Note that it is not my intention here to enter into a discourse 
which delves into the finer details surrounding the characteristics and behaviours of 
political institutions. A thesis of this size and scope will not permit me to adequately 
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summarize, let alone research, all of the various issues involved. My aim is to 
capture the essence of how different political institutions make use of various 
strategies and institutional arrangements to influence the behaviour of the 
bureaucracy. In drawing comparisons to parliamentary systems, the issue will be 
kept simple by focusing on the classic Westminster model32. In a more complete 
account which would, for example, make allowance for the existence of coalition 
governments, the issue becomes far more complicated introducing a range of other 
institutional factors.     
 
With regard to key political institutions of government, number of these possess a 
non-trivial ability to control bureaucratic behaviour. Key state institutions include the 
legislature, the political executive, and the judiciary. Legislatures provide a forum for 
discussing political, economic and social issues are therefore critical institutions in 
the policymaking process. They formulate and approve laws to address various 
socio-economic problems, approve funding for agency programs, and oversee the 
implementation of government policies. 
 
The political executive consists of the president and cabinet in presidential systems 
and the cabinet (including the prime minister) in parliamentary systems. As chief 
executives of government, presidents are very powerful actors through their 
unilateral power to make a number of structural and procedural decisions. Cabinets 
serve more as aid to presidents in the policymaking and implementation process 
(Stein et al, 2006). In parliamentary politics, it is the ministerial cabinet, even more 
than the legislature, which serves as the locus of executive decision making (Rowat 
                                               
32
 Within this model, two major parties compete in elections. The government is formed by the party gaining 
the majority in parliament. 
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1985, Epstein and OHalloran 1999, Strom 2000). As formal heads of the 
departments and agencies falling under their portfolios, cabinet Ministers are 
responsible for introducing and guiding to adoption important policy measures, 
advocating and defending specific policy proposals and decisions, and for 
evaluating and supervising the details of policy implementation. 
 
The judiciary is another institution capable of influencing the exercise of bureaucratic 
autonomy. Courts are often required to decide cases dealing with bureaucrats 
alleged overstepping of their authority. Judges are therefore required to determine 
the constitutionality or legality of administrative actions. 
 
Because of the relatively closer proximity of taxing bureaucracies to the Executive 
and their constant interaction with the Judiciary in filing cases against taxpayers or 
responding in cases brought against administrative actions, it was decided that 
because of the more likely impact of these two organs, to focus on these as part of 
the research. 
 
 3.8.4.1   How the Executive May Condition Bureaucratic Autonomy 
 
 
Political executives have at their disposal an array of mechanisms, both informal 
and formal, to exert control over the bureaucracy. Whilst informal constraints are 
achieved during the course of executive-bureaucratic inter-relations and 
communication interchange; formal constraints include control over budget 
submissions, monitoring and oversight, influence over administrative procedures, as 
well as the use of practices such as centralisation and politicisation.  
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Informal attempts at control may involve regular daily meetings with senior civil 
servants; the assignment of tasks to specific individuals within the organisations; or 
the review of administrative decisions. Interference by political executives in 
operational matters can sometimes be to an extent where it results in 
micromanagement of the policy implementation process33.  
 
In terms of formal constraints, cabinet ministers and presidents play an agenda 
setting role for agency appropriations. Final appropriation figures for agency 
programmes are heavily influenced by the budget estimates that political executives 
submit to the legislature. In the area of monitoring and oversight, political executives 
may impose on bureaucrats certain information collection and reporting 
requirements. They may review the reports from other central agencies or 
departments charged with monitoring various aspects of agency performance. 
Evidence of non-compliance with executive directives may result in sanctions, 
internal personnel movements, transfers, and structural reorganisations. 
 
Autonomy may also be conditioned through influence over agency rules and 
administrative procedures. In parliamentary systems, where ministers play a central 
role in the drafting of regulations and departmental circulars, bureaucrats may be 
instructed how laws should be interpreted and implemented. Rockman (1997) 
argues that in the U.S. separation of powers system, divided government and the 
weak political leverage of presidents leads to a growing dependence on presidential 
use of administrative regulations and executive orders to take the place of, and 
sometimes to override, statutory mandates.  
                                               
33
 For a classic example of this type of interference, see Polidano (1999) on the U.K Prison Service and the 
Derek Lewis Affair. 
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Centralisation is another strategy used by the political executive to condition 
administrative discretion. Central institutions check and balance the activities of 
bureaucrats in functional areas such as planning and policy formulation, and 
resources management.  
 
Yet another means of safeguarding against bureaucratic drift is through the practice 
of politicisation. Researchers distinguish between different orientations or 
conceptualisations of politicisation (see Stahlberg, 1987; Rouban, 2003). The more 
widespread view, and the one more relevant for the purpose of this discussion, is 
politicisation as partisan control of the bureaucracy, whereby party political criteria 
are used as the basis for the appointment and tenure of public servants. Use of 
public employment by the ruling party to provide jobs to its members has in some 
cases resulted in the institutionalisation of patronage/spoils systems and clientelistic 
practices (Edie, 1984; Stone, 1980). When politicisation occurs, there are no longer 
any institutional barriers between political masters and the bureaucracy (Rouban, 
2003), as political recruits are expected to return the favour of their patron party. 
Stone (1980) notes that in clientelistic democratic systems, political leaders break 
the rules of the game without any cost or consequences, often disregarding 
obligations of institutional accountability. According to Rowat (1985), in countries 
where top civil servants are strongly politicised in the sense of partisanship, we can 
safely generalise that such individuals cannot play a truly essential role in decision 
making processes. 
 
Focusing on comparative politics and comparative government and strategies used 
to exercise control over the bureaucracy, distinctions have also been made with 
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respect to the differing behaviours of political executives in different constitutional 
systems. In both presidential and parliamentary systems, the president and the 
majority party in power both have a broad electoral base. This broad constituency 
creates strong pressures for incentives built around public interest (Moe 1985, 1990; 
Moe and Caldwell, 1994; Stein et al, 2006). Viewing good governance and sound 
public administration as effective strategies for promoting public good, political 
executives in both regimes strive for a system with an institutional capacity that will 
allow them to take charge of government. Such a system is achieved via 
bureaucracies which can be controlled from the top (Moe and Caldwell, 1994). 
Despite these similar goals, however, one fundamental difference lies in the relative 
ability of these executives to achieve their objectives. Whereas in parliamentary 
systems the majority party has unchallenged authority to build the type of system it 
desires, under presidential government system fragmentation and constant 
opposition presents presidents with a number of challenges (Moe and Caldwell, 
1994). This leads to a different emphasis in terms of the relative importance of the 
strategies used by executives within the two regimes.  
 
Modern U.S. presidents make use of the institutional presidency34 to strengthen its 
capacity for bureaucratic control (ibid: 190). This has led to an emphasis on two 
major forms of bureaucratic control: centralisation and politicisation. Unlike the 
British Westminster system where two main central agencies  Cabinet and the 
Treasury - have oversight over the bureaucracy, in the U.S. presidential system, a 
                                               
34
 Moe (1985, 1993) describe the institutional presidency as a structural feature which extends beyond the 
boundaries of the White House and the Presidential Office to include various other presidential organisations. It 
also refers to the patterns of behaviour that link the Presidency to other parts of the political system. Golden 
(2000), in a similar vein, makes reference to an administrative presidency - a management strategy designed 
to bring the fourth branch to heel and to create a more compliant and responsive bureaucracy through enhanced 
presidential control. Presidents are able to achieve their policy goals administratively through the bureaucracy 
rather than legislatively through Congress. 
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high degree of centralisation results in the oversight of a single policy area 
sometimes being split amongst a range of central bureaus and committees. The 
U.S. separation of powers system is probably the best known example of 
politicisation (Mulgan, 1998). In their search for responsive competence (Moe and 
Caldwell, 1994:188), modern U.S. presidents assume office with the supposition that 
government has no organic past (Aberbach and Rockman, 1988). Strategic 
appointments are made as far down into the bowels of the agency as the law would 
allow (Golden 2000:07).  
 
Some researchers argue that there has been an erosion of the strong tradition of 
politically neutral career officials at the top and senior levels of the bureaucracy in 
parliamentary systems and an increase, over the years, in levels of politicisation 
(Rowat, 1985; Mulgan, 1998; Huber and Shipan, 2002).  Machine politics or patron-
clientelism has been identified as a dominant feature of the organisation of mass 
support for competitive political parties in third world countries (Stone, 1980). Riggs 
(2001), a classical development writer advocated the spoils system for developing 
countries as a means of ensuring political control of the bureaucracy. Other 
researchers argue, however, that such practices have not developed in any 
systematic way and that the pursuit of merit recruitment prevails in most western 
administrative systems (Stahlberg, 1987; Rouban 2003). In parliamentary 
Westminster type regimes, because the majority party has unchallenged supreme 
authority and a variety of means to discipline non-compliant bureaucrats, it can 
afford to rely on an institutional structure which is built around neutral competence 
(Moe and Caldwell 1994:187). Stone (1980) notes that in the liberal democracies of 
advanced capitalist countries, tendencies towards politicisation are muted and 
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restrained by various institutional forces  by the rules of accountability to other 
institutions, by a more active, knowledgeable and independent public opinion, by a 
diverse powerful and independent mass media and, by legal institutions that limit 
excessive personalised authority. These and other countervailing tendencies keep 
clientelistic power tendencies in check and guarantee more impersonal, predictable 
patterns of administration.  
 
 
 
 3.8.4.2   How Courts May Condition Bureaucratic Autonomy 
 
Do courts interfere with the bureaucracy? Hammond and Knott (1996) distinguish 
between two possible types of constraint: procedural and substantive. With 
procedural constraints, formal constitutions or agency-specific legislation may 
specify the procedures which must be followed to safeguard against arbitrary or 
capricious decisionmaking. In its enforcement capacity, the court may rule that 
bureaucrats honour such provisions of the law. Substantive constraints, on the other 
hand, relate to court judgements in administrative choices. The Court must judge 
whether a specific administrative decision is legally permissible under the 
Constitution or under the statute delegating authority to the agency. Decisions may 
uphold or challenge agency actions. When the judiciary upholds the terms of the 
delegation, the agency is being allowed to autonomously manage some area of 
policy as it sees fit (Stein et al, 2006). Autonomy is also influenced by the outcome 
of appellate cases. Landmark appellate decisions may lead to incremental or radical 
shifts in administrative processes and procedures in order to address the issue 
which formed the subject of the courts decision, or to reflect dominant legal 
viewpoints (Beckett 2007). 
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Empirical findings on judicial/bureaucratic relations point to an uneasy partnership 
between the two institutions. Beckett (2007) highlights the differing levels of 
deference by the courts to administrative interpretation of statutes and 
administrative processes. At the low end of the scale are Latin America countries 
which have, over the past few years, witnessed an increase in the number of judicial 
rulings against executive preferences (Stein et al, 2006).  
 
3.9  Conclusion 
 
Having argued the need for political principals to ensure alignment of the interests of 
bureaucratic agents with political preferences, and their efforts at political control to 
maintain accountability, this chapter focused on some of the conditioning factors that 
may serve to enhance or retard the practice of administrative discretion. The 
literature underscored the need to go beyond myopic focus on the organisations 
internal production function, the imperative to recast organisations as open systems 
and therefore the importance of reexamining the role of institutional factors on 
administrative functioning. This study is therefore interested in the consequence of 
such an open and dynamic context within which fiscal entities operate. The studys 
rejection of a single factor explanation and its adoption of an approach that draws on 
two explanatory theories  resource dependency theory and institutional theory  
will not only assist in the identification and analysis of factors at various level of the 
environment (micro-, meso- and macro- level), but will allow for the assessment of 
the relative weighting of respective groupings. Whilst internal micro-level factors 
such as structures and systems, resource availability and resource control may 
explain a small amount of the variance between formal and factual autonomy, it is 
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hypothesised that broader macro-institutional independent variables such as interest 
group participation, the legal/administrative framework, legal tradition and system of 
government may explain far more efficiently the variance under investigation. 
Chapter one and this Chapter respectively made mention of politico-administrative 
cultures. Part of the investigation is to determine whether, for example, certain 
conditioning factors have followed historical paths and the effect of such trajectories 
on administrative decision-making. 
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PART II: METHODS AND BACKGROUND 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN, CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Figure 4.135 is a graphic illustration of the studys overall research process. 
Outcomes of phases 1 to 4 served as the basis for discussion in chapters one to 
three. This chapter, which focuses on the remaining phases 5 through to 8, 
examines the studys research design, sources and methods of data collection, as 
well as the method of data analysis and reporting of findings. Comparative case 
research that draws on the qualitative method was used as the basis for conducting 
this idiographic explanatory study. Methods of data collection involved a 
combination of literature and documentary review of primary and secondary data 
sources, individual indepth focused semi-structured interviews (SSIs), and focus 
group discussions FGDs. Data collected were analysed and cross-checked using 
techniques of pattern-matching, qualitative content analysis and triangulation. 
 
4.2  THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
 
Determining how best to design a study of the social world is still a highly contested 
issue across several research disciplines. Appendix X illustrates the two 
fundamentally different and competing paradigms that have given way to different  
                                               
35
 Despite the process being depicted as linear, this was not actually the case. For example, even at the early 
stage during problem definition and development of the theoretical framework, consideration was being given 
to research design issues. 
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Figure 4.1: The Studys Research Process 
Adapted from Sekaran (1992) 
 
methodological stances. Whilst positivist researchers make use of quantitative 
methods such as surveys and experiments to test hypothetical-deductive 
generalisations, post-positivists make use of qualitative approaches in order to 
holistically understand experience within context-specific settings. Data are 
interpreted idiographically in terms of the particulars of the case, rather than 
nomethetically in terms of lawlike generalisations (Patton, 1990). 
 
Despite the philosophical divide and the disagreement which continue over the 
appropriateness of the different methods, one convergence in thinking is that there 
is no perfect research design. Each method, given its limitations, is only an 
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approximation to knowledge, providing as it does a different glimpse of reality. 
Hence the call for pragmatism in choice of appropriate method (Patton, 1990:39; 
Snape and Spencer, 2003: 15) rather than adherence to a set of methodological 
principles, however strongly supported by philosophical arguments. Choice of 
method should be based on criteria such as the purpose of the inquiry, the specific 
nature of the phenomenon under study, the state of existing knowledge; resource 
availability; and administrative convenience (Lijphart, 1975; Downey and Ireland, 
1979; Bonoma, 1985; Benbasat et al, 1987; Yin, 1989; Patton, 1990, 1999; Flick, 
2006). The issue is appropriately summarized by Warwick (1973:190) who draws an 
analogy between the choice of research method and the selection of an accessory 
lens for a camera: 
 
It is almost meaningless to ask in the abstract which is better: a wide 
angle or a telephoto lens. The answer depends completely on the type of 
picture that one wants  broad panoramic coverage or more intense 
concentration on expression and detail. 
 
This study opted for the latter type of picture, resulting in a design choice of 
comparative case research that draws on the qualitative method. The following 
sections explain. 
 
4.2.1    COMPARATIVE CASE RESEARCH 
 
 
Case research or case studies continue to be used extensively, including in the 
traditional disciplines such as anthropology, clinical psychology, and political 
science; as well as in the practice-oriented fields such as public policy, public 
management, urban planning, and management sciences. Multiple definitions of the 
case study abound. Probably most cited is Yin (1989:23) who defines the case study 
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as an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. Case research 
is deemed highly suited to sticky, practice-based problems where the experiences of 
the actors and the context of the action are of critical importance (Benbasat et al, 
1987); and for when propositional depth is prized over breadth and boundedness 
(Gerring, 2004). Unlike statistical analysis where the focus on incidence does not 
permit the tracing of processes over time, case research goes beyond providing a 
static snapshot of events, cutting across the temporal and contextual gestalt of 
situations (Bonoma, ibid).  
 
Of the single case study, an n of one, we are told, can be adequate if the treatment 
of the material is sufficiently generic or if the quality and nature of the findings are 
suitably unique (Pettigrew, 1990). Bekke et al (1996), however, highlight the 
dangers of concentrating on the single case and assuming that one country is either 
so general that all others are like it or is so particular that no others need to be 
compared. The fact that findings may be the result of the idiosyncrasies of the 
particular research setting is something of which the researcher needs to be mindful. 
Add to such arguments the fact that research within the confines of a single country 
where the context is fixed, does not allow for the broader institutional context to play 
any part in theorising or empirical testing (Huber and Shipan, 2002).  
 
To counter such methodological limitations, one strategy is a research design which 
makes use of comparative case research36. Unlike single case design where the 
                                               
36
 In this study, the terms comparative case research, comparative method and cross-national comparison 
and cross-case analysis are used interchangeably. 
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emphasis is on a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded within its context, 
the comparative method refers to social scientific analyses involving observations 
in more than one social system, or in the same social system at more than one point 
in time (Warwick and Osherson, 1973:8). With the current emphasis on 
contextualisation, such cross-national comparisons are increasingly being used to 
better understand social reality within different contexts, i.e. how processes and 
outcomes are qualified by local conditions, and thus to develop more sophisticated 
descriptions and more meaningful explanations for national likeness and unlikeness 
 
This study for varied reasons makes use of the comparative method. Case research 
was deemed to be best suited to the highly complex phenomenon being 
investigated and to the studys broad research objectives. Although quantitative 
large-n research of the survey type would allow for broad coverage of the issues, 
statistically reliable and generalisable findings; the goal here is not breadth or 
representativeness, but primarily depth of knowledge. Beyond the single case 
design, comparative cross-case analysis will allow for a better understanding of the 
role of institutional context and how both the thinking and practice of autonomy 
might vary under different circumstances. 
 
4.2.2    USE OF THE QUALITATIVE METHOD 
 
 
Method indicates the type of research tools and techniques which might be used to 
collect empirical evidence (Cavaye, 1996), the two basic types of data collecting 
methods being nomothetic or quantitative methods (based on numeric data) and 
idiographic or qualitative methods (based primarily on verbal data). The primacy of 
quantitative research during the 1930s-1970s gave way from the late 1970s to an 
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expansion of interest in the qualitative method, and its spread across the various 
social science disciplines. Unlike quantitative study, qualitative research largely 
informed by the naturalist or interpretative stance, studies phenomena within their 
natural settings. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2003: 13), the word qualitative 
implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities and processes and meanings that 
are not experimentally examined or measured (if measured at all), in terms of 
quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. The focus is not on linear cause-effect 
relationships, but rather an attempt to gain in-depth knowledge of the complexes of 
social action and social meaning systems of people who affect or are affected by the 
phenomenon under study. The researchers subsequent role involves his/her 
engagement in a process of reconstruction of the respondents constructions 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 359, original emphasis).  
 
Various researchers have cited the primary virtues of qualitative data to include their 
richness and holism, vividness, clarity, and provision of thick description (Jick, 1979; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Platt, 1988; Orum et al, 1991). According to Miles and 
Huberman (1994), the advantage of qualitative portrayals of holistic settings and 
impacts is that greater attention can be given to nuance, setting, interdependencies, 
complexities and context.  
 
In this study, use is made of qualitative measures for the primary reason that the 
institutional issues being investigated, such as rules and regulations, behaviours, 
values and meaning systems, are largely non-statistical constructs not easily 
amenable to quantification or operationalisation in quantitative terms. As an 
explanatory case study, thick data gathered via qualitative means would assist this 
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author in the search to go beyond quantitative snapshots of what and how many, to 
focus on how events unfolded and likewise to attempt some assessment of causality 
in response to the posed research questions. 
 
4.3  THE COMPARATIVE FOCUS 
 
 
Chapter 1 already elaborated on the studys research context. Just as a reminder to 
the reader, the comparative case study focuses on revenue administrations (tax and 
customs) in the Caribbean islands of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. The 
following section elaborates on the manner of conduct of the comparative analysis. 
 
Figure 4.2 serves to illustrate important features about the studys comparative 
focus. The two case studies embodying the four focal organizations allow both for a 
within-country comparison, as well as a cross-case analysis. Whilst the within-
country comparison provides for constancy of context37 and allows for testing of 
localised factors, the across-country comparison allows for the testing of contextual 
variables. The within country comparison is indicated by the vertical arrows inside of 
each ellipse. The across-country comparison is indicated by the horizontal arrows 
between the two ellipses. The vertical arrow t1...tn represents the temporal dimension, 
illustrating how fiscal administrative reform efforts are being investigated as 
contextualised processes evolving over time. 
 
 
 
                                               
37
 The analysis therefore takes advantage of the many similar national characteristics serving as controls. 
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Figure 4.2: The Studys Comparative Focus 
 
 
The nature and extent of autonomy exercised by the Dominican organisations is 
therefore not only investigated relative to the Jamaican cross-case experience but 
also relative to each other, and relative to their own pre-reform status. 
 
The lack of symmetry of the two ellipses in the diagram symbolises the relative 
weighting given to the focus on and analysis of the two cases. In this lens or 
keyhole-styled comparison (Walk, 1998: 1), the Dominican case serves as a lens 
or framework for understanding the Jamaican case which is the main focus of the 
study. Data on the pre-reform experience of the focal organizations in the DR is 
used as a proxy measure to test or check similarities with the experiences of the 
Jamaican organisations pre-TaxARP. 
 
As noted by Pettigrew (1990) about the use of such an approach, one limitation with 
the treatment of the DR as a less intensive case is that while there may be an 
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approximate equivalence of standards on what change has occurred (the content of 
reform), there will be a weakening of data richness and interpretation of how and 
why change occurred (the process and the context of reform). 
 
4.4  THE RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.4.1    MEASUREMENTS AND MEASURES 
 
The proper operationalisation of theoretical concepts is an obviously necessary 
condition for testing any theory, unless the theory itself has been formulated in 
strictly observable language, something that is a rare exception in the social science 
(Nowan, 1989). Moving from theoretically meaningful concepts to their empirically 
observable manifestations, however, can sometimes prove quite challenging. 
Adcock and Collier (2001) provide what I consider a useful roadmap to aid in this 
task. Figure 4.3 illustrates their framework with some of the tasks and key issues 
involved in the measurement and establishment of empirically valid measures. 
 
Depicted at the highest level is the background concept that encompasses the 
range of potentially diverse meanings associated with a given concept. 
Measurement, the interaction among levels 2 to 4, involves three sequential tasks: 
(a) moving from the broad background concept to the formulation of an explicit 
definition or systematised concept which is adopted by the researcher; (b) the 
operationalisation of the systematised concept to produce valid measures or 
indicators; and (c) the scoring of cases to arrive at findings or observations (scoring 
not applicable for the purpose of this study).  
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Regarding levels 1 and 2 involving the task of conceptualisation, the reader will 
recall that in chapter two, I presented both the background and systematised 
concepts in respect of the studys dependent variable. Having discussed some of 
the general meanings and understandings associated with the construct of 
autonomy, this author presented her own definition of the concept as used in the 
study. Bureaucratic autonomy was defined as the constrained freedom or 
independence available to or acquired by an organisation, which enables it, in its 
actual behaviour, to freely and independently make strategic and operational 
decisions without outside interference. It was noted that the autonomy or freedom 
being referred to here, is autonomy from state authorities, state institutions and 
external societal actors within the policy environment. 
 
As a logical follow on from Chapters 2 and 3, the next level of the measurement 
process involves the task of the operationalisation of the concept of autonomy and 
the development of a set of suitable measures or indicators. The following two 
sections describe in detail the measurement of the dependent variable, as well as 
the framework used to analyse factors impacting on the exercise of bureaucratic 
autonomy. 
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Figure 4.3: Conceptualisation and Measurement - Levels and Tasks 
 
Source: Adcock and Collier (2001: p.531) 
 
4.4.1.1   Measuring Bureaucratic Autonomy 
 
Mentioned earlier was the need to establish an operational concept of autonomy in 
order to empirically establish its prevalence as well as its consequence within the 
focal organisations. The central goal here is to obtain an accurate and valid 
measure of the phenomenon under study.  
 
On the subject of measurement validity, worth highlighting is the distinction made by 
Adcock and Collier (ibid) between measurement issues and disputes about 
concepts. Since within a given discipline there will exist some background concepts 
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which are straightforward and easily understood and others which are complex and 
controversial, any assessment of the quality of a measure of such contested 
concepts should focus on the relation between observations and the systematised 
concept (ibid: 530-531, own emphasis added), leaving aside potential disputes 
about the background concept as an important but separate issue. 
 
This argument is particularly poignant within the present context. Given the 
fuzziness and ambiguity surrounding the concept of autonomy, I argue that any 
attempt at its operationalisation is likely to be contested on the grounds of an 
alleged misfit with one or other understanding of the construct. The point being 
made, therefore, is that in this study, the manner of measurement of the dependent 
variable should be assessed not against any possible conceptions of bureaucratic 
autonomy, but rather against the systematised concept or definition proffered 
earlier by this author, and in the context of the research questions being addressed. 
 
Presently, there is no germane set of indicators for measuring autonomy. 
Contemporary empirical research examines the issue from a variety of 
methodological perspectives (Ballou, 1998). In most studies, the focus is on a few 
selected dimensions, each dimension measured at a very broad level, using only 
one or two indicators (Verhoest et al, 2004). In this study, which focuses on formal, 
informal, and factual autonomy, the dependent variable is operationalised using the 
autonomy index developed by Verhoest et al (ibid). The authors argue that, although 
one trade-off of their detailed and comprehensive indicator set is the time-
consuming character of the research, their product is an instrument with a high 
degree of measurement validity. 
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the measure used to assess the relative nature and extent of 
autonomy of the revenue departments. Bureaucratic autonomy is measured using 
two broad categories, encompassing six different dimensions: 
 
(1) Autonomy as the level of decision-making competencies formally granted 
to the organisation, which encompasses managerial (financial 
management and human resources management) autonomy and policy 
autonomy; and 
(2) Autonomy as the exemption from constraints on the actual use of decision-
making competencies, which includes legal, structural, financial, and 
interventional autonomy. 
 
The figure shows, under each of the dimensions, the various indicators which are 
used for more detailed measurement and analysis. 
 
In a number of empirical studies, including the one from which this measure is 
taken, the overall autonomy of the agency in comparative terms is measured via 
summation or aggregation of the weighted quantitative scores for each of the 
dimensions. Given the perils involved in assigning subjective weights to dimensions 
and affixing quantitative values to qualitative data (Kidd and Crandall, 2006), and 
considering the small-n scale of the research, in this study, measurement of relative 
levels of bureaucratic autonomy is purely qualitative.  
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   Bureaucratic 
   Autonomy
    Level of Decision-making
Competencies
   Exemption from Constraints on Actual 
  use of Decision-making  Competencies 
Managerial Autonomy 
Policy Autonomy
 Freedom of choice of 
policy instruments         
in policy implementation
Human Resources 
Management 
(HRM)
 Strategic HRM 
- Setting levels of   
Remuneration
- Determining policy on: 
recruitment, promotion, 
performance management
 Operational HRM
- Staffing & Deployment
- Pay & Remuneration 
- Performance Appraisal
- Training & Career 
Development
- Discipline & Integrity 
Management
- Separation
Legal 
Autonomy
 Legal 
Basis/Legal 
Character
 Patrimony
Structural 
Autonomy
 Governance 
Framework/Model
- Board of Directors Model ?
- Board composition and 
appointment of Board 
members
Role & responsibility    
of different actors 
(Minister and the 
Board) vis -à-vis the 
revenue department 
 Clarity of reporting 
lines
Financial 
Autonomy 
 Financing Regime / 
Funding Mechanism 
( Source of funding in law 
and in practice)
 Arrangements for 
the transfer of 
allocated funds 
Interventional 
Autonomy
 Influence in setting 
performance goals 
and performance 
targets 
 Nature and extent of 
performance 
monitoring &  
measurement by 
government 
 Extent of application 
of sanctions 
 Audit provisions by 
law
 Nature and extent of 
arrangements for 
internal and external 
auditing in practice 
Financial 
Management 
 Control over   
Expenditure 
Management
 Degree of Budget 
Flexibility
 Control over  
financial 
administration and 
accounting 
- procurement 
- Asset management/asset 
disposal
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Figure 4.4: Index for Measuring Bureaucratic Autonomy 
                   Adapted from Verhoest et al. (2004)
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4.4.1.2   Conceptual Framework for Analysing Factors Influencing 
Autonomy 
 
 
 
A conceptual framework38 explains graphically or in narrative form the presumed 
relationships among the key factors, constructs or variables considered integral to the 
dynamics of the phenomenon being investigated (Sekaran, 1992; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). Making use of prior theorising and empirical research as important inputs, 
frameworks can be rudimentary or elaborate, descriptive or causal. Figure 4.5 is a 
schematic presentation of the theoretical framework used to guide the investigation and 
analysis of factors impacting on the practice of bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
With regard to theoretical input, in developing the model, a number of theories were 
evaluated in terms of their relative strengths in explaining those factors most likely to 
impact on the decision-making competencies of the bureaucracy. Chapter three 
discussed the utility of resource dependency theory in explaining the role and 
importance of the task environment; in particular, the notion of resource exchange as a 
central feature of the relation between an organisation and its constituencies, and the 
linkages among organisations as a set of power relations. Recognising, however, the 
inherent limitation in a single theoretical explanation which focuses on organisational 
factors and factors within the focal organisations immediate task network, this author 
sought a complementary theory whose arguments extended beyond the traditional 
approaches. Chapter three also examined the role of institutional theory in its portrayal 
of the organisation as an open system embedded within a broader institutional  
                                                
38
 The terms conceptual framework, theoretical framework and conceptual model are used interchangeably 
during the discussion.  
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Meso-Level (External) 
Conditioning Factors:  
 
Immediate 
Technical/Task  
Network Environment 
 
 
  Attitudes and Behaviors of 
Central Government & 
Other Government 
Institutions  
 
 
  Capacity of Central 
Government and Other 
Government Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-Level (Internal) 
Conditioning Factors: 
 
Organisational 
Environment 
 
        ORG. CAPACITY  
 
 
 
 
 Internal Structures &  
   Systems   
 
  Control over Resources  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macro-Level (External) 
Conditioning Factors: 
 
Institutional Environment 
 
 
 Legal/Administrative Framework  
    (Rules (Formal/Informal)/Laws/  
     Regulations)  
 
 
 
 Legal Tradition 
 
 
 
 System of Government (relations     
 with the different levels of government) 
 
 
 
  Interest Group Participation          
     (The role of donors agencies,  
       trade unions, private sector  
       groups, etc.) 
 
 
Factual Bureaucratic 
Autonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
Figure 4.5: Framework for Analysing Factors Impacting on Bureaucratic Autonomy 
 
 Dotted lines suggest the porosity of the environment, and the potential overlap of factors that may not be contained within the 
environment in which they are represented as a part. 
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environment  much of that environment consisting of a nexus of formal and 
informal rules, politics, social and cultural forces that inflict normative and 
coercive pressures. 
 
Applied, therefore, to the study are the convergent insights of resource 
dependency and institutional theories to develop a framework which focuses on 
factors at three inter-related and substantive levels. In addition to input from 
these theoretical approaches, the framework also draws heavily on the empirical 
work of Grindle and Hilderbrand (1997); Larbi (1998a); and Batley and Larbi 
(2004). The framework suggests that factors at the micro organisational, meso 
task network, and macro broad environmental levels impact on bureaucratic 
functioning and bureaucratic autonomy.  
 
Having identified the three broad categories, the question then remained which 
variables should be included within each of the categories. Sekaran (1992) extols 
the virtues of a meaningful and parsimonious framework which explains the 
variance far more efficiently than an elaborate and cumbersome one 
encompassing an unmanageable number of factors which only marginally add to 
the explained variance.  In selecting indicators, use was made of this strategy of 
parsimony (Lijphart, 1975; Sekaran, ibid; Miles and Huberman, 1994) to 
judiciously restrict choice to those variables which, at least at the outset, seemed 
most important given the subject being investigated. The three broad areas of 
analysis are operationalised using indicators that include: the legal and 
administrative framework; legal tradition; government; interest group 
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participation; internal structures and systems; control over resources; attitudes 
and behaviours, as well as the capacity of central government and other 
government institutions. 
 
The model suggests that reforms which maintain continued controls in any or all 
aspects of these identified factors will result in the reduced capacity of the 
bureaucracy to function autonomously. The model, it should be noted, was not a 
static one-off creation.  As data were collected, the framework underwent about 
three revisions where empirically less meaningful factors were replaced with 
more meaningful ones. 
 
4.4.2    DATA COLLECTION: INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESSES 
 
In order to achieve its objectives, one of the main requirements of the study is to 
collect data which are historical (that take into account pre-reform situations); 
processual (that focus on the evolution of change); contextual (that examine the 
relations between process and contexts at different levels of analysis); and plural 
in nature (that describe the differing versions of reality as perceived by different 
actors involved in the reform process). 
 
Qualitative studies generally rely on the integration of data from a variety of 
methods and sources of information, a general principle known as triangulation. 
The logic underlying triangulation is rooted in the complexity of social reality, and 
the limitation of all research methodologies, namely that no single method ever 
adequately solves the problem of rival explanations. Reliance on a single piece 
runs the danger that undetected error in our inferences may render our analysis 
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incorrect (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2006). By triangulating, the weaknesses in 
a single method are compensated for by the counterbalancing strengths of 
another. According to Snow and Anderson (1991), by adding one layer of data to 
another to build a confirmatory edifice, constructs and hypotheses are more 
strongly substantiated, adding rigour, breadth and depth to the investigation.  
 
In this study, data gathering methods involved the initial desk study, the conduct 
of individual phenomenological semi-structured interviews (SSIs), focus group 
discussions (FGDs), as well as documentary analysis of various source 
documents. These various sources not only allowed for the gathering of 
historical, processual and contextual data from a range of perspectives, they also 
allowed for triangulation. Field data were collected in two separate phases over a 
total period of seven and a half months (four and a half months in Jamaica, and 
three in the DR), between the beginning of May 2006 and the end of January 
2008. The second field visit was undertaken to collect additional data to address 
research hypotheses on legal tradition and system of government. Table 4.1 
summarises the methodology for data collection. Given the brevity of the table 
information, a bit more detail is provided on key methodological issues including 
the development of the topic guides, interviewee selection, the interview process, 
as well as the documentary analysis. 
 
 
4.4.2.1   The Questionnaire Instrument and Interview Topic Guides 
 
 
Linked to the framework illustrated in Figure 4.4, a questionnaire instrument was 
devised to measure autonomy along all seven dimensions (legal, structural, 
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policy, financial, financial management, human resource management, 
interventional) as identified. In Part I of the questionnaire, items are used which 
measure the full range of freedoms, from low to high levels of independence. 
Data is also captured pre- and post-reform for each dimension. Part II of the 
questionnaire captures more in-depth qualitative data on the nature and extent of 
interventional autonomy. Attached at Appendix XI is a copy of the questionnaire 
instrument. 
 
A main topic guide was devised to measure influences on bureaucratic autonomy 
at the various levels of environment. A second guide was also developed and 
used during the second field visit to collect data on the legal tradition 
independent variable. One major issue with the development of data collection 
tools was that whilst these needed to be as comprehensive as possible to ensure 
capture of current, historical, processual and contextual data, care needed to be 
taken with respect to the intrusion on the interviewees time.  
 
Both guides make use of open-ended questions to enable interviewees to frame 
their own unique responses. Incorporated was a mixture of questions relating to 
factual knowledge, personal experiences and behaviours, as well as values and 
opinions; with questions grouped under the same theme. Some questions were 
augmented with probes that served as cues to the interviewer for the level of 
detail desired for responses. Note that despite the wording of the main topic 
guide, questions were asked in relation both to pre- and post-reform status.   
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Table 4.1: Methodology for Data Collection 
Srl. No. DATA GATHERING 
METHOD 
NATURE OF THE WORK UNDERTAKEN COMMENTS 
 
1. 
 
DESK STUDY 
Literature review on subjects of Public Sector Reforms, New Public Management, 
Decentralisation and Autonomisation. Library sources included University of 
Birmingham (physical and online resources); University of Londons Senate 
House Library; and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. Online searches of 
website of international organisations such as the World Bank and other 
institutions with a development portfolio. 
Desk study resulted in the narrowing of the 
research focus and a consolidation and 
integration of the key issues. Gaps identified 
assisted in the development of the studys central 
arguments and the formulation of the research 
questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
DATA COLLECTION 
 & 
INTERVIEWS 
Study involved: 
 2 phases of fieldwork data collection 
 Total of 149 in-depth semi-structured interviews involving 115 respondents, 
plus some informal conversations 
 Within the organisations internal environment, a cross-section of individuals 
interviewed at all levels of organisational functioning 
 Within the task network environment and broader institutional environment, 
interviews conducted with senior officials in central government institutions, 
senior officials in private sector entities, members of the judiciary, academics, 
plus others with a vested interest in the functioning of the organisations 
 Use of Key Informant Methodology to select interviewees. Key Informants 
selected primarily via information from documentation such as the 
Organisational Chart, the Civil Establishment Order, the Staff List, and Job 
Profiles. Some interviewees recommended as a result of the process of 
snowballing. 
 
Data on the nature and extent of autonomy was 
largely collected via the administering of a 
questionnaire instrument (See Appendix XI). 
The interview process was guided by the 
development and use of two separate topic 
guides to collect data on influences on 
bureaucratic autonomy (See Appendices XII and 
XIII). 
 
Topic Guides were developed using the studys 
research questions and theoretical framework as 
a basis. 
 
3. 
FOCUS GROUP 
DISCUSSIONS (FGDs) 
 Open ended interviews with a homogeneous group of typically 6-8 persons 
lasting between 1-1 ½ hours 
 Total of 24 FGDs held. Data were used to triangulate information collected 
during one-to-one interviews and documentary analysis 
 
 
4. 
DOCUMENTARY 
ANALYSIS 
 
 Use of a range of open-published and restricted official government 
documents, plus privately authored open-published materials 
These included Bills, Legislation, Reports and 
Newspaper Articles (See end of References for 
documentation consulted) 
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Copies of both interview guides are attached at Appendices XII and XIII. For the 
Dominican case study, prior to the field visit, both guides were forwarded via email 
for translation of the questions from English into Spanish to the liaison officer 
identified to assist me during the fieldwork.  
 
4.4.2.2   Selection of Respondents: Use of the Key Informant   
Method (KIM) 
 
 
 
A plurality of perspectives was derived from interviewing a wide range of 
stakeholders both internal and external to the focal organisations. Within the 
organisations, interviews were conducted with senior management personnel 
who dealt with policy issues at the strategic level and who worked closely enough 
with policymakers to be able to offer judgement about the latters behaviours and 
attitudes. The elite bias (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was avoided by also 
including individuals at the middle and lower organisational levels. External 
stakeholders interviewed included senior managers in institutions in the focal 
organisations immediate task environment. These included government officials 
in Ministries and other government departments. Other stakeholders interviewed 
with an interest in the functioning of the revenue departments included senior 
officials in private sector companies. In Jamaica, also interviewed were recently 
retired senior civil servants, as well as a few university academics with 
specialisation in the fields of politics and government. In essence, the studys 
range of interviewees included both those who acted as the initiators of change 
as well as those who were affected by the changes. 
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With regard to the actual selection process, interviewees were selected using the 
key informant method (KIM), a technique whereby informants are not selected at 
random, but rather on the basis of their position in the organisation or, because 
they are supposedly knowledgeable about the issues being researched (Phillips, 
1981; Bagozzi et al, 1991; Kumar et al, 1993).  
 
In selecting key informants (KIs) within each of the organisations, use was made 
of the current organisational chart and the Staff List or Civil Service 
Establishment Order as appropriate, to identify the various Divisions/Sections; 
job titles; and the number of posts allocated for each title within a Division or 
Section. The assigned liaison officers were responsible for contacting divisional 
or section heads to schedule interview meetings. In a number of cases, it was the 
division or section head who was actually responsible for selecting the 
interviewees (in particular, when more than one post was allocated for a 
particular title and they were a number of incumbents from whom to choose).  
 
Cognizant of this selection problem associated with the KIM, a few precautionary 
measures were taken to avoid measurement error. Different strategies were used 
to both ensure and evaluate the competency of KIs to report on issues. Firstly, in 
both case studies, in order to avert a situation where the task of providing the 
needed information was delegated to whoever was most available, at the start of 
the interview scheduling process, liaison officers were asked to emphasise to 
Division and Section Heads the importance of selecting respondents on the basis 
of knowledge rather than convenience. Secondly, to evaluate the competency of 
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informants, three items at the beginning of the topic guide collected information 
on the interviewees current position, his/her length of time in the organisation, as 
well as the length of time within the current position. By including such items, I 
was able to ascertain (1) whether the person holding the title carried out the 
duties as envisioned and (2) where appropriate, whether the person held the 
position when the event being investigated occurred. 
 
With regard to the selection of KIs external to the revenue departments, again 
selection was based on organisational title. Organisations with whom the 
revenue administrations directly interface, as well as other stakeholders with an 
interest in the functioning of the focal organisations were contacted directly in 
order to schedule interviews with persons in senior management positions. 
University academics likewise were contacted directly at their offices in order to 
arrange meetings at times and dates that were mutually agreeable. 
 
In addition to identifying KIs on the basis of position within the organisation, other 
KIs were added to the initial list through the process of snowballing (Foster, 
1996; Denscombe, 1998; Black, 1999). Interviewees were either asked or 
volunteered the names of additional persons whom they believed could 
meaningfully contribute to the data collection process. One advantage of 
snowballing is that sponsorship facilitates access and encourages co-operation. 
A few senior managers facilitated access to recommended sources by emailing 
or telephoning the individual to arrange a meeting. The full list of those 
interviewed and the organisations to which they are affiliated is provided at 
Appendix XIV. 
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4.4.2.3   The Interview Process 
 
 
 
Interview sessions commenced with a few introductory statements, where 
interviewees were reminded or informed of the nature and purpose of the 
research and of its potential benefits to the organization. In the DR, where some 
interviews were tape-recorded, permission was sought from the respondent prior 
to the start of the session. 
 
Elaborating on the DR interviews, approximately one third of these were 
conducted in English. Interviewees in these sessions were mostly senior 
managers who had studied abroad and undertaken degree courses where 
English was the language of instruction. Interviewees showed a clear 
understanding of the questions, and provided responses which were free-flowing 
and comprehensible. For the remaining interviews with officials who had limited 
or no knowledge of English, I was assisted in these sessions by bilingual native 
Spanish speakers. These individuals acted as translators, posing the pre-
translated questions from the translated interview guides and performing 
simultaneous translation of the interviewees responses. 
 
Across both cases, with regard to the questions asked, it was the managers at 
the top and middle organisational levels who were questioned on strategic issues 
such as the level of policy autonomy, inter-organisational relations with 
stakeholders.. Supervisors and junior staff were questioned primarily on 
operational issues. In essence, questions focused on matters about which it was 
felt the interviewee would have been able to report.  
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In order to ensure that I obtained historical information as well as a processual 
account of events, questions were asked in the present, past, as well as the 
future tense. For example, persons were asked how things were done in the 
past, how they are currently being done, as well as envisioned future plans. 
Questions were also asked about past, present and future attitudes in relevant 
areas. I asked respondents questions not only about their own knowledge, 
attitudes and behaviours, but also about those of other colleagues within the 
organisation. This provided an opportunity for respondents to disclose 
information without having to admit, for example, any misconduct or improprieties 
on their part.  
 
Not all questions were used at every interview. Sometimes a selection was made 
based on the time granted by the interviewee, or as earlier stated on the 
particular area of responsibility of the respondent. This prevented a shifting from 
qualitative to survey-style interviewing to cover all of the topics, which could have 
impacted negatively on the quality of data collected.  In cases where rich detailed 
information was being provided and I was unable, by the end of the session, to 
cover all of the relevant issues, a follow-up interview was requested and in all 
cases these were granted. There was also no rigid adherence to the original 
sequencing of questions. Where the respondent touched on a particular subject 
slated for later discussion, (s)he was permitted to speak on the topic, provided 
what was being said was relevant to the study. 
 
 Interviews typically lasted between one and two hours. At the conclusion of each 
interview, respondents were prompted by a request to provide any additional 
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information which (s)he felt might be relevant. This open invitation often yielded 
additional insights into the issues being investigated. 
 
At the end of each day, data collected were transcribed verbatim and saved in 
MS Word documents. In the DR, where interviews conducted in Spanish were 
tape-recorded, the translated recorded version was cross-checked against the 
simultaneously translated data for completeness and consistency. As figure 4.1 
shows, at this data collection phase, some data analysis was undertaken. This 
provided an opportunity to fill any missing gaps in information or to clarify issues 
where I noticed a lack of perceptual agreement in interview responses. Such 
differences were reconciled by going back to either one or both respondents to 
(dis)confirm the accuracy of the information provided. 
 
4.4.2.4   Documentary Analysis 
 
 
Prior to the field visits, I identified a set of documents and statistical data which I 
believed would have assisted in the process of data collection. A list containing 
the documents and statistical data being requested was emailed in advance to 
the four departments. Attached at Appendix XV is a copy of the list which was 
forwarded. 
 
For the documentary review, use was made of a combination of open-published 
and restricted official state documents, along with private open-published 
documentary materials. Together these included Acts of Parliament, and other 
pieces of legislation and regulations; strategic plans and annual reports; internal 
guidelines and newsletters; evaluation reports produced by external consultants; 
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as well as newspaper articles (including news articles, editorials, columns as 
expressions of opinions and letters to the editor). In the DR case, whilst some 
documentation was in English, a number of documents, such as the legislation, 
study reports and internal newsletters were written in Spanish. These documents 
were translated by the officers who assisted in the translations during the 
interviews. 
  
4.4.3    DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORTING 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) refers to the huge chasm that often separates data from 
conclusions, because of the little space allocated to discussion of analysis. 
Bryman and Burgess (1994), in a similar vein, note the reluctance of qualitative 
researchers to lay bare the procedures associated with the analysis of data. The 
section discusses the process of data analysis and the method of reporting used 
for the study. 
 
4.4.3.1   Analysis of Case Data 
 
 
As already mentioned, a comparative case study approach is applied in the 
present study. By its very nature, the research generated a huge amount of data 
that needed to be sufficiently analysed using appropriate data analysis 
techniques.  
 
So how does the qualitative researcher proceed with analysing data from multiple 
cases? Albeit there being no single right approach, clearly there is a need for 
some analytic strategy. Regarding the strategy used for data analysis, the 
  
159 
 
research questions and the conceptual framework were applied as the primary 
tools for guiding the analysis of the data. The initial task involved the 
development of a classification system to facilitate coding or data indexing.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the replication strategy used during the data analysis 
process. Finding merit in the argument that initially each case must be 
represented and understood as an idiosyncratic manifestation of the 
phenomenon of interest (Patton, 1990: 387), findings were first analysed and 
interpreted at the single-case level. 
 
Examining in-depth first the Jamaican case, data collected were subjected to a 
within-case analysis. Using the devised coding system and starting with the 
printed interview transcript materials, the content of these documents was 
analysed and manually coded using the technique of pattern matching. Using MS 
Word, chunks of the coded text were electronically copied from interview 
transcript files and pasted with other items that fit under the same heading into 
an appropriate excerpt file. Care was taken to identify the documents from 
whence coded data were taken. A similar process was then used for case data 
from the documentary review. 
 
Excerpt files were then printed for local integration (Weiss, 1994) of the 
information within the particular file. Interview data and data from the 
documentary sources were synthesised by a process of triangulation. Only when 
the evidence from the different sources corroborated each other did I consider 
there was a finding, and such information used as part of the study. This 
procedure was then followed by the inclusive integration (ibid) of case findings 
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from the various excerpt files, in order to report a single well-knit story with 
respect to the case. 
 
This process of within-case analysis was then repeated for the Dominican case. 
Chapters five through nine of the thesis report findings from the single case 
analyses. Within case analyses were then followed by a cross-national 
comparison of the two cases in order to examine the effect of contextual and 
institutional factors and to explore joint and deviating patterns. Findings from the 
cross-case analysis are reported in chapter ten.  
 
Also undertaken was a process of content analysis to investigate styles of legal 
drafting in both cases. Content analysis has a long history in social science 
research. Qualitative content analysis is a research method involving the 
subjective interpretation of the context of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. The method 
goes beyond merely counting words to examining language intensely for the 
purpose of classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories 
that represent similar meanings (Weber, 1990). 
 
As illustrated in figure 4.1, the process of data analysis concluded when I was 
satisfied that the studys research questions had been appropriately and 
sufficiently addressed. 
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4.4.3.2   Report of Empirical Findings 
 
In reporting the studys empirical findings, again the research questions, 
theoretical propositions and theoretical framework were used as the basis for 
structuring the report. For each of the major issues investigated in the research  
the rationale behind reform; the practice of bureaucratic autonomy; and the 
factors impacting on the practice of autonomy  I present under the appropriately 
headed chapters and sections my findings on these topics first for the Jamaican 
case, immediately followed by those for the Dominican case.  This reporting 
structure, in my view, lends to better readability than other options which were 
contemplated. For example, it avoids a situation where, by breaking the larger 
issues into smaller sub-topics and repeatedly alternating between the two cases, 
the report comes off more like a ping pong game, detracting the reader from 
gaining a coherent picture of each case with respect to the main issues being 
investigated. 
 
Included within the thesis are excerpts from interviews and documents, primarily 
as evidence for the various assertions being made, as well as to enliven the 
report. In quoting interview respondents, a decision needed to be taken on 
whether or not to edit selected statements. In this study, whilst some statements 
were edited as appropriate in order to make it easier for the reader to grasp the 
point(s) being made, care was taken not to alter the meaning of original 
statements either by changing words or by undertaking a more literate and 
pointed translation. 
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As a final point on reporting, the reader may notice that in my review of the 
literature dealing with factors impacting on the exercise of bureaucratic 
autonomy, I discuss in sequential order first the micro level factors, followed by 
factors at the meso and macro levels; whilst in my report of empirical findings this 
ordering is being reversed. The treatment of the issues in this manner is 
conscious and deliberate. In Part I of the thesis, the discussion was structured to 
underscore the traditional approach used within organisational analyses whereby 
consideration is usually given to the micro and meso level factors, at the expense 
of examining the potential impact of factors at the broader macro level. I 
therefore presented these traditional arguments, before introducing what I 
consider to be my special contribution to the topic with the subsequent 
incorporation of broader institutional factors. In Part III of the thesis, findings on 
the impact of macro level factors are first reported, in order to demonstrate the 
extent to which these factors work their way through to the meso and micro 
levels of bureaucratic functioning. 
 
4.5   REFLEXIVITY: EVALUATING THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
RESEARCH PROCESS 
 
 
Hailed as one of the primary methodological innovations, reflexivity, the project 
of examining how the researcher and inter-subjective elements impact on and 
transform research (Finlay, 2003: 4), has become an important part of the 
evolution of qualitative research. Though not always referred to explicitly as 
reflexivity, the concept is best understood as the researcher reflecting on the 
quality of his/her research; for example by evaluating research decisions, 
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methods and outcomes, making explicit any biases which may have crept into 
the study; as well as by examining the impact of personal presence, position, and 
perspective. 
 
Although the usual caveats with respect to perceptual data apply, considerable 
care still needs to be taken to attend to concerns of measures such as credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability39 that will adequately (if not 
absolutely) affirm the trustworthiness of qualitative inquiry (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). In the remainder of this section, the quality of the present study is 
examined. 
 
4.5.1    MEASURES AND CONSTRUCT VALIDITY 
 
 
Here the focus was on assessing the degree to which correct operational 
measures were developed for the constructs investigated in the study. Both the 
autonomy index adopted and the theoretical framework developed were based 
on previous empirical work. Given the attested validity of the autonomy measure 
adopted by the study from a previous empirical work which was very similar in its 
focus, it is safe to argue the high level of construct validity of the measure of 
bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
                                                
39
 Lincoln and Guba (1985) identify and define a set of post-positivist criteria for establishing the 
trustworthiness of findings from qualitative studies as follows: credibility (the degree of truthfulness of 
findings as perceived by those observed or interviewed and within the context of the study); transferability 
(the extent to which findings can be transferred to other settings); dependability (the extent to which 
consistent findings would emerge, should the research be carried out again) and; confirmability (the 
provision of evidence that corroborates the findings, such evidence gained directly from subjects and the 
research context). 
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Unlike the fairly comprehensive nature of the autonomy measure, this author 
acknowledges the limitations of the theoretical framework for measuring 
influences on autonomy in its coverage of only some of the most salient and 
relevant autonomy conditioning factors. Parsimony in choice of variables means 
that as an indicative schema, this map of the territory being investigated 
represents only a slice of reality, as opposed to a full understanding or complete 
picture of the complex conjunction of factors that might produce opportunities for 
or constraints on discretionary action. 
 
Reflecting on the potential impact of the studys use of the KIM, already 
discussed is the strategy used to minimise the introduction of errors through 
respondent selection. Also at issue, and equally important, was the potential 
introduction of systematic or random errors through KIs provision of incorrect or 
biased information. Phillips (1981) notes that researchers using the KIM often 
ask informants to perform complex tasks of social judgements about macro-level 
phenomena, and/or to perform aggregations over persons, tasks, organisational 
sub-units or event, which may produce unreliable results.  
 
Considering the possibility of the introduction of systematic errors into the study, 
my manner of conduct of the interviews as well as what I perceive as my 
influence on the research site assisted in minimising such distortions. In order to 
engender trust and cooperation, and to obtain accurate and detailed information, 
interviewees were assured prior to the start of interviews of the confidentiality of 
their responses. Acceptance of such assurance resulted in the majority of 
interviewees reported on the full spectrum of perceived organizational functioning 
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 including the good, the bad, and the ugly  by so doing, Focusing on potential 
randomised errors introduced by individual perceptual and cognitive limitations, 
the use of multiple informants allowed for the cross-checking of different peoples 
views and judgements. 
 
Yet another factor considered with respect to measurement validity relates to the 
problem of linguistic equivalence (Warwick and Osherson 1973:30). Whilst the 
technique of back-translation40 would have allowed for greater rigour, lack of time 
prohibited cycling through such a process. The fact that use was made of 
bilingual native Spanish speakers to translate the questions from English to 
Spanish, and that during the interview process, interviewees demonstrated a 
clear understanding of what was being asked by providing free-flowing 
responses that appropriately addressed the questions, leads me to conclude the 
achievement of linguistic equivalence of measure. 
 
4.5.2    CREDIBILITY 
 
 
Qualitative analyses can be evocative, illuminatingly masterful  and wrong. The 
story well told as it is, does not fit the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 262)41. 
Conveyed within this statement is the notion that when the researcher writes for 
publication, or in cases such as this, for assessment for the award of a higher 
degree qualification, (s)he faces the task of conveying to the reader the credibility 
of his/her findings  i.e. the plausibility of inferences which are being drawn from 
                                                
40
 The technique of back-translation involves iterative translations from English to Spanish, Spanish to 
English, then again from English to Spanish until all discrepancies in meanings are clarified or removed. 
41
 Note that this is a view which might not necessarily be shared by some critical non-positivists. 
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the study. The qualitative investigator has to devise means of ensuring that the 
external observer is able to follow the process of reasoning applied at the start of 
the research through to the studys presented conclusions. 
 
In this empirical work, various precautionary measures and strategies were 
employed to enhance the researchs credibility. At the data collection phase, 
strategies were used to safeguard against errors introduced by use of the KIM. 
During data analysis, use of pattern matching allowed for the gathering of 
evidence from which valid and logical inferences were drawn. The convergence 
of this evidence, as witnessed during the process of triangulation of the various 
data sources, further increases the probability of the credibility of the studys 
findings and interpretations. In the reporting phase, provision of information that 
is rich and thick in description has allowed for the establishment of a thread or 
chain of evidence that runs from the studys initial research questions, to 
assumptions and design choices, to the specific data uncovered, and finally, to 
the results and conclusions. 
 
4.5.3   TRANSFERABILITY 
 
 
Given the highly context and case dependent nature of qualitative findings - 
experiences and meanings largely bound to the time, people and setting of the 
particular study - most qualitative researchers rarely make claims about 
transferability (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). Likewise, this author makes no claim 
about the transferability of the findings of this research to contexts outside of the 
study. The most being argued here is that the use of a design based on 
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comparative case research has reduced the risk of reporting idiosyncratic events, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that findings will transfer. My provision of a 
detailed thick description, for example of how hypotheses and constructs were 
developed, should assist a future researcher hopeful of making such a transfer, 
in deciding whether or not such an act should be contemplated. Following the 
arguments earlier highlighted about analytical generalisation, I argue for the 
transferability of the conceptual framework introduced in the study, which may be 
used in future research on this topic. 
 
 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter presented the studys design and methodology. Provided was the 
rationale for the use of a comparative case method that draws on the qualitative 
approach to data collection and data analysis. The methodology employed will 
allow for a peering into the black box of political decision-making, social actions 
and interactions that permeate bureaucratic functioning. This then makes it 
possible to explain the why and how of reforms and the practice of autonomy. 
Also presented were the two frameworks separately devised to measure the 
nature and extent of autonomy in practice, as well as influences on the exercise 
of bureaucratic discretion.  
 
Regarding the nature and extent of autonomy practiced within the focal 
organisations, the analysis will draw on a number of issues discussed in chapter 
two, including not only the formally ascribed amount of autonomy granted to the 
Revenue, but also their capacity to act and to make use of informal means to 
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break free of institutional constraints. Analysis will focus on the relative 
importance of the difference dimensions of autonomy, as well as the dynamics 
surrounding autonomy that may result in a waxing and waning of discretionary 
space. Focusing on the influences on autonomy, the study will investigate a 
number of outcomes, including the relative impact of the three identified levels of 
environment, highlighting as appropriate the specific autonomy dimension 
affected by each of the factors. The chapter concluded with the authors 
introspection on the overall quality and rigour of the research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
TAX ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS: 
RATIONALE & PROCESSES 
 
 
 
5.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter presents answers to the first research question posed in the thesis, 
concerning the rationale underlying fiscal administrative reforms and choice of 
institutional forms. Also provided, for each of the cases, is a brief summary of the 
process of reforms, actions undertaken and actions omitted. The effects of such 
omissions and actions on capacity for autonomous functioning will be seen in the 
later analysis. 
 
 
5.2    TAX ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN JAMAICA  
 
 
5.2.1    THE RATIONALE BEHIND REFORM 
 
 
During the 1980s the GoJ, as part of a Jamaica Tax Structure Examination 
Project, embarked on a comprehensive programme of tax reform, the central 
economic objective of which was the achievement of a high and stable level of 
growth and employment creation. Whereas, at the time, the primary focus was on 
good tax policy, the government recognised that reform objectives could not be 
achieved without the capacity for their proper implementation. The problem of an 
inadequate tax administration therefore now begged specific attention. It was 
from this genesis that the Jamaican government entered in 1994 into a loan 
agreement with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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(hereafter the World Bank or the Bank) for the co-financing of a Tax 
Administrative Reform Project (hereafter TaxARP or the Project) that was to 
focus exclusively on the administrative dimension of tax reform. The project 
would be implemented over a six-year period at a total estimated cost of 
US$42.0 million.  
 
TaxARP commenced with an in-depth study of the tax administration system by 
the GoJ and the World Bank. Note that the Customs Department was not 
originally included in TaxARP. Customs modernisation, which commenced in late 
1999 under a separate five-year World Bank sponsored ´Customs Modernisation 
Programme´ (CMP), proceeded as part of the broader Jamaica Public Sector 
Modernisation Programme, and was then later included as part of TaxARP. 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the pre-reform organisational structure of tax administration 
in Jamaica. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Pre-Reform Organisational Structure of Tax Administration 
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Line organisation was divided into six departments  Inland Revenue, Income 
Tax, General Consumption Tax, Stamp Duty & Transfer Tax, Customs, and Land 
Valuation - with four other units which undertook functions related to tax 
administration reporting directly to the Financial Secretary.  
 
TaxARPs Project design was based on a multi-dimensional diagnosis of 
shortcomings in a number of areas, namely the organisational structure of the tax 
departments; the legal framework of tax administration; voluntary compliance; the 
control of tax evasion and tax collection; management systems; and 
computerisation. The analyses, conclusions and proposed reforms were 
published in May 1994 in the Jamaica Tax Administration Reform Project - Staff 
Appraisal Report (hereafter SAR or the Report).  
 
According to the Reports main findings, tax administration suffered from three 
main inter-related problems that led to major constraints in revenue mobilisation, 
as illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: SAR Findings of the Major Problems in Tax Administration 
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Problems stemmed largely from: 
 
 a) narrowness of the tax base, with a significant gap between actual and 
potential revenue yield remaining a perennial problem;  
b) underperformance of the tax administration attributed to structural 
organisation on the basis of tax types and inherent problems of duplication, 
limited management capacity as well as capacity for revenue collection and 
the control of tax and customs evasion; and 
c) poor levels of voluntary compliance, occasioned by high transaction costs 
involved in the payment of taxes and weak enforcement of tax laws. 
 
According to SAR (1994:12), these problems reinforce[d] each other negatively 
and led to a downward spiral of ineffectiveness, inefficiency and inequity of the 
overall system. The Report thus went on to explicitly outline the value 
proposition behind the reform: 
 
In order to make the requisite investments for providing social services 
and building the economic infrastructure needed for private sector 
development; reduce the debt burden; offset the anticipated declines in the 
existing tax base; and allow eventual reduction of tax rates, GoJ needs to 
improve revenue collection substantially. For this purpose, the efficiency 
and effectiveness42 of tax administration needs to be improved (ibid:14) 
 
 
TaxARP was to represent an integrated approach to tax reform and 
modernisation, incorporating several features of effective and efficient tax 
administration systems. Figure 5.3 illustrates the recommended multi-
dimensional strategy to achieve a turnaround in the chronic problems facing tax 
                                                
42
 Whereas effectiveness refers to the way the revenue is collected (fraud, fairness, compliance etc.), 
efficiency refers to the resources spent on each unit of tax collected. 
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administration. The 3-pronged approach would focus on broadening the tax 
base, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of tax administration, as well as 
on the facilitation of voluntary compliance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 5.3: The Proposed Multidimensional Strategy for Reform 
 
 
 
Immediate project outcomes such as the simplification of work processes, 
improved tax information systems, and reduced administrative costs would allow 
not only for the financing of budgetary needs, but most importantly for an 
eventual reduction of tax rates which would spur private investment. 
 
Between 1999 and 2002, the GOJ, the World Bank and other donors also 
launched a separate modernisation project for the Customs Department. Unlike 
TaxARPs main findings, internal assessments revealed that the problems 
plaguing the Customs administration stemmed mostly from a primary reliance on 
manual paper-based systems which not only resulted in inefficiencies, but 
provided fertile ground for fraud and inconsistencies due to the lack of 
accountability. According to senior Customs personnel, reforms were being 
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implemented against the background of an estimated JA$4b lost in 1999 as a 
result of fraud and corruption, and the need to better guard against such revenue 
shortfalls. The rationale, therefore, behind Customs reform was to enable the CD 
to more efficiently, effectively and also more transparently process and facilitate 
the movement of goods and passengers. Government in a press release in the 
early phase of the reform publicly acknowledged its banking on reforms to help 
curb corruption within the system, emphasising the critical attention that would be 
paid to the issue of integrity during the process of modernisation (Jamaica 
Observer, November 15, 2001). A Six-Point Modernisation Plan therefore 
focused on areas such as a streamlining of operations, improvements and 
automation of processes, managing for results, as well as the enhancement of 
voluntary compliance through the effective enforcement of Customs laws. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the resulting proposed structure for reforming the 
administration of taxes in Jamaica. The restructured Tax Administration would 
consist of seven departments, newly created or reoriented, to make them more 
specific to functions as opposed to the type of taxes administered.  
 
Recognising that physical reorganisation alone was insufficient for the 
sustainability of successful reforms, the Bank included as part of its initial loan 
agreements a few conditionalities regarding loan disbursements. Under TaxARP, 
conditions included, for example, agreement by the GoJ to the review of the 
compensation structure in tax administration. Under both TaxARP and CMP, the 
development of a legal framework capable of effecting modernisation plans, 
followed by the necessary presentation to Parliament of amendments to the  
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Figure 5.4: The Jamaica Tax Administration - Proposed Organisational Structure 
 
administrative and procedural provisions of tax laws, as agreed by the Bank, 
were other conditions of loan disbursement. Apart from conditionalities, also 
worth mentioning is the set of operational recommendations  a set of key 
organisational and management concepts, initiatives, practices and outcomes - 
which the Bank argued should be made indispensable parts of the overall 
framework. 
 
One of the most important operational recommendations was for the 
empowerment of management and staff within the restructured tax departments. 
The revenue departments should be delegated sufficient authority to perform 
their most important functions, in return for strict accountability for achieving pre-
determined performance targets. Tax Commissioners should not only be given 
authority to execute their own budget allocations, delegation of authority should 
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also be secured for major aspects of personnel administration and management 
now controlled by central institutions. In the Banks view, the newly-reformed 
institutions, operating with a modern resource base and greater autonomy would 
be able to significantly improve revenues as well as the quality of services 
provided to taxpayers. 
 
 
Worth mentioning at this stage is the extent to which conditionalities and 
recommendations were followed, in order to later gauge the impact of earlier 
decisions on reform processes and reform outcomes. The World Banks blueprint 
model for reform was not accepted in its entirety, but adapted to suit what 
government deemed to be the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the Jamaican 
situation. Figure 5.5 illustrates the actual implemented tax structure.  
 
Continuity with the past saw ongoing direct lines of reporting between the 
Financial Secretary and entities such as Fiscal Services Ltd (the informatics arm 
of government) and the Revenue Protection Department (which assisted the 
Revenue in compliance and enforcement). Such continued structural 
arrangements spelt huge implications for the Revenues capacity to act 
autonomously, due to resource dependency and the quality and timeliness of 
services provided by such entities within the focal organisations technical or task 
network environment.  
 
Regarding structural change, the administration of both domestic and 
international taxes and support for tax administration would be undertaken within 
a newly constituted umbrella Jamaica Tax Administration that incorporates the  
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Figure 5.5: The Jamaica Tax Administration - 1999 Implemented Structure 
 
 
 
Inland Revenue, the Customs, the Taxpayer Audit and Assessment, the Tax 
Administration Services, and the Taxpayer Appeals departments. More 
important, from the point of view of this research, are those deviations which from 
the outset spelt implications for autonomous bureaucratic functioning. Contrary to 
global trends in fiscal reforms where newly modernised revenue administrations, 
by virtue of the enabling legislation, are structurally divorced from central 
authority, the GoJ did not follow this route. Instead of being placed at arms-length 
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from central government and empowered to a level advocated by the World 
Bank, the Jamaica Tax Administration was legally constituted as a directorate 
within the Ministry of Finance with less formally granted autonomous powers. 
 
Such decision prompted heated debate during the reading of the Bill in the Lower 
House. According to the Opposition Jamaica Labour Party Shadow Minister of 
Finance, governments piecemeal adoption of reform was in sharp contrast to the 
general approach of the World Bank, which considered the introduction of a 
substantial degree of autonomy in tax administration as essential to the long term 
success of reform. Shaw opined: 
 
One would have hoped that the government would have opted for the more 
autonomous approach indicated by the World Bank, as a means of 
establishing a tax administration machinery capable of meeting the 
challenges of the future, instead of attempting to establish the flawed 
arrangements indicated in this Bill...[A]ll around the public sector 
bureaucracy we are giving more autonomy...last week we gave the National 
Youth Service statutory body status. We are changing some agencies from 
statutory body to executive agencies, but the biggest thing in town, taxation, 
does not have the autonomy.43 
 
 
 
5.2.2    THE PROCESS OF REFORM 
 
 
To assist with the design and establishment of the Tax Administration (TA), a 
group of expatriate Consultants (hereafter the Group or the Consultants), were 
hired to analyse existing systems and processes, to make suitable 
recommendations, and to guide the transformation process.  
 
                                                
43
 Comments made during the reading of the Bill An Act to Amend the Revenue Administration Act. 
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TaxARP implementation, which was undertaken in three phases, proceeded 
under the guidance of three high level documents  a Master Plan, a Broad 
Strategic Plan and a detailed Transition Plan. Whilst Phase I of the Project 
focused on the identification of specific tasks required to achieve objectives 
under four of the five project components, Phase II involved the conduct of 
various assessments  manpower audits, training needs analyses, job 
evaluations and job classification  that would feed into project implementation. 
 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the institutional arrangements that guided Phase II of the 
Project. To provide overall leadership for the reform process, a special Project 
Co-ordination Unit (PCU) was established, comprising a Director and Deputy 
Director and five senior members of staff seconded from the different revenue 
departments. The PCU fell under the supervision of a high level Steering 
Committee comprising Deputy Financial Secretaries within the Ministry of 
Finance, Commissioners of the revenue departments being restructured, as well 
as other Commissioners and Heads of Departments44. The Steering Committee, 
which provided executive management oversight for the project, met on a 
monthly basis to share and discuss proposals, review progress and resolve 
problems. Consultants reported to the Chairman of the Committee through the 
PCU Director.  
 
Similarly for the Customs Modernisation Programme, project design and 
execution also involved the use of an expatriate group of Consultants. Oversight  
                                                
44
 Membership of the Steering Committee also included the Commissioners of Customs and Land 
Valuation, the Chief Parliamentary Counsel, the General Manager of Fiscal Services Ltd., as well as the 
Director of the Revenue Protection Division of the Ministry of Finance. 
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Figure 5.6: TaxARP Phase II  Project Organisation Chart 
Source: Adapted from the Barents Group 1996(a):2-2 
 
of this Project was the responsibility of a Steering Committee which comprised 
the Director General of the Tax Administration, the President of the Jamaica Civil 
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Service Association, as well as representatives of Fiscal Services Limited, the 
Cabinet Office, and the Revenue Protection Department. 
 
For Phase III of the Project, the implementation of the Master Plan, activities 
included recruitment and selection, the implementation of management systems, 
the strengthening of important functions like internal audit and data processing, 
as well as the development of a computerised MIS to facilitate the exchange of 
information amongst the tax departments. Contrary to initial plans, the 
Consultants were not involved in this final phase. Members of the revenue 
departments worked without any external specialist technical assistance dealing 
with the task of reform implementation. 
 
Regarding the recruitment of staff to the newly created positions, all posts within 
the abolished revenue departments were declared redundant and transferred to 
the MoF. Members of staff of each department were required to apply and 
compete for positions within the newly created TA. Most of the persons who 
headed the now defunct organisations were re-selected to head or hold senior 
positions within the newly established organs. The Customs selection exercise 
resulted in approximately 1200 of the original staff being employed to the 
department and about 240 persons being referred to the Office of Services 
Commission for either redeployment elsewhere in the civil service or for 
retirement. As later shown, institutional memory loss was to later impact 
negatively on internal levels of knowledge and expertise and by extension on the 
capacity of persons to perform delegated roles.  
 
  
183 
 
The general conclusion drawn about the process of reform in both projects is that, 
although a number of strategies were put in place on paper to ensure the smooth 
implementation of the TA, in a number of areas the actual process did not 
proceed as smoothly as anticipated. Ineffective project oversight undertaken by 
already overworked senior personnel, poor internal communications, and a 
general lack of adequate preparation of staff for change were only some of the 
shortcomings highlighted. Of particular interest was the charge that TaxARP 
implementation focused primarily on legislative issues, possibly to the detriment 
of other areas also critical to successful reform outcomes. 
 
5.3    TAX ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
 
 
5.3.1    THE RATIONALE BEHIND REFORM 
 
 
Two major compelling reasons lay at the root of governments decision to 
undertake administrative reform of its functions for the collection of domestic and 
international taxes. During the early 1990s, the Dominican Republic embarked on 
a programme of liberalising its trade policy regime, substituting its old 
protectionist politics for measures that would induce businesses to be more 
competitive in the new world environment. The main aim of market liberalisation 
was to promote, facilitate and consolidate the DRs integration in the international 
economy. 
 
 
In order to achieve this objective, Free Trade Agreements between the DR and 
the Central American Common Market (CACM), as well as between the DR and 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) were signed and went into force in 
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October 2001 and December 2001 respectively. In 2004, the DR joined five 
Central American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and 
Costa Rica) to conclude a Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.: the United 
States  Central America Free Trade Agreement  Dominican Republic (CAFTA-
DR)45, which for the DR took effect from March 1, 2007. The Agreements 
removal of barriers to trade and investment in the region resulted in an 
assurance of the DRs preferential access to the worlds largest economy, as well 
as new market access for approximately 80% of U.S. consumer, industrial and 
agricultural products that would immediately enter the DR free of duty.  
 
Responsibilities contracted in the CAFTA-DR pact focused on a number of areas, 
particularly on the administering of customs procedures. Provisions in the 
Agreement on customs administration and trade facilitation focus towards 
achieving greater efficiency, enhanced transparency, heightened predictability, 
as well as improvements in express delivery service. Article 5.2 dealing with the 
release of imported goods mandates that each signatory to the Accord shall 
adopt or maintain simplified customs procedures for the efficient release of goods 
in order to facilitate trade between the parties. Customs authorities shall adopt or 
maintain procedures that provide for the release of goods within a period no 
greater than that required to ensure compliance with its customs laws and, to the 
extent possible, within 48 hours. A separate expedited customs procedure should 
be implemented for the clearance of express shipments from the port of entry 
within six hours of submission of all necessary documents.  
                                                
45
 The DR was added to the Agreement in August 2004. 
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At the time of the DRs signing of the Agreement, the situation on the ground 
paled in significance to the new requirements. Paperwork to process containers 
with duty free merchandise took 12 days on average; 15 days being the typical 
timeframe for the clearance of containers holding duty payable goods. The DR 
government and its Customs department therefore faced the serious and urgent 
challenge of upgrading existing provisions for customs processing of imported 
goods. 
 
The second reason underlying administrative reform likewise relates to events on 
the macroeconomic front. In August 2004, in the wake of the countrys deep 
financial crisis, the new Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) government undertook 
a series of measures to stabilize the economy and regain a path economic of 
growth. In January 2005, an economic program was implemented, backed by a 
new 28-month Standby Arrangement (SBA) with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Embodied within the SBA were conditionalities typical of loan agreements 
approved by international donor agencies, including provisions relating to the 
achievement of fiscal targets. Given, as a result of entry into CAFTA-DR, the 
imminent gradual reductions in income from customs duties, it became clear the 
need to fortify collections from domestic sources of revenue, in order to achieve 
the fiscal targets set in the SBA.  
 
Whereas the focus on customs processing and the functioning of the DGA took 
centre stage as a result of CAFTA-DR; the functioning of the DGII and its 
capacity to contribute significantly to the attainment of fiscal targets 
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simultaneously became of paramount importance. Evident was the need for 
flexible dynamic institutions capable of responding to the rapidly changing and 
challenging circumstances. Pressures on government started to mount, both at 
the international and national levels.  
 
At the international level, the United States government and the IMF each issued 
a requirement calling for the passage of two separate pieces of legislation, each 
law to grant formal autonomy to the two state revenue departments. The U.S 
governments mandate formed part of the requirement for the implementation of 
the CAFTA-DR Accord; whilst for the IMF, the requirement was a guarantee for 
meeting fiscal objectives, as well as for continuing with the SBA. These were 
mandates which, at the national level, received the full backing and support of a 
number of private sector organisations such as the National Business Council, 
industrialists and Dominican importers who felt that autonomisation was 
necessary in order to permit the revenue agencies to create and implement the 
type of technical processes needed to facilitate the free flow of legitimate trade 
and commerce. 
 
In 2006, government responded to these externally imposed requirements by 
drafting  a set of laws that would permit the decentralisation of administrative 
decision making to its state departments responsible for the collection of taxes 
and customs duties, and having these laws approved by Parliament. In April 
2006, the proposed pieces of legislation or Autonomy Bills were approved by 
unanimous vote of the 80 deputies present at Congress, and in June 2006, again 
unanimously, by the Dominican Senate after two readings. On June 19, 2006, 
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President Leonel Fernández signed into effect Laws 226-06 and 227-06 which 
respectively made the DGA and the DGII semi-autonomous revenue agencies. 
According to a statement made by the Chamber of Deputies reported in the April 
5, 2006 Dominican Today newspaper, the bills rendered the Dominican tax 
system adequate for entering the Free Trade Agreement. They served the 
purpose of making revenue collection more efficient, diminishing administrative 
expenditures generated by duplicated functions; as well as the purpose of 
simplifying customs and tax collection procedures. The agencies would continue 
to function as separate institutions. 
 
5.3.2    THE PROCESS OF REFORM 
 
From the date of promulgation of the laws, a transitory period of 180 days was 
provided for the revenue agencies: (a) to develop the necessary regulations of 
internal operations that would give effect to the laws, and (b) to devise a 
restructuring plan that would bring about improvements in technical processes 
and administration. Each agency contracted the services of an external private 
sector consulting firm to work directly alongside its organisations senior 
management staff to undertake a number of critical tasks. These included the 
conduct of an evaluation of existing personnel, the defining of policies that would 
permit the rational use of human resources, as well as the development of a 
structure and processes appropriate for operation as a decentralised entity. In 
addition, in order to meet IMF requirements, as well as restructuring stipulations 
set by the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the DGA embarked on 
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a programme of retrenchment of some 2,500 of its workers over the 7-month 
period following the promulgation of Law 226-06. 
 
 
5.4    CONCLUSION  
 
 
This chapter presented findings on the value propositions or reasons underlying 
the implementation of revenue administration reforms in the two cases, as well 
as insights into the reform process. Differences between the two cases are 
evident both in terms of the primary goal of reform, as well as in the degree of 
control over the final shape and character of reform outcomes.  
 
In Jamaica, tax administrative reforms can best be understood as a response to 
crisis  governments dissatisfaction with the performance of revenue collection, 
especially in the face of fiscal deficits and rising public expenditure needs (as 
outlined in chapter one). Revenue therefore remained central to fiscal 
administrative reform efforts, the means of attainment through improved 
efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, integrity, as well as equity through a 
broadening of the tax base. Undoubtedly, the most significant change was the 
rationalisation of the structure and organisation of tax administration. 
 
In the Dominican Republic, the need for tax administrative reforms can best be 
understood in the context of economic developments that took place in the 
country during the early 1990s. Liberalisation of the DRs economy and the 
expectant boom in international trade as a result of entry into the CAFTA-DR 
Agreement occasioned the need for an emphasis on trade facilitation, with a 
focus on efficiency, heightened predictability, transparency, and quality service 
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delivery. Revenue mobilisation, in the first instance, was therefore less prominent 
in terms of the primary motive for reform. Anticipated loss of revenues from 
market liberalisation as well as entry into a Standby Agreement with the IMF led, 
in addition to the initial focus on efficiency, to a concern with the effectiveness of 
revenue collection as a safeguard for ensuring the achievement of fiscal targets. 
The need for formidable institutions and the limited likelihood that outcomes 
being sought could have been achieved under existing arrangements resulted in 
significant operational changes in the form of wide-ranging discretionary powers 
being formally granted to the two revenue collecting institutions. 
 
In both cases, donors played a role in the development of the fiscal 
administrative reform agenda, albeit with differing levels of influence. Whilst in 
the DR, the trajectory of reform was heavily influenced by the donor and efforts to 
satisfy donor conditionalities and other external pressures, in Jamaica there was 
relatively less of a western influence in terms of a wholesale adoption of the 
model put forward. Government decisions were a function of the dependency 
and power relations that existed between each country vis-á-vis the donor 
agency. Whilst Jamaica benefitted from the technical knowledge and expertise 
provided through technical assistance from the donor agency during the planning 
but not in the actual implementation phase of reform, the Dominicans opted for a 
go-it-alone strategy, relying on the expertise of local public administration 
consulting firms to devise policies and implement various strategies. 
 
The following chapters present findings which show, for example, how half-
hearted reforms, donor influence, and the benefits of technical expertise during 
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the implementation phase of reform determined the amount of space allocated 
for bureaucratic discretionary decision-making and capacity to act on decision-
making competencies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY IN PRACTICE: 
THE JAMAICAN CASE 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
    
This chapter examines the nature and extent of de jure or formal autonomy 
granted by law under the various revenue and public service laws and 
regulations; along with the de facto (or actual) and informal autonomy exercised 
in practice by the two focal organisations within the Jamaican case study. Also 
discussed is the extent of informal autonomy, meaning those informal strategies 
and practices employed by the agencies to escape bureaucratic constraints. To 
allow for a historical treatment of the issue of reform, the organisations are 
examined on the basis of their pre- and post-reform situations, with differences 
between local organisations being highlighted as appropriate. Because these 
organisations operate within the framework of the national governmental system 
and are part of the general civil service apparatus, it is expected that, though 
some minor differences may exist, huge disparities between their situational 
circumstances is highly unlikely. Detailed cross-country comparisons are 
reserved for Chapter 10. Findings are reported under each of the autonomy 
dimensions identified in Chapter 4. Linked to Figure 4.4, Table 6.1 serves as a 
reminder of the benchmark criteria being used within each of the dimensions to 
describe and later compare relative degrees of autonomy.  
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Dimension of  
Autonomy 
Reform 
Design Feature 
Description 
 of Criteria 
 
Legal Autonomy 
 Legal Basis 
 Legal Personality/Character 
 Patrimony 
 Legal basis on which entity was created 
 Relationship to central government machinery 
 Ability to own assets and create liabilities 
 
 
Structural Autonomy 
 
 
 Governance Framework 
 Governance Model  
 Appointment of Agency Head  
 Reporting Relationships (Clarity of Lines of 
Responsibility) 
 Role and responsibilities of key leadership personnel 
 
Financial Autonomy 
 Funding Regime/Financing 
Mechanism 
 Transfer/Release of Funds 
 Source of funding 
 Ability to extend funding 
 Whether automatic or non-automatic  
 
 
Policy Autonomy 
 
 
 Controls over policy 
implementation 
 Controls over quantity and quality of outputs; over 
performance objectives/performance targets 
 Extent of freedom of choice in selection of policy 
instruments (programmes , (sub) processes, 
procedures, strategies, and initiatives) to achieve 
performance objectives 
 
Managerial 
(Financial Management) 
Autonomy 
 
 
 Financial administration and 
accounting controls 
 Degree of control in areas such as budget execution, 
asset management/asset disposal 
 Budget flexibility 
 Controls over financial management & accounting 
processes and procedures 
 
Managerial 
(Human Resources 
Management) 
Autonomy 
 
 Ownership, control & 
oversight of the HR system at 
two main levels: 
 
o Strategic HRM 
 
 
 
 
o Operational HRM 
 
 
Strategic HRM: 
 Controls over determination of HR policy in areas such 
as establishment levels, levels of remuneration, and 
performance management 
 
 
 
Operational HRM: 
 Controls over operational HR issues such as staffing, 
deployment, training & development 
 
 
Interventional Autonomy 
 
 Institutional arrangements for 
controlling and monitoring 
performance  
 Nature and extent of: 
o Ex post reporting requirements 
o Provisions for evaluation and audit of operations 
o Sanctions/interventions as a result of under/non-
performance 
 
Table 6.1: Autonomy Dimensions for Comparative Analysis 
 
6.2 LEGAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
Created through an Act of Parliament, the Revenue Administration (Amendment) 
Act No. 15 of 1998, the Jamaica Tax Administration (JTA) was established on 
December 1, 1999 as a directorate within the MoF. The five revenue 
departments, notwithstanding their legal status as separate and independent 
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organs of government, were all encompassed under this single unifying Tax 
Administration (TA) structure. Neither the IRD nor the CD has any legal 
personality outside of central government, nor do they have the authority to own 
assets or to borrow funds on the capital market.  
 
Absent a separate legal status, still within close proximity of the Finance Ministry, 
and still needing to interface heavily with a number of other central government 
institutions, the revenue departments were found lacking autonomy along this 
dimension. 
 
6.3 STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY (GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK) 
 
 
In 1981, the GoJ established an intermediate Revenue Board with responsibility 
for the direction (albeit for a short period of time), co-ordination, inspection and 
monitoring of all operations of the various revenue departments. Creation of the 
Tax Administration in 1999 and the concomitant deinstitutionalisation of the 
Board of Management structure resulted in the creation of a new institutional 
layer between the departments and the Ministry of Finance. Created was a new 
position of Director General (DG) Tax Administration, and the DGs Executive 
Office (DGEO), staffed by a small group of specialist analysts in tax and customs 
matters. Revenue Commissioners report directly to the DG, who in turn reports to 
the Finance Minister through the Finance Secretary (FS). The Tax Administration 
chief executive and heads of departments are all appointed by the Public Service 
Commission on the advice of the FS. 
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Focusing on roles and responsibilities, direct control and supervision of the 
departments remains the purview of the Minister of Finance, who maintains all 
the attendant powers of alteration and rule-making granted him under the various 
revenue laws. The Financial Secretary continues to interact with and give 
guidance to the most senior officials within the revenue departments. The role of 
the Director General, as spelt out in the Revenue Amendment Act, entails the 
exercise of centralised direction and supervision over all revenue departments, 
including the oversight of priorities between strategic, medium-term and annual 
plans for tax administration. Unlike governance arrangements elsewhere, for 
example in Guyana, where the head of the Authority has legal jurisdiction over 
and full responsibility for revenue operations, lack of appropriate legislative 
amendments to Jamaican tax and customs laws means that all powers 
emanating from the revenue laws (for example, powers to make a determination 
or to issue interpretations) are still vested with the heads of the revenue 
departments.  
 
Foreseen during the design stage of reform was the potential backlash against 
such structural arrangements as regards clarity of lines of authority and 
accountability. Speaking during the debate of the Bill to amend the Revenue 
Administration Act, the Shadow Finance Minister spoke of governments 
fashioning of a phenomenon referred to as a Director General: 
 
´a position without clout, a position without considerable authority, a position 
almost like an emasculated puppet perhaps to operate at the whim and fancy 
of the Ministry of Finance. (Bill to Amend the Revenue Administration Act, p. 
81). 
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The lack of a fully empowered chief executive has, in the view of the 
parliamentary Opposition members, resulted in a loose amalgam of executive 
control and a confusion of the chain of command. It has given rise to an 
anomalous situation of the departments continued strong operational ties to the 
centre and their enlarged scope for autonomy from the Director General and the 
Director Generals Executive Office. Reported was the tendency, not so much 
within Inland Revenue but particularly within Customs, for decisions involving 
reforms to be taken by senior management without the prior involvement of the 
Director General.  
 
The foregoing has illustrated the limited structural autonomy of Inland Revenue 
and Customs from the parent Ministry of Finance, their enlarged scope for, and 
at times, actual exercise of autonomy from the Office of the Director General as a 
result of lack of changes to existing revenue legislation.  
 
6.4 FINANCIAL AUTONOMY  
 
 
 
Financing of the Jamaican public sector is governed by three principal 
instruments, namely: 
 
(a) the Constitution; 
(b) the Appropriations Act; and 
(c) the Financial Administration and Audit Act. 
 
Both the Inland Revenue and Customs derive their income from central 
government funding provided through standard annual parliamentary 
appropriation using the normal public expenditure management and budget 
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decision processes of government. After the initial allocation of funds, the 
departments have little real means of extending their incomes to cover any 
unexpected expenditure. Chapter VIII, Section 114 of the Constitution specifies 
that all public revenues must be paid into the Consolidated Fund. Regarding 
unexpended appropriations, the departments have no authority to carry over 
funds to the next financial year (FY). Section 19 of the Financial Administration 
and Audit Act stipulates that every appropriation shall cease to have effect at the 
close of the FY and any unexpended balances be paid into the Consolidated 
Fund. Departmental income can be extended via two means: a) through 
approved Supplementary Estimates whereby additional funds are allocated in 
November, near the end of the FY, or b) through representation to the Ministry of 
Finance for emergency funding to cover programmes outside of the allocated 
budget. In the case of Customs, income is extended through the permitted 
withholding of a small percentage of collected customs user fees46 that are used 
to assist with operational costs.  
 
Regarding the release of funds, Section 117 subsections 1 & 2 of the 
Constitution stipulates that no sum shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund 
except upon the authority of a warrant under the hand of the Finance Minister. 
Requests for recurrent expenditure are funded via monthly warrants and via 
quarterly warrants for capital expenditure.  
 
                                                
46
 Customs collects user fees on all imported goods at a current rate of 2% of the Cost, Insurance & Freight 
(C.I.F) value of imports. 
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the process flow from the submission of the monthly cash 
flow statement by the departments to the Finance Ministry, to the disbursement 
of requested funds.  
    
 
                            Monthly Cash Flow Statement 
 
 
                                Ministry of Finance Budget Division 
 
   
                                      Ministers Approval 
 
 
                                                   Warrant 
 
                          
                                               Accountant General 
 
 
                                                    Requisition to the Bank of Jamaica 
 
 
                                                                     Authentication by the  
                                                                   Auditor General 
 
                                                    
                                                                              Funds sent to the Individual 
                                                                        Bank Accounts of Ministries/Depts 
 
 
                                                                             Expenditure Clearing Accounts 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Funding Process 
 
 
As illustrated, funds are not released automatically through the direct deposit of 
monies into the departments bank accounts, but disbursed via various central 
controlling institutions which serve as points for additional authorisation. 
Warrants are first authorised externally by the Accountant General before 
authentication by the Auditor General. 
 
 
The vast amount of centralised controls emanating from supreme and other 
national laws have resulted in the revenue administrations having very limited 
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formal and factual financial autonomy. Heads of both departments highlighted the 
impact of financial dependence, including the inability to execute programmes 
within the timeframes and sequence as planned in the organisations Strategic 
Plan and operational Work Plans. 
 
 
6.5 POLICY AUTONOMY  
 
 
Whilst the Ministry of Finance has sole responsibility for determining fiscal policy, 
few formal ex ante rules, norms and standards govern the choice of policy 
instruments and processes for the departments achievement of fiscal objectives. 
IMF findings in its 2007 fiscal review and the findings of this study confirmed that 
both Inland Revenue and Customs exercise a fairly large degree of policy 
autonomy, albeit at the informal level. Such autonomy, however, must include 
programmes and initiatives that fit within the framework of governments 
macroeconomic policies and with fiscal rules and guidelines.  
 
In the areas of planning and performance management, both departments have 
a fair amount of leverage in identifying long, medium and short term strategic 
priorities; as well as in determining performance objectives, targets and 
performance indicators. Commissioners noted that though change strategies and 
change initiatives are generally discussed with the Financial Secretary, 
policymakers expect that heads of departments will assume full responsibility for 
determining strategic priorities and for deciding how outcomes will be achieved. 
Historically, very few requests for modifications to strategic or operational plans 
are issued by the Director General or the Finance Ministry. Where the 
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departments are conditioned in their exercise of policy autonomy is in deciding 
the quantity of output for revenue targets. Whilst there has been some change 
over the years in the level of involvement of the Tax Administration in setting 
revenue targets, the process is still largely top-down with targets being imposed 
from above by the Finance Ministry. 
 
Focusing on choice of policy instruments and (sub)processes for achieving fiscal 
outcomes, strategy formulation by the Customs department to address a number 
of global challenges has resulted in the development of automated risk 
management and just in time delivery systems. Automated services include 
direct trader input of import and export declarations, the electronic transmission 
of manifests before cargo arrival, and electronic data interchange for electronic 
payment of duties and taxes. Risk management systems and techniques have 
been applied through a Fast Track facility that permits cursory checking of 
documentation submitted by low risk brokers with an error rating of 5% or below, 
as well as a Selective Importation Inspection System (SIIS), implemented in 
1994, that allows importers with a good track record to have their containers 
selectively examined at their premises. A Pre-Arrival Processing System 
implemented in August 1992 provides just-in-time service delivery to importers by 
facilitating the processing of documents up to 10 days prior to cargo arrival. Initial 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of such systems continue to be under 
the departments sole purview. For example, with the Fast Track and SIIS 
systems, which importers/brokers are included on or removed from these lists 
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and how they are monitored are matters solely for Customs determination. Post-
reform the Customs continues to make such programmatic choices. 
 
Inland Revenue likewise is fairly unfettered in its choice of strategies for 
executing government policy. Initiatives include the implementation of automated 
services such as electronic drop boxes and Internet Kiosks for the timely and 
efficient collection of taxes. Compliance strategies involve the introduction of a 
Voluntary Disclosure Programme to encourage defaulting taxpayers to 
voluntarily acknowledge their tax liabilities in return for concessionary treatment 
with regard penalty charges. Compliance officers have discretion to reduce 
penalties payable by law, and to negotiate with taxpayers the terms of 
arrangements for settling outstanding debt.  
 
Both organisations continue to receive enormous support from the Ministry of 
Finance in their choice and execution of programmes and initiatives geared 
towards the achievement of fiscal aims and objectives. 
 
Findings show that the IRD and CD enjoy a fairly high degree of informal policy 
autonomy both pre- and post their reform status. Such autonomy is being used to 
identify and sequence the implementation of various strategies, programmes and 
initiatives. 
 
6.6 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AUTONOMY  
 
 
Each focal organisation both possess and exercise a limited amount of formal 
and factual financial management autonomy. Each has its own Accounting 
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Division responsible for maintaining departmental accounting records, its own 
bank account into which funds are paid with full authority to write cheques 
against such accounts to honour debts.  
 
Autonomy extends very little beyond these structural arrangements. The 
Financial Administration and Audit (FAA) Act (1959), the Regulations and 
Instructions accompanying the Act, the Financial Management (Ministries and 
Departments) Regulations (1996), the Staff Orders (2004), and the Civil Service 
Establishment Act (Amendment 2007) all set out basic principles for the 
management and control of public monies.  
 
Operational within each department is the automated centralised Financial 
Management Information System (FMIS) implemented under governments 
Financial Programme Management Improvement Project. Approved budgetary 
allocations are inputted onto the FMIS, with all subsequent expenditure being 
drawn through the system. Regarding asset acquisition and asset management, 
the Estate Management Division of the Ministry of Environment and Housing has 
full responsibility for acquiring all premises for purchase or rent. Neither Inland 
Revenue nor Customs has authority to dispose of government assets without the 
prior approval of the Finance Ministry.  
 
Both departments make use of the process of virement to divert allocated funds, 
albeit with certain restrictions. Funds can be vired within an object code after 
approval by the internal Accounting Officer. By law, the departments are not 
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permitted to shift funds from Objects 21 or 3147 or to move funds across other 
objects without the prior permission of the Ministry of Finance. In practice, 
however, whilst the departments adhere to restrictions attached to the 
abovementioned two object codes, funds are occasionally moved across other 
objects. Ex-post approval of such exercise of informal powers is usually granted 
provided there is proper justification and the department has remained within its 
overall drawing balance.  
 
Where the departments exercise a fair amount of formal and factual autonomy is 
in the procurement of goods and services. In 1992, the closure of the Central 
Supply Division paved the way for the decentralisation of the procurement 
function to Permanent Secretaries and heads of departments, a situation which 
carried into the post-reform period. Departments over the past two decades have 
therefore been responsible for procuring a large amount of their goods and 
services, excluding the purchase of large capital goods and contracting for civil 
works. Each department has a Procurement Committee whose function includes 
evaluating submitted tenders and approving the purchase of goods and services 
at a cost up to the set threshold limit of J$3.99m. In order to free themselves of 
constraints resulting from central procurement guidelines and this perceived low 
threshold limit, both departments currently engage in the informal autonomous 
practice of contract fragmentation. Such actions provide a means of escape from 
                                                
47
 Object 21 covers compensation of employees, including items such as wages, salaries, overtime, housing 
and utilities allowances, entertainment and meal allowances. Object 31 covers the purchase of capital goods 
and includes items such as furniture, small equipment and appliances, motor vehicles; as well as computer 
hardware and software. 
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the delays resulting from forced competitive bidding and review by external 
institutions. 
 
Despite such autonomy, findings showed a marked difference between the focal 
organisations in their actual exercise of powers in the area of procurement. 
Unlike Customs, which reportedly has a long history of procuring the majority of 
resources needed to assist in modernisation, the Inland Revenue Department, 
during the past four years under the new dispensation, has started to use its 
purchasing powers to acquire the goods and services needed to effect and 
sustain reforms. New senior managers in the IRD spoke disapprovingly of the 
practice under the old dispensation of large amounts of unspent funds being 
returned to the Consolidated Fund at the end of each financial year, despite a 
clear lack of availability of resources in a number of critical areas. Efforts are now 
being made to purchase much needed furniture and computer equipment that will 
likewise enable tax modernisation. 
 
Challenges and possible repercussions of delegating financial management 
autonomy vis-à-vis other forms of authority were outlined by the government of 
the day: 
 
We have to be more careful with money than for example with hiring or 
firing, especially considering that one is dealing with the handling of 
billions of dollars. When I suggested to my Cabinet colleagues that 
success would depend on the accountability systems in place, I was told 
that what I summarised in a couple of words is, in practice, much more 
difficult and involving, with a number of implications and ramifications. 
Government already has problems with small institutions. Devolving 
financial management matters, the issue of capacity will need to be 
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addressed within all of the revenue departments (Dr Omar Davies, 
Finance Minister). 
 
The above statement makes clear the apparent risk perceived by government of 
granting formal financial management autonomy to the revenue agencies. Not 
surprising therefore, is the fairly limited elbow room for manoeuvre along this 
dimension. 
 
6.7 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AUTONOMY 
  
Prior to December 2002 (pre-TaxARP and some three years into reform), the 
revenue services operated within a framework characterised by a high degree of 
centralisation of authority and policy for personnel administration. Such authority 
was shared amongst three main central institutions: the Office of the Services 
Commissions (OSC), the Establishment Division (ED) of the Finance Ministry, 
and the Efficiency and Reform Directorate (ERD) within the Office of the Prime 
Minister.  
 
At the level of strategic human resource functioning, pay levels, which were tied 
to the civil service pay scales, were set by the Compensation Unit of the ED 
through a process of job evaluation and governments ability to pay. Both the 
Compensation and the Industrial Relation Units of the MoF were responsible for 
salary revision in consultation/negotiation with the various unions representing 
public sector employees. For the creation and classification of new posts or the 
establishment of new organisational units, the revenue agencies were required, 
like the rest of other government departments, to submit their requests to the 
ERD.  
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At the human resource operational level, all recommendations relating to 
appointments, discipline and separation had to be forwarded to the OSC for 
submission through the Public Service Commission to the Governor General, in 
whom final authority was vested. Chronic problems and weaknesses occasioned 
by this split in responsibilities included slow response times in dealing with 
staffing proposals, lengthy timeframes in filling vacancies and in addressing 
disciplinary matters. 
 
In 1999, as part of a broader thrust towards improved service delivery and 
accountability under the Jamaica Public Sector Modernisation Programme 
(PSMP), the decision was taken to delegate some of the functions under the 
Public Service Regulations (1961). In December 2002, the MoF became the 
nineteenth entity to receive the instruments of delegation  the Delegation of 
Functions (Public Service) (Specified Departments) Order 2002. Under the new 
arrangements, the departments scope of HR management autonomy was to 
encompass four specific areas:  
 
1. appointments (including recruitment, first appointment, transfers, 
promotions, acting arrangements and secondments).  
 
2. training and development (excluding the selection of officers to undertake 
local courses of over 90 days duration, and of candidates for overseas 
training programmes and scholarships);  
 
3. discipline; and 
4. separation (excluding retirement on medical grounds, approval of requests 
for early retirement, and retirement beyond age 60). 
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Delegation of these four functional areas meant that still outside the departments 
scope of authority are other areas of HR functioning such as organisational 
(re)structuring, pay and grading, and position classification. Note that whilst 
departments still have no authority to determine pay levels, they are able to 
determine the point on the payscale at which employees (recruited or promoted) 
will be remunerated.  
 
 
Revenue agencies were expected to exercise full control of the delegated 
functions for all personnel up to the senior level and to make suitable 
recommendations to the Tax Administration for all such matters relating to senior 
personnel. Consequently, the function of central controlling institutions was to 
change from direct involvement to monitoring and reviewing whether line 
departments are executing their powers in accordance with the Delegation of 
Functions, the Staff Orders and the Public Service Regulations. 
 
The Instrument not only clearly delineated the scope of authority granted, but 
sought to ensure that administrative discretion was tempered within a framework 
of accountability. Pursuant to the Instrument, an Accountability Framework, a 
Values Framework as well as guidelines issued by the Public Services 
Commission all outlined the central standards and rules to which the 
departments were expected to adhere. Repeated or gross violation of rules and 
regulations could result in the revocation and reversion of authority to the OSC or 
the Governor General. The role of the OSC involved ensuring agency adherence 
to guidelines through periodic site visits as well as the review of submitted HR 
schedules. 
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In order to effectively exercise such authority, Committees focusing on specific 
areas of human resources management, discipline, and staff development were 
established at the Tax Administration executive level and mirrored at the 
departmental levels. Regarding the actual exercise of delegated human resource 
powers, marked achievements in the area of appointments included the use of 
more progressive recruitment strategies, namely the conduct of structured 
interviews and the use of psychometric testing to enable more targeted and 
effective screening of job applicants and placement of new functionaries. 
Focusing on training and development, whilst neither department to date has in 
place a formal training strategy for the development of human capital, each has 
used its autonomy in this area to engage in the conduct of annual training needs 
analyses, the development of training plans, and the conduct of training courses 
to meet identified training needs. According to one in-house Training Consultant, 
learning and development has been pushed higher up the organisational agenda 
and made more a part of mainstream operations than was previously the case. 
 
Despite definite achievements, however, there were concerns about the misuse 
of delegated authority, particularly with regard to appointments, and moreso in 
the case of the Inland Revenue department. Notwithstanding established policy 
on appointments and promotions, characteristic of the IRD under the old 
dispensation was the practice of appointing persons on the basis of loyalty to top 
management as opposed to merit and competence - a situation that led to what 
one former HR Specialist referred to as the institutionalisation of a culture of 
sycophancy. 
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Aside from the actual exercise of formal powers, also worth noting is the 
departments practice of informal strategic and operational HR autonomy, 
sometimes in circumvention of civil service rules and regulations. Unable to set 
levels of remuneration to address problems of low morale and high turnover, both 
departments resorted to boosting salaries through the payment of honoraria. 
According to the 2001 Auditor Generals Report, during the 12-month period 
January-December 2000, Customs paid honoraria to its accounting staff, a 
practice which seemed to be an ongoing feature instead of the exceptional 
occurrence normally expected (p.12). The 2004 Report spoke to the informal 
practices engaged in by Customs so as to free itself of establishment constraints. 
These included the payment of salaries totaling approximately J$6.7m to twenty-
seven fortnightly and temporary monthly paid employees: (a) assigned to posts 
that were not on the approved Civil Service Establishment and; (b) for whom no 
letters of employment were seen. Also highlighted was the practice of post 
manipulation. Both departments were found engaging in the creative act of 
borrowing vacant posts within specific work sections to meet manpower needs 
within other functional areas. Established posts were therefore being filled with 
incumbents operating outside the work areas to which these positions were 
allocated.  
 
Findings revealed that prior to 2002, the two focal organisations exercised a 
limited amount of strategic and operational human resources management. After 
2002, delegation of specific HR functions resulted in the departments capacity for 
the exercise of operational human resources management, albeit within a 
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framework of monitoring and controls. The organisations made use of a number 
of informal creative and sometimes illegal practices to circumvent constraints on 
the exercise of strategic human resources management. 
 
6.8 INTERVENTIONAL AUTONOMY  
 
 
 
Subjected to extensive reporting requirements, as well as to having both their 
financial and non-financial activities heavily scrutinised through various internal 
and external audit processes, the Inland Revenue and Customs departments, in 
practice, exercise a minimal level of interventional autonomy. Table 6.2 illustrates 
some of the formal reporting requirements of the revenue departments.  
 
 
Srl. 
No. 
 
Document Type 
Frequency of 
Submission 
1. Budget Estimate  Yearly 
2. Supplementary Estimate Yearly 
3. Costed Activity Plan Yearly 
4. Cash Flow Forecast Monthly 
5. Statistics on Revenue Yield Daily 
6. Revenue / Expenditure Accounts Monthly 
7. Reports on Revenue Foregone Monthly 
8. Arrears of Revenue Monthly 
9. HR Schedule Monthly & Quarterly 
10. Quarterly Report Quarterly 
11. Contract Awards Report Quarterly 
12. Cost Savings Report  Quarterly 
13. Half-Yearly Report Bi-annually 
14. Appropriation Account Yearly 
15. Annual Report Yearly 
 
Table 6.2: Departments Formal Reporting Requirements 
 
Submissions include both ex ante plans and ex post performance data.  Near the 
end of each financial year a Draft Budget Estimate and a Costed Activity Plan 
detailing funds needed for the following year and the projected usage of such 
funds must be submitted to the Finance Ministry.  Requests are followed up at 
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the end of the year by the submission of an Appropriation Account detailing 
actual expenditure against approved estimates, as well as an Annual Report 
covering all aspects of organisational performance along both quantitative and 
qualitative performance measures.  
 
Interventions by internal actors originate from entities such as the Internal Audit 
Division established within each department to conduct audits of both business 
and support functions; as well as the Audit Committees that review all internal 
audit reports, analysing recommendations and responses by auditees. 
Interventions from external actors come from a number of sources, including the 
Office of Services Commissions (OSC), the Auditor Generals Department 
(AGD), and the Office of the Contractor General. The departments submit on a 
quarterly basis to the OSC a human resource schedule detailing performance in 
the four autonomous HR areas. External audit of all government departments is 
the constitutional responsibility of the Auditor General. Section 120 (1) of the 
Jamaican Constitution provides for the establishment of the post of Auditor 
General with responsibility for auditing and reporting on all public accounts, 
reports submitted at least once per year to Parliament through the Public 
Accounts Committee for scrutiny and deliberation. To aid in the effective 
discharge of its duties, the AGD has, over the last eight years, permanently 
stationed a team of four auditors within each of the two focal departments.  
 
The various central institutions make use of a range of criteria for assessing 
performance, including (a) the degree of compliance with the FAA Act, the Staff 
Orders and Regulations, procurement guidelines, as well as the Accountability 
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Framework under the DoF; and (b) the extent of controls in critical areas such as 
revenue collection and the detection of tax evasion.  
 
Focusing on sanctions, heads of departments are subject to summons before 
Parliament to give account for actions taken or not taken as highlighted in the 
Auditor Generals Annual Report; and also to attend meetings in the Finance 
Ministry to respond to matters causing concern. In terms of poor or non-
performance, the only punitive measures for failure to meet individual 
departmental targets as well as the set collective fiscal revenue target is the 
withholding of cash bonus incentives from staff. 
 
Research findings therefore lead to the conclusion that both the IRD and the CD 
exercise a minimal level of interventional autonomy, subjected as they are to 
mandatory requirements for the submission of plans and reports which need to 
be reviewed and or/approved by central authorities. Such central institutions 
have the right to intervene in organisational processes should standards fall 
below the expected requirements. Table 6.3 summarises the formal autonomy 
delegated to the revenue agencies along the various dimensions discussed. 
 
6.9 CONCLUSION  
 
 
 
This chapter presented findings on the nature and extent of autonomy granted to 
and exercised by the revenue agencies. Despite recommendations of the World 
Bank for the implementation of a model of tax administration typical of that 
adopted in a number of developing countries in Anglophone Africa, Jamaica did  
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Table 6.3: Degrees of Formal Autonomy of the Jamaican Revenue Agencies 
DIMENSIONS OF 
AUTONOMY 
 
JAMAICA REVENUE AGENCIES 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL AUTONOMY 
 
Legal Basis:  Revenue Administration (Amendment) (RAA) Act (No. 15 of 1998) established the new revenue 
departments with effect from 01 December, 1999. 
 
Legal Status:  
(a) Pre-Reform: Agencies existed as departments of government.  
(b) Post-Reform: Under the new law, departments each created as separate organs under an umbrella Tax 
Administration Directorate. Agencies still dependencies of the Ministry of Finance with no separate legal 
personalities, no ability to own assets or to borrow funds on the capital market. 
 
STRUCTURAL 
AUTONOMY:  
 
(GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS) 
 
 
 
Pre-Reform: Intermediary Board of Management structure in place with the 1981 passage of the Revenue Board 
Act and the establishment of the Revenue Board. Commissioners reported to the Minister of Finance through the 
Finance Secretary (FS). 
Post-Reform: De-institutionalisation of the Board with the passage of the RAA Act. Insertion of a new institutional 
layer through the creation of the post of Director General (DG) and establishment of the Executive Office of the DG. 
Revenue Commissioners report to the DG who reports to the Minister of Finance through the FS.  
 
 
 
FINANCIAL  
AUTONOMY: 
 
(FUNDING MECHANISM) 
 
 
 
Source of Funding:  
 
Both Pre- and Post-Reform: Standard parliamentary appropriation using the normal public expenditure 
management (PEM) and budget decision processes of government. Limited ability to extend appropriation via 
supplementary estimates; in the case of Customs, opportunity to do so through permitted withholding of a 
percentage of customs user fees. 
 
Transfer of Funds: Not automatic. Funds released (monthly for recurrent expenditure, and quarterly warrants for 
capital expenditure) by the Accountant General upon submission of cash flow statement to the Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
 
POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
Both Pre- and Post-Reform: Little, if any, autonomy to determine output with respect to revenue targets. Fair 
amount of latitude to choose among alternate behaviours when implementing a policy decision. Generally, limited 
ex-ante rules, norms and standards specifying the policy instruments and processes for use in the achievement of 
fiscal objectives. Minimal interference in operational matters by the Financial Secretary or the Minister of Finance. 
 
MANAGERIAL 
 
(A. FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT)  
 
AUTONOMY 
 
 
Both pre- and post-reform: Fair amount of authority to procure goods and services within set guidelines. Authority 
to reallocate (vire) funds within object headings. Departments generally required to operate within the broader 
spending framework established by government, following central rules and guidelines for accounting and asset 
management.  
 
MANAGERIAL 
 
(B. HUMAN RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT) 
 
AUTONOMY 
 
Pre-reform up to 2002. Very little autonomy in the management of human resources. HR authority and policy 
shared between three central institutions: the Office of Services Commission, the Efficiency and Reform Directorate 
of Cabinet Office, and the Establishment Division of the Ministry of Finance.  
Post-2002 and beyond reform: Instrument entitled the Delegation of Functions Order 2002 (DoF) signed 
between the Public Service Commission and the Finance Secretary delegated to the revenue agencies full 
authority for the management of four main HR areas (appointments, training, discipline and termination). 
Departments expected to operate within clear guidelines as specified in the Accountability Agreement and Values 
Framework accompanying the DoF. 
 
 
 
INTERVENTIONAL 
AUTONOMY 
 
 
Both Pre and Post-TaxARP:  
(a) Reporting Requirements: Both departments subject(ed) to extensive financial and non-financial reporting 
requirements, particularly with respect to achievement of revenue targets.  
(b) Audit Provisions: Various internal institutional arrangements for pre- and post-audit checking, including the 
establishment of the post of Chief Internal Auditor and the Division of Internal Audit. External audits performed by 
central agencies such as the Office of Services Commission and the National Contracts Commission.  
ACCOUNTABILITY 
TOWARDS 
STAKEHOLDERS AND THE 
GENERAL PUBLIC 
 
- No requirement by law to report to any supreme body such as Parliament for performance outcomes. 
- Publication of Annual Reports by both agencies. 
- Both organisations engage in public consultation with respect to the exercise of their revenue collecting and 
rule-making powers. 
 
 
TRANSITORY 
PROVISIONS 
DURING REFORM 
 
All jobs transferred to the MoF. Revenue officials required to compete for jobs within the newly 
reformed departments. No specific transitory period allocated within the enabling legislation. 
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not follow wholeheartedly such recommendation. Whilst virtually all revenue 
collecting agencies were brought under one umbrella body, overall the 
bureaucracy was delegated only a fairly limited amount of formal autonomy to 
operate within the new structural arrangement. 
 
Governance arrangement resulted in governments toggling from an intermediary 
Board Model to the introduction of a new intermediary layer in the form of an 
Executive Secretariat headed by a Director General and staffed by a group of 
experts in tax and customs. In both instances, lack of empowerment of these 
institutions to direct the operations of the revenue departments meant that at no 
time, pre- or post-reform, was the Revenue ever far removed structurally from the 
Finance Ministry. 
 
Financially, the departments relied totally on central government funding, with 
only the Customs department having the opportunity to extend income through 
the charging of user fees. The criticality of this resource, the magnitude of the 
resource exchange, the lack of its substitutability, as well as the non-availability 
of alternate sources (given the departments lack of legal status to borrow on the 
capital market) occasioned a high state of dependency on the Ministry of Finance 
for financial resources. The unavailability of funds at the times needed resulted in 
some programmes and initiatives being compromised in terms of their scope, 
timeliness or actual implementation. 
 
Likewise limited was the amount of formal autonomy granted in the areas of 
financial management and strategic human resources management. The high 
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degree of centralisation and formalisation, as well as the proliferation of a 
number of central institutions with approval or oversight functions allowed very 
little room for operational flexibilities. 
 
Despite the lack of formal autonomy along these dimensions, the Revenue, 
moreso the Customs Department, were able to exercise some degree of informal 
autonomy in order to increase flexibilities. This was achieved through practices 
such as virements, the borrowing of vacant posts allocated to specific functional 
areas to create and fill positions needed in other areas, as well as remunerating 
staff above levels set out in the Civil Establishment Order so as to motivate lower 
paid staff. Informal policy autonomy was exercised through independently 
devised and implemented long, medium and short term strategic priorities, 
programmes and initiatives in line with governments macro-economic policies 
and its fiscal administrative reform agenda aimed at increasing revenue yield. 
Such informal policy autonomy was only fettered in the ability of the Revenue to 
determine quantitative revenue collection targets. 
 
Where autonomy was formally ascribed to the departments was in the area of 
operational human resources management. The Revenue was delegated formal 
autonomy to appoint, train and develop, discipline and terminate staff, albeit 
within an accountability framework that detailed the parameters for performance. 
Formal autonomy in this area was actually being put to use to effect significant 
improvements in the management and development of human resources, 
through, for example, the application of best practices in employee recruitment 
and selection, as well as in provisions for building capacity through training. 
  
215 
 
 
Given the delayed formal delegation of operational human resource management 
powers - some three years after administrative reforms - one lingering question 
remaining was the likelihood of greater autonomy being granted along other 
dimensions in the near future. On the subject of financial management 
autonomy, the Deputy Finance Secretary noted: 
 
In the long term, I do not see any hope for greater autonomy. Because of the 
financial constraints we are under, we will want all revenues to flow through the 
Consolidated Fund. There may be a case for greater autonomy in the long 
term. After a full evaluation of the performance of the executive agencies, we 
may then look at the revenue departments. 
 
Governments overall short to medium-term plans for empowering the Revenue 
were laid bare by its most senior finance official in the Peoples National Party 
(PNP) administration. As stated by the Finance Minister: 
 
´Autonomy, the way I see it, is cosmetic and not revolutionary. I dont 
know that it provides any greater efficiency. We should be able to 
streamline administrative procedures and improve our operations within 
existing arrangements. 
 
 
 
Having examined the nature and extent of autonomy delegated and exercised 
within the Jamaican case, the spotlight now turns on policies, practices and 
circumstances within the Dominican case. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY IN PRACTICE: 
THE DOMINICAN CASE 
 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Mirroring Chapter 6, this chapter presents findings on the nature and extent of 
formal, factual and informal autonomy in respect of the Dominican case both pre 
and post autonomisation. The reader may recall, as mentioned in Chapter 4, that 
the methodology being employed is that of a keyhole comparison. The results 
presented for the Dominican case are not as in-depth and detailed as for the 
Jamaican case. Again issues are discussed using the benchmark criteria 
presented in Table 6.1. 
 
7.2    LEGAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
Pre-modernisation, the Customs Department (DGA) and the Internal Taxes 
Department (DGII) were both constituted as public entities, part of and fully 
dependent on the Ministry of Finance. As part of a process of fiscal 
administrative reform, two new pieces of legislation, Laws 226-06 and 227-06 of 
June 21, 2006, established the DGA and the DGII respectively as decentralised 
semi-autonomous state entities each with its own separate legal status. Both 
laws offer to the two agencies functional, economic, financial, technical and 
administrative autonomy, with legal capacity to own assets, acquire rights, as 
well as to enter into agreements, contracts and covenants.  
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7.3    STRUCTURAL AUTONOMY (GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK) 
 
Before passage of the autonomy laws, revenue departments fell directly under 
the Finance Ministry, agency heads reporting to the Secretary of State, Finance 
on a range of financial and non-financial matters. No intermediary board model 
existed to monitor and oversee the governance of these institutions. The General 
Director and sub-directors of both agencies were hired and subject to removal 
from office by the President of the Republic in the exercise of his constitutional 
authority. 
 
Article 5, Paragraphs I and III of both new pieces of legislation specified clearly 
the new governance arrangements. Both agencies would continue to be directed 
by a General Director who would serve as chief executive, with responsibility 
inter alia for: 
 
 directing the politics, strategies, plans and administrative programs of 
the institution; 
 
 devising the organic structure48 and budget of the organisation; as 
well as  
 
 monitoring and supervising the execution of the functions of the 
organisation 
 
Both laws made provision for the establishment of a fully empowered internal 
Board of Management - a Council of Direction, comprising the General Director 
as Chair, and four deputy directors. Council responsibilities include approving the 
organisations organic structure and annual budget. 
                                                
48
 The organic structure of the organisation includes features such as its organisational chart as well as its 
HR regime which covers matters such as job classification, evaluation and promotion systems, salary scales 
and career plans. 
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This initially planned degree of arms-length control was, however, fairly soon 
interrupted by the passage of law 494-06 in December 2006. This piece of 
legislation was far-reaching, first in its creation of a new restructured Finance 
Ministry and secondly, in its establishment of a Higher Council of Tax 
Administration49 to monitor and oversee the performance of the revenue 
agencies. It was a move that was to drastically alter the agencies original scope 
of autonomy as a result of redefined roles and responsibilities.  
 
The Secretary of State continues to have responsibility for determining fiscal 
policy, as well as for co-ordinating the management of public agencies to ensure 
fiscal sustainability. General Directors, instead of being responsible for directing 
the politics, strategies, plans and administrative programs of the institution as 
mandated under the original autonomy laws, are now responsible for directing 
the application (own emphasis added) of such matters.  The Council of Direction 
witnessed a shift in its status from an empowered to an advisory role, i.e from 
approving the various submissions presented by the departments to knowing 
and thinking on matters and presenting these to the Higher Council for approval. 
Article 18 of Law 494-06 states that it is the newly created Higher Council which 
would now be directly responsible for defining and approving institutional plans 
and strategies, and for monitoring and evaluating the departments performance.  
 
                                                
49
 The Higher Council comprises the Secretary of State for Finance as Chair, the Secretary of State for 
Industry and Commerce, the Technical Secretary of the Presidency, the General Director of the DGII and 
the General Director of the DGA. Both chief executives participate in the meetings of the Governing 
Council, with voice and vote. 
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Commenting on the rationale for this about-face decision, one deputy director in 
the DGII opined that: 
 
Approval of laws 226-06 and 227-06 in June 2006 submitted to debate 
the extensive reach of structural autonomy granted to the two revenue 
agencies, and more importantly, the need for consideration to be given to 
the control mechanisms that needed to be put in place to serve as a 
counterweight to such autonomy. The product of this debate, law 494-06, 
served to clarify the status and role of the DGII and the DGA vis-à-vis 
relevant internal and external public institutions. 
 
Findings demonstrate that a large degree of structural autonomy was granted to 
the Dominican revenue agencies, a measure, within a short six-month period, 
slightly retrenched to allow for more controls by the centre over matters involving 
the formulation of strategic priorities and the development of high level plans and 
programmes for policy implementation. 
 
7.4    FINANCIAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
Prior to 2006, operations of the Dominican revenue agencies were fully funded 
through central budgetary appropriations, mostly based on the previous years 
figures with incremental adjustments to the various items. In this context, the 
Technical Operating Cabinet was responsible for setting commitment limits and 
the National Budget Office (ONAPRES) for approving expenditure. 
 
Requests for funding were submitted by spending units on a case-by-case basis, 
approvals reportedly proving to be highly discretionary.  
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Efforts by the Republic at improving resource predictability after 2002 resulted in 
a move towards a warrant system to replace transaction-based approvals. Under 
this system, each Ministry or spending unit submitted a quarterly plan (warrant) 
to ONAPRES for approval. Funds were then released to the departments on a 
monthly basis. All non-executed assigned funds expired at the end of each 
quarter and at the end of the financial year.  
 
According to Head of the Finance Department, DGII, initially limited allocations 
made it very difficult for the organisations to implement much needed changes. 
Additional funding could only be sought after the first month of the fiscal quarter, 
or via requests for supplementaries to be approved by Congress. 
 
With regard to monies collected, all revenues had to be paid into governments 
collection account, the DGA being an exception given its authority to withhold 
part of its income from the collection of customs user fees. 
 
 After June 2006, financing of the revenue departments ceased to be a line item 
of governments budget, funding now set primarily as a fixed percentage of actual 
tax collections. Under Law 226-06, the income of the DGA will be derived from 
4% of the effective collection obtained each month by way of taxes on foreign 
trade, and 0.4% of the cost, insurance and freight (CIF) of imports charged to 
importers as customs user fees50. In the case of the DGII, Law 227-06 stipulates 
that the departments budget will be financed by 2% of the effective collection 
obtained each month from taxes administered.  For both departments, additional 
                                                
50
 The Law specifies that such fees can only be charged where customs clearance or shipment of goods is 
effected within 2 days for the calendar year 2006, and in 1 day from the calendar year 2007. 
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sources of financing will be incomes originating from: seizures; the sales of 
goods of property; the provision of services; transfers, bequest and donations of 
other sources (public or private, national or foreign)51; proceeds of programmes 
of international co-operation; as well as credits or loans from public or private 
financial companies. 
 
Both pieces of legislation mandate the automatic transfer of such funds by the 
National Treasury directly into the account of each organisation within the first 5 
days of the month following that in which the collections had been generated. 
Formal financial autonomy is actually being realised in practice, through the 
automatic actual release of funds both at the level and within the timeframe as 
specified by law.  
 
Financial flexibility, which resulted in a direct funding regime that allowed for 
increased availability of resources within the DGII, was credited largely for the 
unprecedented major turnaround in revenue yield after only one year of its 
operation as a decentralised state organ. 
 
7.5    POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
 
Both the DGII and the DGA exercise(d), both pre- and post-autonomisation, a 
fairly large degree of policy autonomy, hence no major formal shift in this area. 
Agencies were, and still are expected to adopt the relevant institutional politics 
(norms, programs and systems) pertinent to guaranteeing the best fulfillment of 
                                                
51
 Excluded are donations from taxpayers and the trading community. 
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objectives, insofar as they are aligned with national fiscal policies, and can be 
financed from allocated budgets.  
 
Factual exercise of policy autonomy has resulted in the DGIIs continued efforts 
at closing the compliance gap through the conceptualisation and implementation 
of a number of initiatives. Measures include the introduction of a system of fiscal 
proofs to assist in tax collection. Other initiatives such as automation and 
software localisation, as well as modified procedures of collection all allow for a 
strengthening of the DGIIs administrative environment. The department 
continues to promote tax consciousness through the application of tax education 
and disclosure programmes to improve the behaviour of taxpayers in the 
opportune and voluntary fulfillment of their tax obligations.  
 
Likewise within Customs, a number of introduced measures have resulted in 
more effective and efficient systems for law enforcement and revenue collection. 
To combat fraud, the agency has forged linkages with a number of regional and 
international institutions. Modern computerised systems, including the installation 
of close circuit TVs and x-ray equipment, have been implemented for better 
control of passengers baggage and containerised cargo.  
 
7.6  FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AUTONOMY 
 
 
Cash management in the Dominican Republic is led by a number of central 
governing institutions; primarily the National Budget Office, in co-ordination with 
the National Treasury and the Office of the Comptroller General. Figure 7.1 
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illustrates the typical process that guided the departments request for and 
receipt of funds to pay for goods and services prior to autonomisation. 
 
Repeated checks aimed towards ensuring the accuracy and completeness of 
submitted documentation and that requests were consistent both with quarterly 
allocations and the availability of funds as reported by the Treasury. The entire 
process from receipt of goods/services to actual payment could last well over two 
weeks in best case and months in the worst. 
 
Although, however, no commitment of funds was valid without approval from the 
Treasury and the Comptroller General as outlined above, the process was 
neither interrupted nor delayed without their consent. The revenue agencies 
continued to incur commitments and to generate internal debt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.1: Process for Accessing Funds to Pay for Goods & Services 
Receipt of goods/services & Invoice 
(Corrected) documentation sent to 
National Budget Office for review 
Approved request sent to Comptroller 
General for further review  
Treasury releases funds for payment of 
goods/services. 
Review of payment order and supporting 
docs by depts Internal Auditor 
Docs sent to Ministrys Internal Audit Unit 
for review. Returned (with corrections) 
Final review of docs by Treasury and 
Accountant General 
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Another area for the informal practice of autonomy in financial management was 
that of procurement. The 1966 Procurement Act sought to centralise 
procurement under the Government Procurement Directorate (DGP). However, 
the DGPs inability to cope with the demands of servicing the needs of all public 
institutions resulted in public entities having a fair amount of purchasing freedom. 
Similar to their public counterparts, the two focal entities followed their own 
internal procurement procedures, making use of practices, some of which (for 
example, direct contracting) managed to circumvent government attempts at 
systemic control. 
 
Procedures allowed for the virement of funds within programmes without need for 
recourse to the Finance Ministry, only for co-ordination with the Budget Office. To 
transfer funds between distinct programmes, however, a legal instrument 
authorising such transfer needed to be submitted for final approval by the 
legislature. Funds could not be shifted from the capital (personal services) or 
payroll heads without special authorisation from both the Finance Ministry and 
the Office of the Technical Presidency.  
 
Governments modernisation of the financial management system in 1996 
through its introduction of the automated Integrated Financial Management 
System (SIGEF), and the subsequent decentralisation of SIGEF to all spending 
units resulted in heavy centralised controls over the public income and 
expenditure process. Greater transparency was brought to bear on a range of 
administrative processes such as budget amendments, payment processing and 
asset accounting.  
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With autonomisation, the DGII and the DGA assumed a larger degree of financial 
management authority. Directly responsible for a number of key areas including 
budget execution, asset acquisition and asset disposal, the departments 
prepared their own regulations to give effect to provisions within the legislation. 
Clearly stated in the new laws is that the financial resources over which the 
departments now have control are to be administered according to the legislation 
that governs the administration and control of resources of the Dominican State. 
Delegation of authority in the management of state finances has resulted in 
central institutions such as the National Budget Office and the Office of the 
Comptroller General being cast in backend monitoring and oversight roles. 
 
7.7    HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM) AUTONOMY  
 
 
All public personnel functions in the Dominican Republic are regulated by Law 
14-91 of May 199152 (commonly referred to as the Civil Service and 
Administrative Career Law)53; its enforcement Regulations No. 81-94 of March 
1994; and other supplemental regulations. The law and regulations all fall under 
the aegis of the National Office of Administration and Personnel (ONAP).  
 
Before autonomisation, the DGA and DGII were only two amongst a number of 
public organisations which, informally and by default, exercised a great deal of 
strategic and operational HRM autonomy largely because the laws and 
                                                
52
 The practical effect of this law only occurred some four years after its promulgation. 
53
 In the DR, the terms civil service and administrative career have specific definitions. In general, the 
civil service describes a body of law that regulates relationships between the government and its public 
employees. The career system, which is divided into two main branches - the administrative career (which 
includes all jobs in support of tax and customs work), and the tax and customs career (including all 
technical jobs in these two areas) - is a more general effort to increase the professionalisation and 
modernisation of the public service. 
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regulations aforementioned were never properly implemented for three main 
reasons: 
 
(1) lack of political will  the rules and regulations for applying the law were not 
approved until 1994. Even then, the regulations dictated that the law had to 
be applied first in the Department of Finance, and that only executive orders 
could mandate the application of the law in other government institutions: 
(2) Structural barriers  having grown accustomed to clientelistic practices in the 
recruitment and selection of staff, many agency directors erected a number 
of barriers that hindered ONAP from applying the law; and  
(3) Lack of capacity within ONAP  ONAP lacked sufficient financial backing 
and personnel with the requisite skills to implement the law. 
 
The DGII and DGA therefore informally exercised such available freedoms in a 
number of HR policy and programmatic areas such as recruitment, job 
classification, training, performance management, and disciplinary action. Both 
organisations had devised bonus schemes for revenues collected in excess of 
the annual targets as incentives to boost individual performance. 
 
The 2006 autonomy laws formally delegated to the two revenue agencies the 
authority to define their own organic structures; to determine area jurisdictions by 
creating, modifying and suppressing regional areas and administrative units in 
response to global challenges and demands. Authority was granted by law for 
each department to adopt a non-public sector personnel regime which involved, 
for example, establishing norms on entry and the setting of their own salary 
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structures. Certain specified transitory dispositions included the development of 
an administrative restructuring plan, internal regulations and personnel 
arrangements adapted to the mandate and objectives of the new legislation.   
 
With regard to the factual exercise of such autonomy, within a year of 
promulgation of the laws, both organisations had devised the administrative 
structures and internal regulations with which to improve the agencies 
administrative and technical management. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 respectively 
illustrate the new high level structures of the DGII and the DGA. In March, 2007 
the Higher Council of Tax Administration approved both the DGAs organic 
structure and its internal HR Regulations. The newly devised structure for the 
DGII, in line with the organisational models of tax administrations in Latin 
America, was approved in January 2008.  
 
Since April 2007, both organisations have conducted job evaluations, on more 
than one occasion adjusting pay levels accordingly to the salary scales of the 
private sector labour market. Salary revisions not only improved on the salaries 
paid prior to reform, but also streamlined and regularised pay rates by 
addressing several anomalies that existed as a result of pay differentials 
amongst jobs involving similar work.    
 
  
228 
 
HIGHER COUNCIL 
OF TA 
      
 
DIRECTOR-GENERAL  
 
Access to Information 
 
Public Relations 
 
Protocol  
International 
Co-operation 
 
Internal Control 
Council of Direction 
(Planning Committee) 
Ethics 
Committee 
Tenders 
Committee 
 
Economic Studies 
 
OPERATIONS & 
TECHNOLOGY 
SUB-DIRECTION 
 
COLLECTIONS 
SUB-DIRECTION 
 
 
LEGAL 
SUB-
DIRECTION 
 
COLLECTION 
SUB-
DIRECTORATE 
LARGE  
TAXPAYERS 
FINANCIAL 
INTERNAL 
AUDIT 
 
FINANCE HUMAN  
RESOURCES 
 
Administration 
& Logistics 
Information 
Technology and 
Communications 
Local 
Administrations 
Career 
Development 
Benefits and 
Compensation 
Accounts 
Treasury 
Collections 
Audit 
Alcohol &  
Tobacco 
Audit 
Planning 
External 
Audit 
 
Reconsiderations 
Collections 
Purchases 
Administration 
of Inventory 
Maintenance 
Security 
Budget 
Information 
Systems 
Web Design 
Technology 
Infrastructure 
Collections 
Control 
Registration of 
Taxpayers & 
Fiscal Proofs 
Credits & 
Compensation 
 
Special Regimes 
 
 
Valuation of Goods 
 
 
Legal 
Motor Vehicle 
Planning & 
Processes 
Management of 
Services 
Taxpayer 
Education 
Key: 
 
 
 
 
  Sub-Directions 
 
 
 Management 
 
 
 Departments 
 
Figure 7.2: New Organisational Structure of the DGII 
OFFICE OF THE 
 
GENERAL DIRECTOR 
 
PUBLIC 
RELATIONS 
TECHNICAL 
DELIBERATIVE 
COMMISSION 
LEGAL 
CONSULTING 
     AUDIT 
  FREE ZONES 
SUB-DIRECTION 
GENERAL 
FINANCE 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
SUB-DIRECTION 
DEPT. 
PURCHASES 
DEPT. 
  MAINTENANCE 
SECCION 
MAYORDOMIA 
GOBERNACION 
CLUB DE 
ADUANAS 
   FREE ZONE 
       CONTROL 
   DEPARTMENT 
DEPT. 
TRANSPORTATION 
PROCUREMENT 
SECTION 
  STORES 
& ARCHIVES 
    DEPT. 
MECHANICAL 
WORKSHOP 
INSPECTION 
        DEPT. 
MARITIME TERRITORIAL 
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONS & SUB-ADMINISTRATIONS 
AIRPORTS 
•ELIAS PIÑA 
•DAJABON 
•JIMANI 
•PEDERNALES 
•PUERTO PLATA 
•SANTIAGO 
•LA ISABELA 
•PUNTA CANA 
•LAS AMERICAS 
•BARAHONA 
•LA ROMANA 
•PORTILLO 
GENERAL DIRECTION OF CUSTOMS 
FUNCTIONAL ORGANOGRAM 
    FINANCE 
SECTION 
DEPARTMENT OF ORGANISATION AND METHODS 
JULY 2006 
GENERAL 
SUB-DIRECTION OF 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
SECTION OF  
PENSION & 
RETIREMENT 
PAYROLL 
SECTION 
INFORMATION 
REGISTRATION 
          UNIT 
    PERSONNEL 
DEPARTMENT 
     ARCHIVE 
      UNIT 
GENERAL 
SUB-DIRECTION 
COLLECTIONS 
SECTION 
ACCOUNTS 
.   SECTION 
GENERAL 
TECHNICAL 
SUB-DIRECTION 
CONTROL OF 
BONDS & 
RE-EXPORTATION 
REVISIONS. 
              DEPT. 
LABOROTARY 
TEMPORARY 
    ADMISSIONS 
           DEPT. 
EXEMPTIONS 
DEPT. 
RULES 
    OF ORIGIN 
    DEPT. 
AUCTIONS 
DEPARTMENT 
     GENERAL 
OPERATIONS 
SUB-DIRECTION 
  NORTH ZONE 
 SUB-DIRECTION 
MEDICAL 
MANAGEMENT 
UNIT OF 
MEDICAL 
INSURANCE 
   FREE 
     ZONES 
     
    FREE ZONES  
SUB-COLLECTIONS 
 WAREHOUSING 
DEPARTMENT 
GOODS 
WAREHOUSE 
RISK 
 ANALYSIS 
SECTION 
SECTION FOR 
LINKS WITH THE 
* CCLEC 
 
PASSENGERS 
& BAGGAGE 
SECTION 
 
CUSTOMS 
INTELLIGENCE 
UNIT OF  
PATRIMONY 
PRESS  
SECTION 
•SANTO DOMINGO 
•HAINA ORIENTAL 
•HAINA OCCIDENTAL 
•BOCA CHICA 
•SAN PEDRO DE MACORIS 
•LA ROMANA 
•PUERTO PLATA 
•AZUA 
 
•BARAHONA 
•CABO ROJO 
•MANZANILLO 
•SAMANA 
•SANCHEZ 
•MULTIMODAL CAUCEDO 
•FERRY 
 
RECEPTION 
POLICE  
SECTION 
\ 
MODERNISATION 
COMMISSION 
 
BASC 
VALUATION 
        DEPT. 
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY  
DEPARTMENT 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 
GENERAL SUBDIRECTION 
MANAGEMENT 
DEPARTMENT 
DIVISION 
SECTION 
UNIT 
MARITIME COLLECTIONS 
TERRITORIAL COLLECTIONS 
AIRPORT COLLECTIONS 
 GENERAL SUB-DIRECTION 
OF TECHNOLOGY &  
COMMUNICATIONS 
QUALITY 
CONTROL 
SECTION 
 
ANALYSIS & 
PROGRAMMING 
SECTION 
   NETWORKS &  
COMMUNICATIONS 
        SECTION 
TECHNICAL  
SUPPORT  
SECTION 
 
STATISTICS 
DEPARTMENT 
TELECOMMUNI- 
CATIONS 
DEPARTMMENT 
 
EXPRESS SHIPPING 
COURIERS 
DEPARTMENT 
DIVISION OF 
REGISTRATION 
& CONTROL 
DIVISIÓN OF 
REVISION & 
SUPERVISION 
 
EXPRESS 
COURIER SUB-
COLLECTION AILA 
 
EXPRESS 
COURIER 
AIRPORT  
PUERTO PLATA 
EXPRESS COURIER 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT OF 
 CIBAO  
EXPRESS COURIER 
INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORT LA ISABELA 
OFFICE OF 
SPECIAL 
DEPOSIT 
 
 BONDED 
WAREHOUSE 
 
HYDROCARBONS 
DEPARTMENT 
DIVISION OF 
REGISTRATION 
& CONTROL OF 
IMPORTATION OF OIL 
 
DIVISION OF 
 SUPERVISION OF 
DESPATCH OF OIL 
 
OIL SECTION IN THE 
COLLECTIONS 
SECTION  
PROTOCOL 
DOCUMENTATION 
CENTRE 
 
ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
 
TARIFF 
DEPARTMENT  
     VALUATION 
     AUDIT 
DIVISION 
OF CHECKING OF 
    VALUES 
OPERATING 
COMPANIES       
    DIVISION  
 
    INVESTIGATION  
         DIVISION 
 
DATABASE  
SECTION 
O&M 
DEPARTMENT 
  EXTRA 
HOURS 
UNIT 
SECTION OF 
PERSONNEL 
EQUIPMENT 
TRAINING 
SECTION 
ABSENCE  
CONTROL 
REGISTRATION UNIT 
•SAMANA 
*CCLEC – Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council 
Figure 7.3: Post-Reform 
Organisational Structure of the 
DGA 
  
230 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
B C D E F G H
PROFESSIONAL 
JOB CATEGORY LOCATION JOB TITLE
GROSS 
SALARY
JAN '07
GROSS 
SALARY 
DEC '07
GROSS 
SALARY 
JAN '08
% INCREASE 
JAN '07 / JAN '08
EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS GENERAL DIRECTOR 106591 403750 546250 412.47
EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS/TECHNICAL/HR SUB-DIRECTORATES SUB-DIRECTORS 71061 191250 258750 264.12
SENIOR MANAGEMENT EXPRESS COURIERS HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF PRIVATE COURIERS 58500 135000 172500 194.87
SENIOR MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT OF VALUATION AUDIT HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF AUDIT 91000 135000 172500 89.56
SENIOR MANAGEMENT AUDIT DEPARTMENT HEAD OF DEPARTMENT 65000 100890 122130 87.89
LEGAL DEPT. OF VALUATION AUDIT LAWYER 15465 37500 43125 178.85
LEGAL LEGAL DEPARTMENT LAWYER 25823 37500 43125 67.00
IT TECHNOLOGY & COMMS. SUB-DIRECTORATE PROGRAMMER 29980 54500 62675 109.06
AUDITING AUDIT DEPARTMENT AUDITOR 35000 77406 91770 162.20
ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT CASHIER 20800 27100 31165 49.83
ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATION, HAINA ORIENTAL CASHIER 8260 16200 18630 125.54
ACCOUNTING ACCOUNTS DEPARTMENT ACCOUNTANT 26000 37500 43125 65.87
CUSTOMS TECHNICAL SUB-DIRECTORATE COLLECTOR 70000 100700 121900 74.14
CUSTOMS DEPTO.  SUB-DIR.  OPERATIVA COLLECTOR 70000 135000 172500 146.43
CUSTOMS CUSTOMS INTELLIGENCE UNIT INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS 13113 28300 32545 148.19
CUSTOMS VALUATION AUDIT DEPARTMENT VERIFICATION OFFICER 22675 37500 43125 90.19
CUSTOMS UNIT, SANTIAGO DEPUTY COLLECTOR 24783 58103 68885 177.95
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION, CAUCEDO SUPERVISOR OF CUSTOMS 16608 28300 32545 95.96
Table 7.1 illustrates salary increases for selected jobs within the DGA over the 
period January 2007 to January 2008. Since decentralisation, there were two 
instances of pay hikes, with some lawyers, auditors and accountants realising 
over 60 per cent pay increases or more than doubling their 2007 annual gross 
salaries. Comparing 2007 and 2008 pay levels, there is now, for example, greater 
compression or less spread in the salary range for lawyers, as also for  
 
 
other job groupings. According to the Assistant Director, Human Resources in the 
DGA, improvement in conditions of service not only made it possible for the 
institutions to recruit professionally qualified staff but was also one way of 
reducing the high attrition rate in these critical areas.   
 
Table 7.1: Customs Salary Hikes for Selected Jobs, January 2007 - January 2008 
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Focusing on the DGII, Figure 7.4 highlights the internal career system devised to 
give effect to Law 14-91. The system is intended to promote equality of 
opportunity for entry into the organisation, as well as professionalisation of 
employees through continuous training, and greater opportunities for promotions. 
Whilst the HR department continues to recruit personnel for administrative 
support jobs, most managerial and technical positions (approximately 85%) are 
now filled via a competitive process using external consulting agencies. During 
2007, four externally managed processes of recruitment were effected with a total 
of 290 new auditors being incorporated into the organisation. Training needs  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Career System of the DGII 
 
analyses continue to be conducted and training plans devised annually to develop 
both technical and generic skills, with courses being delivered at the national and 
regional levels. 
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Autonomy in the area of human resource management, which was informally 
practiced by the DGA and the DGII was now codified and formally delegated as 
part of the autonomy laws. The agencies used such autonomy to develop 
appropriate internal norms and standard that would allow for the efficient and 
effective management and development of human resources. 
 
7.8    INTERVENTIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
Already mentioned was the role of central institutions such as the National Budget 
Office (ONAPRES), the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) and the National 
Treasury in the ex-ante oversight and ex-post review of agency performance. In 
the area of revenue reporting, both focal organisations submit to the President, 
the Finance Secretary of State and ONAPRES a daily report on the fiscal incomes 
collected the previous day, as well as a weekly report to the latter on all charges 
against allotments.  
 
Both agencies faced a number of other encroachments upon organisational 
freedoms. Internal Audit Units (IAUs) established within each agency by the OCG 
conduct ex-ante reviews of all payment transactions, as well as ex-post audits of 
non-financial performance. According to the Head of Organisation and 
Management in the DGA, the work of the IAUs not only continues to add little 
value, but results in additional procedures due to its overlap with the functions of 
the Budget Office. Also playing a central role in the internal audit of processes is 
the General Directorate of Government Accounting (DIGECOG). DIGECOG 
assesses, on a quarterly basis, the implementation of standards, procedures, and 
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accounting systems, ordering prescribed adjustments deemed appropriate. 
Exrernal audit is conducted by the Audit Commission or Accounts Chamber 
(Camera de Cuentas).  
 
 
Post-autonomisation, administrative freedoms have been enlarged in the sense of 
a reduction in the required frequency of reporting. Likewise with regard to 
auditing, this function has now shifted from a primarily frontend operation to a 
more backend process.    
 
7.9    BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
Autonomy laws 226-06 and 227-06 clearly outlined the scope of delegated 
authority and the length of distancing of the revenues agencies from central 
government control. The need however, to strike an intricate balance between 
autonomy and accountability resulted, as mentioned earlier, in the near immediate 
passage of law 494-06 to roll back some of the initially granted authority.  
 
Built into the legislation are a number of provisions aimed at ensuring that the 
departments remain accountable to government, stakeholders, and the wider 
general public for actions undertaken in the execution of fiscal policy.  One such 
provision states that, independent of dispositions of the present laws, selected 
plans and programmes, and the general administrative management of the 
institutions must, at all times, be aligned with the economic policies of the State, 
and comply with the goals of collection established by the Executive Branch. The 
newly decentralised entities would therefore continue to submit to all the fiscal, 
economic, and tax politics of the central government through its various 
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competent organs. Such directives have resulted in the DGII, for example, putting 
in place measures to ensure the systematic preparation and periodic publishing of 
performance reports that enable analysts and civil society alike to assess the 
manner of execution of fiscal policy and the impact of such actions. 
 
In the management and development of human resources, the agencies are still 
expected to follow certain guidelines in operation for other public service 
institutions, which include the use of competitive criteria for recruitment and 
promotions. Both organisations therefore now base their recruitment processes 
on open contest for specialist tax and customs positions. 
 
7.10    CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter presented findings on the nature and extent of autonomy delegated 
to and exercised by the investigated revenue agencies in the DR, both pre- and 
post-reforms. Table 7.2 provides a summary of the formal autonomy delegated to 
the revenue agencies along the various dimensions discussed. 
 
Pre-reform, the agencies, which operated as separate institutions headed by 
officials appointed by the President, had no separate legal basis. Structural 
arrangements ensured that the organisations remained within close proximity to 
the parent ministry, and that controls could be easily exercised over agents by 
political principals. 
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Table 7.2: Degrees of Formal Autonomy of the Dominican Revenue Agencies 
DIMENSIONS OF 
AUTONOMY 
 
DOMINICAN REVENUE AGENCIES 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL AUTONOMY 
 
Legal Basis: Laws 226-06 and 227-06 of June 21, 2006 established the Customs (DGA) and the Internal Taxes 
(DGII) as decentralised semi-autonomous agencies.   
 
Legal Status:  
(a) Pre-Reform: No legal basis outside of central government structure. Departments functioned as dependencies 
of the Ministry of Finance.  
(b) Post-Reform: Departments established as public right entities with their own legal personality. Agencies vested 
with functional, economic, financial, technical and administrative autonomy, with legal capacity to enter into 
agreements and contracts.  
 
STRUCTURAL 
AUTONOMY:  
 
(GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS) 
 
 
Pre-Reform: No intermediary Board. Agency heads appointed and subject to dismissal by the President to whom 
they report through the Secretary of State, Finance. 
Post-Reform: Departments reconstituted as semi-autonomous agencies. Roll-back of initial degree of structural 
autonomy with the passage of Law 494-06 and introduction of intermediary board model (Higher Council of Tax 
Administration). Same method of reporting. Most high level strategies submitted to the Higher Council for approval. 
 
 
 
FINANCIAL  
AUTONOMY: 
 
(FUNDING 
MECHANISM) 
 
 
 
Source of Funding:  
 
(a) Pre-Reform: Funding via standard legislative appropriations. Warrant system replaced transaction-based 
approvals. Funds released on a monthly basis based on submitted quarterly warrant. Limited ability to extend 
funding. 
(b) Post-Reform: Funding regime based on a percentage of collection.  
  (i) Customs: 2-tiered funding mechanism. Income derived from 4% of effective collection obtained each month, 
plus 0.4% of the cost, insurance and freight (C.I.F) on imports charged as customs user fees. 
 (ii) Internal Taxes: Income derived from 2% of actual collection obtained each month.  
Both departments able to extend funding via means such as sale of property, proceeds of programs of international 
cooperation, and loans from private financial companies. 
 
Transfer of Funds: Automatic release of funds by the Treasury within the first 5 working days of each month. 
 
 
POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
Both Pre- and Post-Reform: Departments expected to adopt the relevant institutional politics (norms, 
programmes, systems and processes) pertinent to guaranteeing the best fulfillment of mandated functions. 
Leverage therefore granted for agencies to devise new strategies and to introduce new services provided they can 
be financed from budgetary appropriations and they align with national policies. 
 
 
MANAGERIAL 
 
(A. FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT)  
 
AUTONOMY 
 
Pre-Reform: Ability to establish own internal procedures for procurement of goods and services. High degree of 
formalisation of controls over budget execution, asset management and asset disposal. Ability to vire funds only 
within programme heads.  
Post-Reform: Departments prepare own regulations based on set public policy. Funds to be administered 
according to the legislation that governs the administration and control of the resources of the Dominican State. 
 
MANAGERIAL 
 
(B. HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT) 
 
AUTONOMY 
 
Pre-Reform: Informal autonomy in a number of HR policy and operational areas including recruitment, job 
classification, training and performance management. 
 
Post-Reform: Formal autonomy to establish own internal norms for the HR system (e.g staffing establishment and 
skill mix, position classification, salary levels and conditions) subject to approval by the Higher Council of Tax 
Administration. 
 
 
 
 
INTERVENTIONAL 
AUTONOMY 
 
 
(I) Pre-Reform: 
 a) Reporting Requirements: Daily reports on fiscal incomes submitted to the President, the National Budget 
Office, and the Minister of Finance. Submission of weekly reports to the Budget Office on all charges against 
budgetary allotments. 
 (b) Audit Provisions: Various central agencies responsible for front and backend auditing of financial and non-
financial operations. 
(II) Post-Reform: 
 a) Reporting Requirements: Daily reports on fiscal incomes still part of fiduciary responsibility. Some alterations 
in the frequency of reporting in some areas. 
 (b) Audit Provisions: Audit function shifted more to the backend of processes. 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
TOWARDS 
STAKEHOLDERS 
AND THE                        
GENERAL PUBLIC 
 
- DGIIs monthly publication of performance data on internet webpage. No such  undertaking by the DGA. 
- Publication of Annual Reports by both agencies. 
- Both organisations engage in public consultation with respect to the exercise of their revenue collecting and 
rule-making powers. 
 
 
TRANSITORY 
PROVISIONS 
DURING REFORM 
 
Employees continued to exercise their duties and functions as personnel of the revenue departments. Legal 
provision for a 6-month transitory period for departments to put in place the systems and procedures to give effect 
to the new arrangements. 
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Both entities exercised limited formal and factual autonomy in the areas of 
financial and financial management, with also limited interventional autonomy 
from a number of central government institutions. Total financial resource 
dependence on central government appropriations, with limited opportunity to 
extend funding via external sourcing, hamstrung the agencies in the execution of 
programmes. Heavy centralised controls and a high degree of formalisation 
characterised the whole public income and expenditure process, a great deal of 
checking and double-checking resulting in duplication, inefficiencies and delays. 
 
Whilst resource dependency and centralised controls allowed for limited 
flexibilities in financial, financial management and interventional autonomy, both 
agencies, pre-reform, exercised a fair amount of informal autonomy in a number 
of areas. Actual use of informal policy autonomy resulted in the conceptualisation 
and implementation of programmes and (sub) processes designed to achieve the 
efficiency gains sought as the primary goal of customs reform, as well as 
effectiveness in tax collection. Lack of legitimacy of central institutions such as 
ONAP, as well as the lack of capacity of central institutions charged with the 
direction and oversight of procurement and HR functions resulted in a high level 
of informal freedoms. Such flexibilities were applied to purchasing goods and 
services; to vireing and expending funds, sometimes without prior expressed 
approval; as well as to recruiting and selecting staff and managing performance. 
 
Far-reaching structural and operational changes, part of fiscal administrative 
reforms that took place in 2006, enlarged the discretionary decision-making space 
of the revenue agencies. Still to operate as separate revenue collecting bodies, 
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the departments were now constituted as legal entities in their own right, with 
capabilities that made them far more removed and independent of the central 
government machinery than their pre-reform status. 
 
Structurally, whilst the initially conceptualised fully empowered internal Board of 
Directors model had the advantage of endowing the DGII and the DGA with far-
reaching decision-making competencies and actual capacities to act, 
governments rethink of the scope of such delegations and the implications for 
political accountability resulted in the more strategic decision-making 
competencies involving, for example, the approval of organic structures, annual 
budgets, institutional plans and strategies, now being the preserve of the Higher 
Council of Tax Administration. The departments are therefore now pitted in a 
dependency relation with the Higher Council in some aspects regarding legitimacy 
of policies and programmes. 
 
Reduced financial dependence on central government funding through the new 
percentage of collection funding regime and the mandated automatic release of 
funds, plus the capacity to tap alternate sources of financing, resulted two years 
later in improved operational efficiencies and marked increases in overall revenue 
yield largely as a result of being able to implement various policies and 
programmes. Research findings showed that reform only served to formalise the 
previous informal autonomy practiced in the areas of policy implementation and 
human resources management. Actual capacity to act post-reform led to the 
development of organic structures that would better allow for more flexible, more 
modern and responsive tax and customs services, and to the adoption of a non-
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public sector regime that permitted a reversal of previous high attrition rates and 
the recruitment and selection of the right persons at the right time in the right 
positions. 
 
Autonomisation, while not leading to a total break with the past in terms of a 
relinquishment of centralised controls over public expenditure and requirements 
for reporting on performance, did result in a scaling back of previous controls, with 
a marked reduction in the amount of front-end approvals, monitoring and 
oversight, to more back-end ex-post controls. Such a move served to propel the 
organisation over time from a micromanaged transaction-led organisation to a 
more efficiency-driven institution with greater capacities for managing input, 
process and output flows. 
 
The following chapters will now present findings on the second major component 
of the research which involves an analysis of influences on the practice of 
bureaucratic autonomy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
FACTORS CONDITIONING AUTONOMY: 
THE JAMAICAN CASE 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents finding on factors conditioning the practice of bureaucratic 
autonomy at the three levels of analyses (macro-, meso- and micro-) for the 
Jamaican case. The findings are presented starting at the broader macro-
institutional level to show how these filter through to the internal organisational 
level of functioning.  
 
8.2  THE IMPACT OF MACRO-LEVEL FACTORS ON AUTONOMY 
 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted the issue of organisational functioning within superordinate 
social systems, their embeddedness within broader institutional frameworks, and 
the usefulness of exploring the potential impact of contextual factors on the 
exercise of bureaucratic autonomy. The following sections present findings on the 
actual influence of such environmental factors on bureaucratic functioning; in 
particular, interest group participation, the legal/administrative framework, legal 
tradition, and system of government. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 provides a graphic illustration of some of the key institutions within the 
very complex and multi-faceted revenue administrative environment. A number of 
the linkages serve, amongst other things, to enable co-ordination, to maintain a  
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Figure 8.1: The Institutional Environment of Revenue Administration in Jamaica 
                                    Source: Adapted from Gill (2003:5) 
 
certain measure of governmental controls, and to facilitate increased 
accountability. 
 
8.2.1    INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION 
 
Interest groups within the institutional environment of the tax and customs 
departments in Jamaica that have the potential to impact on bureaucratic 
autonomy primarily comprise taxpayers54, private sector associations, public 
                                                
54
 Taxpayers is used as an all encompassing word to include those subject to domestic taxes as well as 
importers, exporters and their representatives subject to duties and taxes from their involvement in 
international trade. 
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sector unions55, the media, and the general public. Whilst some of these entities 
support and advance the practice of autonomy, others constrain bureaucrats in 
their exercise of administrative discretion. In some instances, case in point the 
public sector unions, behaviour is contingent upon the issue of the day. 
 
As part of efforts to demonstrate accountability, both the Inland Revenue and 
Customs departments actively encourage the participation of their respective 
stakeholders in the planning and operational functioning of the organisations, in 
some cases co-opting entities onto internal committees. The IRD holds regular 
meetings with umbrella bodies and professional associations such as the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants and the Banking Association. Customs likewise meets 
with its constituents, including the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC) and the 
Customs Brokers Association, during monthly meetings of its Quality Assurance 
Committee. Such meetings provide forums for information sharing on trade and 
trade-related issues, plans for reform and modernisation, the (proposed) 
implementation of new initiatives, as well as updates on matters under review.  
During TaxARP, the Jamaica Civil Service Association (JCSA) was offered a seat 
on the selection panel to recruit persons to new positions within the Tax 
Administration. The JCC was the only body appointed to the Steering Committee 
during the Customs Modernisation programme. These stakeholders have, in the 
majority of cases, engendered buy-in amongst members for a number of 
initiatives, thereby facilitating tax compliance and enhancing the ability of the 
departments to serve its clients.  
                                                
55
 The main bodies representing the interests of public officers are the Jamaica Confederation of Trade 
Unions and the Jamaica Civil Service Association. 
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This does not mean, however, that all has been a bed of roses interfacing with 
these institutions. The Customs Department has, on occasion, faced from various 
stakeholder groups threats to its autonomy to interpret regulations and to make 
and alter rules. Lack of agreement with the JCC on what should have been 
included on a list of personal allowances for travellers who are citizens of Jamaica 
resulted in the departments decision to review the regulations which resulted in 
the re-issue of a new revised list. A decision to stop moving containers by road 
between Kingston and Montego Bay in the interest of security met with stiff 
opposition from the trading community.  Likewise the decision to draw more used 
car dealerships into the tax net to boost general consumption tax (GCT) 
revenues. After years of repeated recommendations to government for a change 
to the GCT legislation, used car dealers, who were in the habit of withholding the 
payment of outstanding GCT after the sale of vehicles, were now being forced as 
of September 2006 to either pay all duties and taxes upfront, or establish bonded 
warehouses where the duties are paid over after the removal of the vehicles from 
the warehouse for sale. The new system would require either a doubling or 
trebling of the cash flow of used car dealers or their ability to negotiate bonds to 
develop the new facilities.  
 
In both cases involving decisions relating to the containers and the used car 
dealership, the parties involved made representation through lobbying Cabinet 
Ministers for a reversal of decisions either implemented or initiated by the 
bureaucracy. In the case of the used cars policy, the ballooning of tax arrears by 
this time had far outweighed the social issues involved in regulating the operation, 
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hence the support from government for the decision of the Customs department 
on this issue. In other cases, however, where groups have strong lobbies in the 
Cabinet, the departments were forced to arrive at some form of compromise with 
the involved stakeholders. 
 
Whilst some interest groups impact negatively on the capacity of the revenue 
agencies to use their discretion, others provide the organisation with opportunities 
for discretionary action. One such entity within the Customs operating 
environment is the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which 
works closely with the Jamaica Customs as part of the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI). CSI is a security regime to ensure all containers that pose a 
potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports, before they 
are placed on vessels destined for the United States. Under CSI, a team of CBP 
officials are deployed to work with host Customs administrations.  
 
Regarding the vested interest of the U.S. CBP, one of the minimum standards for 
a country to be eligible for CSI is that its seaport must have regular, direct and 
substantial container traffic to ports in the U.S. Because shipments have already 
been jointly examined by the U.S and the host country customs officials, this 
reduces the amount of examination which CBP has to deal with at the U.S. port. 
This allows CBP to focus more attention on high risk shipments that have not 
been pre-screened. 
 
Customs official interviewed at the Port commented that the CSI functions as a 
co-operative effort as stated as the objective of the initiative. CBP officers operate 
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in accordance with the guidelines of the host country whereby host officials 
conduct the examination and CBP officials observe the security screening. In 
terms of opportunity, membership of the CSI programme has resulted in Jamaica 
being able to counter its lack of financial autonomy to purchase much needed 
resources. Donations of imaging equipment, radiation detection and gamma x-ray 
equipment have been made by the U.S. government to the government of 
Jamaica. The initiative has provided an opportunity for the substitutability of the 
U.S government as an alternate source for the acquisition of critical resources. 
 
Focusing on the media and members of the general public, tax administrators are 
hardly subject to challenges to their decisions and to criticisms from such 
groupings. According to one academic, if administrative decisions are deemed 
harsh or unfair, it is the Minister or the Finance Ministry which bears the brunt of 
the criticism. If finance decisions are taken which result in money being wasted on 
unwise or unaccountable spending, it is the integrity of government that comes 
under attack. This, it was argued, might be a function of Jamaicas political 
culture: 
 
It might be the result of a tendency to politicise issues rather than an orientation 
towards functional analysis of public institutions. The former is good theatre and 
the latter does not sell newspapers. 
 
Dealing with public service unions is somewhat of a mixed case. Most public 
officers in Jamaica are members of the JCSA. Historically, public service unions 
have posed little threat to administrative decisions of the revenue departments. In 
the implementation of reforms, initiatives such as the use of psychometric testing 
in the recruitment and selection process, the introduction and operation of a new 
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performance appraisal system, automation, reorganisation through changes to 
office opening hours in some locations as part of efforts to improve quality of 
service delivery were all introduced free of challenges to policy and human 
resource management autonomy.  According to the General Secretary of the 
JCSA, lack of challenges and pressures was due to recognition of the need for a 
change in which government operated vis-à-vis changing global market realities; 
that it could no longer be a case of business as usual, and the need therefore to 
assist the departments in their preparedness for modernisation.  
 
Unfettered exercise of managerial prerogative was to change, however, during 
the two-year period 2004-2006, with the signing of historic accords or agreements 
between the Government of Jamaica and the Jamaica Confederation of Trade 
Unions (JCTU). 2004/05 witnessed the signing of the first Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU1), with MOU2 signed for the FY 2005/06. These bi-partisan 
corporatist arrangements and acts of voluntarism came about as a result of poor 
macroeconomic conditions in Jamaica which necessitated the arrival of a national 
compromise between the government and the public sector trade unions. In order 
to reduce a spiraling budget deficit, the partners agreed to an overall strategy of 
wage restraint and macroeconomic management.  In exchange for wage restraint 
by the major unions  a 3% increase or a cap of 20% on the wage fund over the 
next 2 years - government committed to pursuing complementary fiscal and 
monetary policies that would maintain macro-economic stability and accelerate 
real economic growth over the medium to long term. The policy was to apply to all 
remuneration under contracts of employment for any kind of work to be performed 
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in the public sector of Jamaica, and to include restraints on expenditures such as 
the purchase of motor vehicles and office equipment, social functions, rental of 
property, and foreign travel. Items were to be made line items in the budget and 
reported on quarterly with reports submitted through the respective accounting 
officers to the Ministry of Finance and Planning, with the application of sanctions 
as soon as breaches were confirmed. Established within the MoF was a Post 
Operations Committee to monitor the activities of the departments to ensure 
compliance with the Agreement. During the period of restraint, there would be no 
reclassification of positions, except for special cases which had to be submitted 
for approval by the monitoring Committee. All recommendations for the filling of 
vacancies needed to be accompanied by an approval letter from the Committee. 
Initially, the revenue departments were required to seek permission to employ 
new staff when there was a resignation, or the post was vacant and needed to be 
filled. After the first year into the agreement, the departments only needed to seek 
approval to employ persons in positions which had been vacant for over a year. 
The onus was therefore on the revenue agencies to ensure that positions were 
not open for any length of time. Conditioning the departments in their use of the 
human resources autonomy granted them two years earlier, the MoU resulted in 
both organisations having to constantly maintain a high level of vigilance over 
their staffing complement. 
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8.2.2    THE LEGAL-ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
8.2.2.1   The Legal Framework 
 
The legal framework of revenue administration in Jamaica comprises the 
Revenue Administration Act (1985); the Revenue Administration (Amendment) 
Act (1999); individual taxing and customs legislation - the Income Tax Act (1955), 
the Customs Act Cap 89 (1941), the Tax Collection Act (1867), and the General 
Consumption Tax Act (1991); as well as other general laws impacting on the 
administration of taxes. Both focal organisations look to the existence of a legal 
framework that will not only facilitate the practice of administrative discretion on a 
number of fronts, but would also increase levels of interventional autonomy 
through minimal requirements for third-party involvement in the bureaucratic 
decision-making process. 
 
Pre-TaxARP, the focal organisations were severely handicapped in their auditing 
and investigation work either due to legal prohibitions or lack of requisite legal 
powers. Major prohibitions related to the exchange of information between the 
various revenue departments, and to obtaining third-party information regarding 
taxable transactions from sources such as banks, financial institutions, 
accountants and attorneys-at-law. No formal mechanism existed whereby 
information relating to individual taxpayers was routinely shared between the tax 
departments. In fact, the different Revenue Acts prohibited the disclosure of 
information unless expressly authorised by the Minister. Lack of powers was most 
seriously felt in areas of search and seizure, impounding of books and the 
imposition of penalties for various defaults. The departments were also 
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constrained by the fact that electronic signature was not recognised by law. The 
Customs Department, for example, while it had designed and implemented most 
of the systems required to facilitate e-commerce (automated manifesting and 
entry processing), the old manual system of submitted paper copies overlaid on 
the automated regime continued because electronic signatures were not yet legal. 
This made it difficult for the department to extend e-commerce initiatives to 
include e-filing and e-payment. These legal hurdles prevented the focal 
organisations from implementing policies and programmes that would allow them 
to reach incriminating evidence that would help them to establish and penalise tax 
evasion and thus set up a credible deterrent to spur voluntary compliance.  
Inability to make full use of newly designed automated systems and processes 
not only resulted in duplication of effort, but in essence served as a rein on reform 
and advancement of the modernisation process. 
 
The priority assigned to legislation during the implementation process of TaxARP 
was briefly mentioned in chapter 5. Extensive amendments to the Revenue 
Administration Act (1985) via the Revenue Administration (Amendment) Act 
(1999) (RAA Act) resulted in changes directed at: enabling information exchange 
between the different government agencies; strengthening the enforcement 
powers of the revenue departments; removing ambiguities and loopholes in the 
legislation that created unintended tax avoidance opportunities; and increasing 
penalties for non-compliance. Legislative response to informational disadvantages 
resulted in a relaxing of the principle of fiscal secrecy enshrined in the revenue 
laws, thereby allowing the revenue laws to share information on taxpayer 
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transactions. In relation to enforcement, amendments to the Revenue 
Administration Act include enhanced powers relating to search and seizure, and 
the impounding of incriminating documents. Focusing on penalties, the various 
revenue laws, which incorporate sanctions of both civil and criminal nature, have 
witnessed a number of amendments. The Customs Act was revised in 2004 to 
introduce significant increases in penalties for customs infractions. In some 
instances, flat rate penalties in key provisions have been replaced by sanctions 
carrying a minimum and/or maximum exaction to ensure their economic 
practicality, and expressed as a percentage of the delinquency, sometimes as 
much as treble in cases where a fraudulent act has occurred. Penal provisions of 
the tax laws likewise were revisited to ensure that these have adequate deterrent 
effect. 
 
Whilst modifications to the legal framework have enhanced the powers of the 
focal organisations to exercise greater autonomy to devise and implement 
programmes and initiatives to ensure efficient and effective tax collection, a 
number of serious shortcomings in the revenue laws still remain. One major 
barrier relates to the continuing need for tax authorities to depend on the judiciary 
both for obtaining information from third parties and also for securing compliance 
with even the procedural provisions of tax laws. 
 
Regarding third party information, modern economic activity involves extensive 
banking and financial transactions. While taxpayers disclose some transactions in 
their returns, many others remain concealed. In order to enforce revenue laws 
and curb tax evasion, authorities need access to such information which involves 
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having the power and authority to requisition the information from third parties, 
including banks and financial institutions. To access third party information, 
section 17G of the RAA Act specifies that the revenue Commissioner must apply 
for an Order to a Judge in Chambers, who may require the production of the 
information, if satisfied that in all circumstances there are reasonable grounds for 
granting the Order and, the information has been requested from the taxpayer 
without success. Such provisions, where reasonable grounds must be 
ascertained and certain conditions satisfied ex ante, introduce a high level of 
judicial discretion into the equation, often resulting in inefficient enforcement.  
 
Not only the revenue laws, but other national laws also present major barriers to 
effective enforcement. These include the Bank of Jamaica Act (1960), the 
Banking Act (1992), and the Financial Institutions Act (1992), with various secrecy 
provisions that prohibit the disclosure of case-specific information involving the 
transactions of their clients, Under section 45 of the Banking Act, any bank official 
who divulges information regarding the money or relevant particulars of the 
account of a customer, is guilty of an offense, except in cases where the 
information is disclosed in connection with civil proceedings, the disclosure is 
made on the written direction of the Minister for the purpose of the investigation or 
prosecution of a criminal offense, or the disclosure is required by virtue of an 
Order of the court.  
 
Lack of third party co-operation and constraints to bureaucratic functioning as a 
result of the requirement for judicial involvement have resulted in repeated calls 
from the bureaucracy for amendments to these pieces of legislation - calls which 
  
251 
 
have been met with stiff opposition from the business community and banking 
lobbyists interest groups. Governments position and its inertia with regard to 
action on the matter was explained by the Finance Minister, Dr. Omar Davies: 
 
 
There is a great deal of international pressure  certainly with tax and 
financial legislation  with the international community currently on a path 
to blackmail everybody to go the same route. Even though we fully 
understand and appreciate the challenges relating to fraud, money 
laundering and terrorism, we are also cognizant of the potential dangers 
of giving the Revenue discretion in this area, which could lead to abuse. 
The reality of the situation is that the law ensures that requests for such 
information come from higher levels in the process, that the authorities 
have to apply through the courts, and that persons must be aware that 
such applications have been made. Such matters border on the invasion 
of privacy and beg the question as to how far one should be able to pry 
into peoples business. 
 
 
The current system of tax laws also impacts on bureaucratic interventional 
autonomy by making the tax authorities highly dependent on the judiciary for 
securing compliance with procedural provisions of tax and customs laws. 
Regarding non-compliance, instead of the use of administrative sanctions that are 
automatically applied, revenue laws make provision for fines which require judicial 
enforcement. Routine defaults, such as failure to: file returns, furnish requested 
information, or appear before the Revenue when summoned, have been made 
offenses punishable by fines and terms of imprisonment. Making these defaults 
offenses means that in order to punish defaulters, the revenue agency has to file 
a case before the court: since by itself it can do nothing. While such provisions 
may therefore appear impressive on paper, in reality, exclusive reliance on the 
judiciary for the imposition of fines and penalties creates many difficulties for the 
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bureaucracy, problems stemming from inordinate delays as a result of the backlog 
in the system.  Whilst not disputing the need for maintaining the judiciarys pre-
eminence in deciding questions of law, highly recommended by the Consultants 
during the early reform stage was the need for the revenue agencies to be given 
direct powers to impose penalties for most defaults, and for the present 
prosecution proceedings, if considered necessary, be retained for use only in 
serious cases of tax evasion. 
 
The situation as described above is further compounded by a legal framework 
which incorporates a blend of national and supranational laws. Constraints arise 
from institutional norms relating to Jamaicas membership in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), its signing in March 1995 and implementation in June 2002 
of the WTOs Agreement on Customs Valuation (ACV), which aims at trade 
facilitation and a minimum disruption of the goods supply chain. 
 
Prior to 2002, valuation of imports was based on the Brussels Definition of Value 
(BDV). BDV advocates the assignment of customs values determined on the 
basis of the normal price, i.e. the price that goods would fetch on the market 
between unrelated buyers and sellers. Whilst the use of invoiced prices is strongly 
recommended, where this is not possible, for example in cases where declared 
values are suspiciously low, Customs administrations have discretion to use other 
suitable means for construing the normal price using any available information. In 
order to protect revenues, the Customs Department developed and continually 
updated its database of minimum values to be used as the normal market value 
for fraud-sensitive or high risk goods. Dissatisfaction with declared values at 
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points of entry usually resulted in reassessment through the upliftment and 
application of minimum values, without need for justification. 
 
Bureaucratic flexibility of the kind described above was to be severely curtailed 
consequent to the adoption of the binding ACV, with its extensive and detailed 
provisions outlining the specific methods to be used for customs valuation. One 
major provision relates to the procedure to be followed in cases where Customs 
administrations have reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of declared values. 
According to Article 13 of the ACV, where values are in dispute, goods should be 
released with a deposit or surety to cover the additional duties and taxes at risk.  
 
Supranational legislation prohibiting the use of minimum values has resulted in 
numerous problems for customs officials. According to the Head of Valuation 
Verification, layering a system such as the ACV, which is predicated on voluntary 
compliance, atop a system where there is culture of non-compliance, is not in the 
best interest of a country such as Jamaica.  
 
Despite these various legal constraints, one pertinent issue remains the extent of 
use by the bureaucracy of those powers which have actually been granted under 
the various revenue laws. In the words of one tax specialist getting the legislation 
or authority is one thing, plucking up the courage to use it is another. Here, this 
researcher noted marked differences in the actions of the two focal organisations.  
 
Officials within the Inland Revenue Department spoke of the organisations poor 
track record for enforcement of tax laws. The department was accused of being 
soft in terms of its misdirected focus on informed as opposed to enforced 
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compliance, with the resulting accumulation of a huge amount of tax liabilities. 
Such views reinforce earlier IMF findings in its 2006 Evaluation Report about the 
reluctance of the department to use its powers relating to the imposition of levies, 
service of warrants and issuance of summonses. Reliance on moral suasion as a 
strategy for compliance is not only challenged by officials within the bureaucracy 
and by donors, but also by taxpaying citizens. In the words of one academic at the 
University of the West Indies: 
 
Government seems to have stopped short of a crusade for tax 
compliance in favour of a campaign for tax collection, relying on the 
traditional philosophy of facilitation instead of criminalisationSpending 
budgets are tough and tight but revenue strategies are soft and loose. Yet 
the revenue department only plans more educational campaigns for these 
artful tax dodgers. Soft governance has its place. We need to be 
compassionate and forgiving. We need to inform and educate the ignorant 
and to make processes easier. But we cannot have open-ended 
permissiveness, which people will exploit. The situation has prevailed 
because governance in Jamaica has followed a tradition of talking tough 
and walking softly. 
 
 
More recently however, the IRD has showed a greater willingness to take action 
against delinquents through, for example, the use of the courts to enforce tax 
arrears and other delinquencies, after having exhausted other recovery methods.  
 
This situation is in stark contrast to the modus operandi of the Customs 
Department with regard to the use of its legal powers. Customs officials speak of 
ready imposition of fines and penalties to collect duties and taxes. Despite the 
penalty structure still containing inadequate and fixed amount penalties, valuation 
and enforcement officials confess to their haste to apply to virtually every offence 
  
255 
 
attempted or committed by the importer, Sections 209-211 of the Customs Act 
which provide strong value-based penalties. Notwithstanding the constraints 
imposed by the WTO ACV, the department has developed its own coping 
strategies for dealing with import valuation problems. Such strategies involve 
drawing on counterpart foreign administrations and exporters as appropriate for 
the provision of relevant information and, in extreme cases flouting the WTO rules 
by retaining goods until the appropriate revenues, as determined by the Customs, 
have been secured. 
   
8.2.2.2   The Administrative Framework 
 
 
 
The Inland Revenue and Customs departments in Jamaica operate within a highly 
centralised administrative framework. Central institutional arrangements, central 
policies and guidelines which continue to apply in a number of key operational 
areas impact on the ability of the focal organisations to make full and effective use 
of their limited powers of administrative discretion. 
 
Major constraints stem from central controls over funding and the expenditure of 
funds. Already highlighted in Chapter 6 is the involvement of the various central 
institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, the Offices of the Accountant General 
and the Auditor General, the Treasury and the Bank of Jamaica in the expenditure 
process. Regarding income, both departments highlighted the lack of funds voted 
by Parliament and provided by the Finance Ministry, and the resulting pressures 
to prioritise, at times having to forego some projects and programmes until the 
start of the following financial year. Customs, in particular, highlighted the drastic 
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cuts in its capital budget during the FY 2008/09. Approved funding, which 
represented a mere 0.5% of the original submission, resulted in the suspension of 
critical programmes, and an impeding of the departments modernisation process. 
 
Central financial controls not only impact on the bureaucracys exercise of policy 
autonomy, but also its use of administrative discretion in the area of human 
resources development. Despite the initial small budgets allocated to the focal 
organisations to conduct local in-house technical training, cutbacks in Object 25 
(training) both prior to the start of the FY during the Finance Ministrys process of 
(re)prioritisation, as well as during the FY, have conditioned efforts at continuous 
professional development through ongoing training and retraining of staff. 
Comparing the two organisations, senior officials in the Finance Ministry and the 
Executive Secretariat of the Director General highlight the Customs Departments 
adeptness in the exercise of human agency or free will in this area, its ability to 
free itself from situational constraints through collaborations with regional 
umbrella bodies, bilateral and multilateral agencies to gain technical and financial 
assistance to develop capacity through training. The result of proactive 
behaviours has been a level of capacitation within Customs which is not mirrored 
in the Inland Revenue department. 
 
With regard to the management of human resources, controls over areas such as 
post establishment, post classification, and pay & remuneration still emanate from 
central institutions responsible for these functions. The Civil Establishment Act 
(General) Order (1995), under the auspice of the Establishment Division of the 
Ministry of Finance, ensures that employment and assignment are confined to 
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established positions. The Act provides a breakdown of the position title, the 
classification, and the number of posts for each title which have been allocated 
within each division or section of a ministry or department. The focal 
organisations, despite their human resource autonomy, have no authority to 
exceed or alter these staffing allocations. The Customs Department, for example, 
in its efforts at implementing strategies for enhanced trade facilitation, was unable 
to alter the composition and skill mix by shifting officers from front end entry 
processing positions to back end risk management and auditing positions. 
Notwithstanding such constraints, chapter 6 spoke of the departments informal 
use of autonomy to exceed establishment levels and fill position by borrowing 
vacant positions from other areas. 
 
Problems presented by the centralised grading system and pay arrangements 
were highlighted as far back as 1996 during the startup phase of TaxARP. Table 
8.1 shows the results of a labour market survey conducted by Project Consultants 
to compare mainstream jobs in the revenue departments with comparable jobs in 
the private sector, data which helped to form an assessment of the exact nature 
and scale of the problem.   
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INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT 
 
 
 
Table 8.1: Market Salaries Comparison for Mainstream Positions in the IRD (1998) 
 
           Source: Barents Report III: pp. 3-11 & 3-12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The table shows the public sector minimum and maximum salary ranges, the mid-
point salary level for each job; the most comparable job in the private sector56; 
the salary average for the particular job; and the percentage by which the Market 
Average (MA) exceeds the Mid-Point average (MP)57. At the journeyman level58, 
salaries in the private sector exceeded comparable jobs in the public sector by 
between 162% and near 400%. Cashiers in the private sector were capable of 
earning nearly 200% in excess of their counterparts in government. For first-level 
manager positions, public sector salaries were exceeded by amounts ranging 
from 151% to 438%. Consultants noted the inability of the Revenue to recruit 
                                                
56
 The Consultants noted that market comparators for each job were not exact matches because of the 
non-existence of comparable jobs in the private sector. Maximum effort was made, however, to find 
positions in the private sector with comparable qualifications, experience and scope of duties. 
57
 For example, MA/MP% for Chief Internal Auditor is 262%. 
58
 Consultants classified a journeyman position as one whereby the post holder works independently having 
fully undergone their period of training. Posts such as cashiers, internal auditors and revenue officers were 
classified up to the level of journeyman.  
 
EXISTING SALARY  RANGE 
JA$ 
MID 
 
MARKET MA/MP 
POSITION TITLE MIN MAX POlNT(MP) 
JA$ 
MARKET POSITION AVERAGE 
JA$ 
% 
Chief Internal Auditor  366,000  435,059  400,530 Chief Internal Auditor  1,048,317 262% 
Manager, Field Enforcement  199,096  263,663  231,380 Operations Manager  896,334 387% 
Collector of Taxes  395,400  470,006  432,703 Administrative Manager  653,846 151% 
Senior Revenue Officer  124,114  137,028  130,571 Cost Accountant  57 1 ,575 438% 
Revenue Officer  111,210  120,354  115,782 Treasury Officer  458,724 396% 
Internal Auditor  250,000  297,171  273,586 Internal Auditor  443,995 162% 
Manager, Office Enforcement  248,207  295,033  271,620 Quality Assurance 
Officer 
 430,976 159% 
Senior Compliance Officer  171,988  204,439  188,214 Senior Accounts 
Clerk/Accounting 
Supervisor 
 400,000 213% 
Cashier  111,210  120,354  115,782 Cashier  2 14.000 185% 
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qualified candidates because of the lower-than-market salary scales in the Civil 
Service as a problem meriting serious consideration. 
 
TaxARP recommended addressing such shortcomings through the adoption of a 
unique Tax Administration (TA) Grading System. The salary scale for the revenue 
services would range from TA-1 (lower entry level positions) up to TA-17 
(Revenue Commissioner), accompanied by salary increases that would bring pay 
levels to at least 80% of that for comparable jobs within the private sector. Tables 
8.2 and 8.3 show the recommendations for selected tax and customs positions. 
 
 
 
Table 8.2: Examples of Recommended vs. Actual Job Classification and Grading System                      
for Mainstream and other Jobs in the Inland Revenue Department 
 
 
 
Job (Post) Classification 
 
Status of Incumbent 
Recommended 
Grade 
Actual Grade 
Clerical 
Clerical 
Clerical 
Entry-level, Trainee 
Still in training 
Journeyman 
TA-1 
TA-2 
TA-3 
 
TA-1 
 
Cashier                                            
Cashier 
Entry-level, Trainee      
 Journeyman (works independently) 
 
TA-3 
TA-4 
 
TA-1 
Compliance Officer              
Compliance Officer              
Compliance Officer                       
Compliance Officer 
Entry-level, Trainee                   
Still in training               
Journeyman                          
Best & most experienced 
TA-4               
TA-5               
TA-6                     
TA-7 
 
TA-2 
Manager, Office Enforcement 
Manager, Taxpayer Service 
First-level manager 
First-level manager 
 
TA-9 
 
TA-4 
Collector (Medium & Small) First-level manager TA-12 TA-4 
Manager, Field Enforcement First-level manager TA-13 TA-4 
Deputy Comm., Planning 
Asst. Comm.(Regional) 
Collector, Kingston 
Collector, St. Andrew 
Programme/1st-level Manager 
Second-level manager 
Third-level manager 
Third-level manager 
 
 
TA-14 
TA-8 
TA-8 
TA-5 
TA-5 
Deputy Comm., Administration 
Asst. Comm., King/St. Andrew 
Second-level manager 
Fourth-level manager 
 
TA-15 
SEG-4 
TA-8 
Deputy Comm., Operations Fifth-level manager TA-16 TA-9 
Commissioner Top Executive TA-17 TA-10 
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Table 8.3: Examples of Recommended vs. Actual Job Classification and Grading System for 
Jobs in the Customs Department 
 
As shown in the tables, entry level grades for some jobs were pitched at TA-4 or 
TA-5 levels in order to attract the best qualified candidates. Serious deviations, 
however, in both field and managerial positions resulted in salaries failing to 
match up to the anticipated 80% mark. 
 
Six years on, after the 2002 delegation of human resource functions, revenue 
departments were still unable to fully exercise their autonomy to recruit the best 
talent in a number of critical areas due to their inability to adjust centrally set pay 
levels. One backlash from pay centralisation has been a relaxing of standards and 
criteria set out in position descriptions relating to qualifications, skills and 
experience, so as to fill vacant posts. Officials also spoke of the impact at the 
bottom line, in terms of overall manpower levels and the reduced capacity of the 
organisation to effectively perform and meet targets in affected functional areas.  
 
Central administrative policies, procedures, rules and guidelines not only 
condition the departments exercise of policy autonomy and human resources 
 
Job (Post) 
Classification 
 
Status of Incumbent 
 
Recommended 
Grade 
 
Actual  Grade 
Clerical            
Clerical          
 Clerical 
Entry-level, Trainee              
Entry-level Trainee                 
Journeyman  
TA-1                
TA-2               
TA-3 
 
TA-1 
 
Customs Officer 
Customs Officer 
Customs Officer 
Customs Officer 
Customs Officer 
Entry-level, Trainee                 
Still in training                             
Still in training                        
Journeyman                                         
Best & most experienced 
TA-5              
 TA-7                              
TA-9                    
TA-11                  
TA-12 
TA-2 (Customs Officer 1)            
TA-3 (Customs Officer 2)             
TA-4 (Snr. Customs Officer) 
(Snr. Enforcement Off.)              
TA-5 (Customs Supervisor)  
(Enforcement Supervisor) 
Dep. Commissioner Heaviest responsibility TA-16 TA-9 
Commissioner Top Executive TA-17 TA-10 
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management autonomy, they also impact on freedoms in the areas of financial 
management, particularly with respect to the procurement of goods and services. 
 
Prior to 1999, revenue departments, similar to other government entities, 
exercised sole authority over procurement up to a set threshold limit of J$0.25m. 
The fact that a vast number of contracts easily exceeded this ceiling resulted, 
after numerous complaints, in a revision to central policies. Table 8.4 details the 
administrative procedures which need to be followed, and the institutions which 
must be involved as appropriate in the contracting process, depending on the 
levels of expenditure.   
 
Dollar Amount Action Approved Authority 
 
 
 
 
Estimated contract value is 
less than JA$250,000 
No advertising required. Opportunities should 
be offered through limited tender, where 
procuring entities must invite at least three (3) 
or more appropriately qualified contractors 
registered with the National Contracts 
Commission (NCC) to participate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency/Ministry shall approve 
contracts subject to set 
procedures. 
Estimated contract value is 
equal to or more than JA 
$250,000 but less than JA 
$1m. 
Opportunities should be offered through 
limited tender, where a minimum of five(5) 
tenders should be invited from appropriately 
qualified contractors registered with the NCC. 
Estimated contract value is 
equal to or greater than 
JA$1m but less than 
JA$4m. 
 
Participation opportunities should be offered 
through selective tender and be open to all 
appropriately qualified suppliers registered 
with the NCC. Unless the nature and/or 
complexity of the procurement require 
national advertising, procuring entities shall 
advertise opportunities in specified local 
locations. 
Estimated contract value is 
equal to or greater than 
JA$4m but less than 
JA$15m. 
 
Opportunities should be offered through 
selective tender by national advertising, 
where all interested appropriately qualified 
contractors who are registered with the NCC 
are offered the opportunity to tender.  
Minister shall approve contracts 
on the recommendation of the 
NCC  I,e. the NCC must 
review ex ante all requests for 
procurement of goods and 
services 
 
Estimated contract value is 
equal to or greater than 
JA$15m but less than the 
international contract value 
threshold. 
 
 
Services shall be procured on the basis of 
selective tender, where all qualified 
contractors who are registered with the NCC 
are afforded the opportunity to tender. A 
contractor prequalification is required.  
Cabinet approval necessary on 
the recommendation of the 
national Contracts Commission 
and the Minister 
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Estimated contract value is 
equal to or greater than the 
international contract value 
threshold  
Opportunities shall be offered through open 
tender with prequalification. 
 
\ 
Table 8.4: Government Policy & Guidelines for the Procurement of Goods and Services 
 
 
All procedures above J$4.0m must be referred to the National Contracts 
Commission (NCC) or specially established sector committees for review. 
Contracts over J$15.0m are subject to the final approval of Cabinet, and in cases 
where the project is funded by an external donor agency, the approval of the 
agency may be required. When submitting to the NCC their recommendations for 
contract awards, the departments are required to complete a very lengthy and 
detailed National Contracts Commission Transmittal Form. Field officers from the 
NCC may select specific projects in which they have an interest and request to sit 
in on tender opening and evaluation for these projects to ensure that established 
procedures are being followed. 
 
Whilst the departments have certainly been granted more latitude after a 
moderate relaxation of controls over procurement, the situation seems to have 
come full circle as a result of recently issued guidelines. As of May 2006, all 
government departments are required to submit ex post monthly statements and 
a Quarterly Contract Awards Report of all contracts awarded from JA$250,000 
up to JA$3.99m. One local newspaper reporting on the CGs demands for mass 
reporting and the objections being raised by government entities wrote: 
 
The present Contractor General has faced criticism and rebuff for 
insisting that he wants to review all contracts to be awarded by public-
sector bodies in a quest to curb abuse of the tendering and awards 
processThe Contractor General indicates that there is no magical 
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disappearance of abuse of the contracting process at the level of 
JAS3.99 and below. (Daily Observer, June 2 2006:8) 
 
 
 
Centralised procurement rules not only impact on bureaucratic exercise of 
financial management autonomy, they also, according to revenue officials, place 
enormous constraints on manpower utilisation. One senior accounting officer in 
the IRD notes that the new directives re. the submission of monthly statements to 
the NCC is a very time-consuming process. The department is now forced to 
employ two officers to work specifically on procurements relating to facilities; one 
individual for general goods and one specifically for services. Whilst procurement 
of goods can take between two and a half to three months, the tendering process 
for services can sometimes take up to five months. Sometimes in the 
achievement of key results and the timeframe for deliverables, specified 
timeframes for the completion of projects are completely thrown off-mark. 
 
 
 
8.2.3    LEGAL TRADITION 
 
 
Jamaicas legal system and laws are based on the common law tradition. Sources 
of law included case law and statute, the last three decades witnessing a marked 
rise in subsidiary legislation. The following section focuses on the common law 
tradition as it operates in Jamaica. Recall that one of the aims of the study is to 
compare the Jamaican common law tradition and the civilian tradition within the 
Dominican Republic, with a view to understanding the extent to which particular 
aspects of legal tradition, namely, drafting style and statutory interpretation, 
impact on bureaucratic functioning and the exercise of bureaucratic autonomy. 
  
264 
 
Ascertainment of Chargeable Income 
Article 13  Deductions Allowed 
No. of Sections: 8 
No. of Pages spanned:   10                                                   
No. of Lines:       307                                                              
No. of Words:    2,365 
No. of specific cases identified as                
qualifying under the Article:  22 
8.2.3.1   Legislative Drafting Style 
 
 
The common law tradition is usually characterised by a style of drafting of 
legislation which is fussy  very detailed and specific in nature. Several 
interviewed legal professionals attested to the detailed manner in which Jamaican 
laws have traditionally been drafted across a majority of policy areas. Noted, 
however, is the contemporary more progressive construction of statutes and 
general attempts to move away from the use of minor details in drafting 
legislation. With regard to the fiscal policy area and taxing statutes, there is a 
tendency in Jamaica towards the adoption of legislation of countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, the result being a style of drafting 
which was very detailed in the past, and which continues up to present day. 
 
Such style of drafting is typical of a number of revenue laws, including the Income 
Tax Act 59 of 1954, the Customs Act, Cap 89 (1941), and the Revenue 
Administration (Amendment) Act (1994). Figures 8.2-8.5 are the results of content 
analyses and selected contents of provisions within these three pieces of 
legislation. Figure 8.2 is an analysis of how the Income Tax Act deals with the 
issue of the ascertainment of chargeable or statutory income, the basis upon 
which a large amount of domestic tax is collected. 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Content Analysis of Article 13                                                                                              
of the Jamaica Income Tax Act (1954) 
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 (8) For the purpose of paragraph r of subsection (1) and subsection (7)   (a) business entertainment means entertainment (including hospitality of any kind) provided by a person, or by a member of his staff, in connection with a trade, business, profession, employment, or vocation carried on by that person, but does not include anything provided by him for members of his staff unless its provision for them is incidental to its provision also for others. (b) any reference to expenses incurred in providing business entertainment includes a reference to expenses incurred in providing anything incidental thereto, and any reference to the members of a persons staff includes reference to persons employed by that person, and, in the case of a company, directors of the company, or persons engaged in the management thereof whether or not employees of the company. 
 
Article 13 is very detailed; eight sections spanning 10 pages that comprise 307 
lines totalling approximately 2,365 words. It states that for the purpose of 
ascertaining chargeable income, there should be deducted all disbursement and 
expenses incurred in acquiring the income. The article identifies 22 specific cases 
qualifying for such treatment, a number of these cases incorporating certain 
provisos that must also be met. Also outlined in detail are deductions precluded 
from consideration under the law. Qualifying under the law are expenses incurred 
in the provision of business entertainment. The said article in section 8, uses 10 
lines and 124 words to define what is meant by business entertainment as 
illustrated in figure 8.3.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 8.3: Article 13 s.(8), Income Tax Act (1954) 
 
 
The same degree of precision and clarity is also visible in the style of drafting 
used in the Customs Act, Cap 89 (1941), which uses very archaic language, 
complicated terminology, and long sentences full of subordinate clauses. A typical 
example, illustrated in Figure 8.4, is Article 210, s.(1) which deals with the penalty 
for evading customs laws relating to imported and exported goods. 
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210 (1) - Penalty for evading customs laws regarding imported or exported goods 
 210.-(1) Every person who shall import or bring, or be concerned in importing or bringing into the Island any prohibited ,goods, or any goods the importation of which is restricted, contrary to such prohibition or restriction, whether the same be unloaded or not, or shall unload, or assist or be otherwise concerned in unloading any goods which are prohibited, or any goods which are restricted and imported contrary to such restriction, or shall knowingly harbour, keep or conceal, or knowingly permit or suffer, or cause or procure to be harboured, kept or concealed, any prohibited, restricted or uncustomed goods, or shall knowingly acquire possession of or be in any way knowingly concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, concealing, or in any manner dealing with any goods with intent to defraud Her Majesty of any duties due thereon, or to evade any prohibition or restriction of or applicable to such goods, or shall be in any way knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any import or export duties of customs, or of the laws and restrictions of the customs relating to the importation, unloading, warehousing, delivery, removal, loading and exportation of goods, shall for each such offence incur a penalty of not less than treble the import duties payable  on the goods nor more than treble the value of the goods; and all goods in respect of which any such offence shall be committed shall be forfeited. 
 
 Figure 8.4: Article 210 s.(1), Customs Act Cap 89 (1941) 
 
In the Act, the article expends 24 lines and 239 words to specify details that 
answer a number of questions which might arise where there is ambiguity. Not 
only are details provided on the nature of the goods involved, also specified is the 
status of clearance and the involvement of the importer/exporter. The law applies 
to all manner of prohibited, restricted, or uncustomed goods, duly or unduly 
cleared, regardless of whether the perpetrator was directly or indirectly involved in 
their harbouring, concealment or removal. By repeating the word knowingly five 
times in the Article, arguably legislators want to make clear to tax administrators 
that the individual must be consciously aware of the circumstances surrounding 
the importation/exportation and of his/her willful intent at tax evasion. Such 
detailed specification therefore places the burden of proof on the bureaucracy to 
produce evidence of such knowledge and behaviours. 
 
Continuity of the traditional detailed and precise style of drafting used in the older 
taxing legislation is still very much evident in the style used for drafting newer tax 
laws. One newer piece of legislation is the Revenue Administration (Amendment) 
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Act (RAA) (1994), which, in Part VIC, incorporates nine articles aimed at 
strengthening the enforcement powers of the revenue agencies. To illustrate such 
continuity in drafting style, Article 17G, dealing with production and inspection 
orders, is shown in Figure 8.5. The provisions specify the purposes for which the 
information being requested must be needed; the persons subject to the 
provision; the specific format for an application of a court order; the undertaking 
on the part of the bureaucracy which must be satisfied prior to the courts 
issuance of the order; the details to be specified in the order; as well as the legal 
obligations of the persons served with the order. The question of the precedence 
of this provision in the RAA over any other potentially conflicting pieces of 
legislation is not left unanswered, as legislators indicate the supremacy of this 
provision over obligations elsewhere to maintain secrecy or restrict information 
disclosure. The law therefore permits little elbow room for bureaucrats to exercise 
discretion, by for example filling in details in subsidiary legislation. 
 
Questioning the rationale behind the precision in the revenue laws, interviewees 
cited two main reasons for such specificity by Jamaican legislators. One reason 
involves efforts at safeguarding individual rights; efforts which they argue often 
constrain agency discretion. Over-prescription has resulted in the Revenue having 
to follow specific procedures, to make specific findings, and to take action within 
specified periods of time.  
 
  
268 
 
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION ACT 
 
17G. Production and inspection orders 17G. (1) Where a Commissioner has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person mentioned in subsection (3) has possession or control of any information, document or record which is relevant to the duties of the Commissioner in relation to- (a) making an assessment in relation to a taxpayer under any relevant law; (b) making an investigation into any case involving tax evasion or for the prevention of fraud on the revenue; (c) determining the tax liability of a tax-payer under a relevant law; or (d) collecting any outstanding amount owed by a taxpayer on account of tax, penalty, interest or fine under any relevant law, the Commissioner may apply to a Judge in Chambers in accordance with subsection (2) for an order under subsection (4) in relation to the person suspected of having possession or control of the information, document or record. (2) An application under subsection (1) shall be made ex parte and shall be in writing and be accompanied by an affidavit. (3) The person referred to in subsection (1) is - (a) a bank licensed under the Banking Act; (b) a financial institution licensed under the Financial Institutions Act; (c) a person registered under the Public Accountancy Act; (d) a building society registered under the Building Societies Act; (e) a society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act or the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, as the case may be; (f) a person who is or has been, a party to any business transaction with the taxpayer in question. (4) Where an application is made for an order in relation to any person, the Judge in Chambers, if satisfied that the Commissioner concerned has requested the information, document or record from the taxpayer without success and that in all the circumstances of the case, there are reasonable grounds for making the order, may make an order requiring the person to- (a) produce to the Commissioner or an authorized person named in the order, any information, document or record of the kind referred to in subsection (1) that is in the person's possession or control; or (b) make any such document or record available to the Commissioner or that authorized person, as the case may be, for inspection. (5) A person referred to in subsection (3)(c) shall only be required to furnish information, documents or records which form part of a taxpayer's accounting records. (6) An order under subsection (4) shall specify the time when and the place where the information, document or record shall be produced or made available, as the case may require. (7) Any obligation to maintain secrecy or any restriction on the disclosure of information or the production of any document or record imposed on any person by or under any of the Acts referred to in subsection (3) shall not apply to the disclosure of information or the production of any document or record pursuant to a requirement under this section. 
                Figure 8.5: Article 17G, Revenue Administration (Amendment) Act (1994) 
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Also having significant bearing on drafting style are certain societal factors. 
Jamaica is characterised in the various local media as a generally non-compliant 
society when it comes to paying taxes. According to one academic, the inability of 
citizens to see value for their tax dollars (poor quality schooling, infrastructure, 
limited social benefits) has gotten the majority of persons into a pattern or mould 
of attempts to avoid or evade payment of duties and taxes. Hence, the need for 
legislation which is detailed and specific to help address this propensity towards 
non-compliance. 
 
Despite continuing detail in the content of taxing statutes, worth noting, however, 
are changes in other aspects of the style of drafting. Comparing figures 8.4 and 
8.5, visible are the marked differences along the lines of sentence 
length/structure, the arrangement of information, paragraphing, and the degree of 
complexity of the vocabulary. According to the Commissioner, Tax Administration 
Services Department, the legal arm of the tax administration: what we are 
currently witnessing is an attempt to drag the Jamaican common law drafting style 
into the 21st century, for example by breaking information up in such a way to 
make it more digestible, and through avoidance of the use of subordinate upon 
subordinate clauses. 
 
8.2.3.2   Statutory Interpretation 
 
 
In Jamaica, use of the strict literal approach to interpreting legislation has been 
the general rule of thumb. This was also typical of the manner of interpretation of 
taxing legislation, as evidenced by cases such as Collector of Taxes v. Winston 
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Lincoln (1988) and R v. Wilson (1994). Over the years, however, cases such as 
Carreras Group Ltd v. Stamp Commissioner (2003), Cigarette Company of 
Jamaica Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Taxpayer Audit and Assessment (2005), 
and Commissioner of Taxpayer Appeals v. Swept Away Resorts Ltd. (2006) have 
resulted in judgments that illustrate a movement away from strict interpretation. 
To illustrate these points, a few cases are explained in some detail. 
 
In the case of Collector of Taxes v. Winston Lincoln (1988), the matter before the 
court involved judicial interpretation of Article 72(1) of the Income Tax Act, which 
outlines the powers of the Commissioner to make assessments for income tax. 
Article.72(1) states: 
 
 
the Commissioner shall proceed to assess every person liable to the 
payment of tax as soon as may be after the expiration allowed to such 
person for the delivery of his return.  
 
In 1985, Mr. Lincoln appealed to the Court of Appeal against a ruling to pay J$3m. 
in income taxes after failing to file returns for the six-year period 1978-1983. The 
taxpayer argued that the Commissioner acted ultra vires, since the ITA grants no 
powers to make ex-parte assessments, i.e., assessments made without first 
considering a return submitted by the taxpayer or first requiring the taxpayer to 
submit a return.  
 
In order to determine the validity of the assessment, the court needed to deal with 
the ambiguity in Article 72(1) which left unanswered the procedures to be followed 
by the Revenue prior to the making of an assessment. To do so, it needed to 
conclude whether the process of assessment could only commence with the 
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issuance of a notice by the Commissioner to the taxpayer to fill a return, as 
mandated under Article 70 of the Act. 
 
In interpreting the provision, the court contended that the Article ought not to be 
construed to include the two situations where the Commissioner has served a 
notice and also where no such notice has been served. This, the court argued, 
would be two concurrent jurisdictions  one providing reasonable protection for 
the taxpayer, and the other providing no protection against assessments, apart 
from the right of appeal. Referring to case law, the court stated that any ambiguity 
in Article 72(1) as to the meaning of the time allowed for the delivery of a return 
must be resolved in favour of the taxpayer, and that as a consequence, 
assessments should be confined to cases where the Commissioner has served a 
notice, as required under Article 70 of the Act. Certain actions, namely the request 
to render a return, and the requirement to wait for the time allowed in the request 
to elapse, are both conditions precedent to the making of an assessment. These 
are the procedures, the Justices agreed, that must be followed in order to contend 
that an assessment is final and conclusive.  
 
Rationalising the purpose behind these conditions, the court argued the intention 
here as being to provide reasonable protection for the taxpayer before an 
assessment is made, by affording him an opportunity of stating his income and 
other relevant matters. Highlighting the canon of construction, which stipulates 
that, if the mandatory provisions of a statute are not followed, then the results 
which flow therefrom are void, the court ruled that in the absence of the two vital 
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preconditions, the assessment was made without jurisdiction, and was therefore 
null and void. 
 
In R v. Wilson (1994), the issue under dispute involved the interpretation of Article 
210 (1) of the Customs Act, Cap 89, under which the appellant Roy George 
Wilson was charged in the Revenue Court for using his employers duty free 
facility to import goods for other importers for a fee. Article 210 (1) states: 
 
Every person who [is]knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion or 
attempt at evasion of any import or export duties of customsshall for each 
such offense incur a penalty of $5,000, or treble the value of the goods at 
the election of the Commissioner; and all goods in respect of which any 
such offense shall be committed shall be forfeited. 
 
 
Mr. Wilson was fined under Article 210 (1), but absent from his penalty was any 
order for the forfeiture of the goods, given his lack of possession of and inability 
to produce the same. In the exercise of his powers the Commissioner, under 
Article 219 of the Act, had granted immunity from prosecution to Mr. Wilsons 
accomplices, allowing them to retain the goods and to pay all duties and taxes. 
The appellants contention was that by proceeding under Article 219 to collect 
the duties on the goods, the Commissioner disenabled himself from making an 
election under Article 210 (1) to impose a penalty, which also includes a 
mandatory forfeiture of the goods. 
 
In interpreting the provisions of the statute, Justice Wright in his summation 
argued the crucial issue; namely, if there are no goods against which an order of 
forfeiture can be made, whether it is competent for a penalty to be imposed. 
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Overturning the ruling of the Resident Magistrates court, the Revenue court 
argued: 
 
It is difficult to see how this could be so[I]n a situation where the goods 
are not amenable to the order of forfeiture, the court in imposing only the 
Commissioners election would be imposing a penalty not provided by law 
(own emphasis). 
 
 
 
According to the courts reasoning, the non-availability of a sentence under Article 
210 (1), because of the action taken by the Commissioner under Article 219, 
meant that proper sentences had not been imposed on the appellant, and 
accordingly, they had to be quashed. 
Legal professionals and tax officials interviewed by the researcher proffered a 
number of related reasons for the literal interpretation of taxing legislation. 
Revenue laws, they argued, include some of the most intrusive powers of the 
State, given the primary objective of government to collect revenue and to 
safeguard society. Just like penal provisions, the provisions within fiscal statutes 
often result in the forced extraction of money, with punitive elements for non-
compliance. This being the case, government has an obligation to say what it 
means or what it intends in clear and unequivocal terms. Once the law is clear, 
this reduces the discretionary powers of tax officials and the judiciary to decide 
whether or not an individual should be forced to be brought within the scope of 
the law. 
 
 
Such strict line of reasoning has, in more recent times however, given way to 
changes in the way taxing statutes are interpreted. One example is the case of 
Carreras Group Ltd v. Stamp Commissioner (2004), Here the matter involved 
  
274 
 
interpretation of specific provisions within the Transfer Tax Act (1971) of Jamaica, 
which imposes a tax on the transfer of certain property, including shares in 
companies. Para. 4 (2) of the First Schedule of the Act provides, however, that a 
reorganisation or reduction of a companys share capital shall not be treated as 
involving any disposal of the original shares, and para. 6 (1) adds where a 
company issues shares or debentures to a person in exchange for shares in or 
debentures of another company, para. 4 shall apply with any necessary 
adaptations as if the two companies were the same company and the exchange 
was a reorganisation of the share capital.  
 
The taxpayer submitted to the revenue authority documents purporting to be an 
exchange of shares for debentures, but was assessed by the Stamp 
Commissioner for transfer tax, on the basis that the transaction was a sale and 
not a reorganisation. Carreras objected and initiated a suit which started in the 
Revenue Court and ended in the Privy Council. In the Revenue Court, Justice 
Anderson relied on the decision of the House of Lords in IRC v. Duke of 
Westminster as authority for saying that a taxpayer is liable to tax on the clear 
words of a statute and not on the perceived intention of the legislature. He noted 
Lord Tomlins dismissal in this case of the supposed doctrine which would allow 
the Revenue to ignore the strict legal position and consider the substance of the 
matter. Based on a strict interpretation of the law, the court held that in these 
circumstances the exchange of shares for a debenture was not a sham but a 
reorganisation falling within the four corners of para. 6 (1) of the First Schedule 
of the Act, and therefore exempt from transfer tax. 
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The Stamp Commissioners appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal and 
Carreras appeal from that decision was dismissed by the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council. In addition to examining the statutory provisions, a number of 
cases were considered, salient among these the landmark English case of 
Ramsey (W.T) Ltd. v. IRC.  
 
Both appellate bodies held that the Ramsey principle59, the standard bearer of 
the modern approach to the interpretation of tax law, would apply to this 
transaction.  Lord Hoffman, who delivered the opinion of the Board, noted that 
since Ramsay, the courts have taken the view that the revenue authorities and 
the court had a duty to examine the transaction in its entirety and not with the 
individual steps into which a transaction may be divided.  Also to be considered 
was the purpose of the legislation which, in this case, was to exempt genuine 
cases of exchange rather than those which had as the main purpose avoidance of 
tax. In the view of the Privy Council, if the transaction was confined to what 
happened on the 27th, by virtue of the agreement executed on that day there 
could be no doubt that it fell within the description in the statute. However, a wider 
view of the terms of the debenture and its redemption two weeks later led to the 
conclusion that it was one transaction, a formal step having no commercial 
purpose. The Justices agreed that it was plain from the terms of the debenture 
and the timetable, the redemption was not merely contemplated, but intended by 
                                                
59
 At pg. 323 of his judgement in this case, Lord Wilberforce reiterated the principle of IRC v. Duke of 
Westminster, but cautioned against it being overstated or over-extended. [I]t does not compel the court to 
look at a document or a transaction in blinkers, isolated from any context to which it properly belongsIt is 
the task of the court to ascertain the legal nature of the transactions to which it is sought to attach a tax or a 
tax consequence and if that emerges from a series or combination of transactionsit is that series or 
combination which may be regarded. The new approach therefore entitled the court to ignore the 
intermediate steps and look at the end result.  
  
276 
 
the parties as an integral part of the transaction, separated from the exchange by 
as short a time as was thought to be decent in the circumstances. The court 
therefore concluded that the exchange and redemption of the debentures were a 
single transaction, a sale which attracts transfer tax. 
 
This, according to a number of legal professionals interviewed, has now become 
the approach used by the courts in interpreting tax law in Jamaica, an approach 
again used in favour of the Revenue in the more recent cases of Cigarette 
Company of Jamaica Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Taxpayer Audit and 
Assessment (2005), the largest tax case in the Jamaican courts; and The 
Commissioner of Taxpayer Appeals v. Swept Away Resorts (2006). In the case of 
the latter, the issue which arose for determination by the court was whether 
interest income earned from a bank account should be regarded as profits or 
gains arising or accruing from an approved hotel enterprise, and therefore exempt 
from tax by reason of Article 9 of the Hotel (Incentives) Act or; as income subject 
to the payment of income tax pursuant to Article 5 of the Income Tax Act.  
 
Swept Away Resorts Ltd. (Swept Away), an approved hotel under the Hotel 
(Incentives) Act was entitled to relief from income tax for a period of ten years. 
Between 1995 and 1999, it was the practice of the hotels management to place 
surplus cash into an interest-bearing account in a commercial bank, significant 
interest income generated as a result of this practice. Though initially, tax was 
paid on the interest earned, in 2001 Swept Away filed amended returns totaling 
approximately J$7.5m, purporting to treat the interest income as not being subject 
to tax, by virtue of Article 9 of the Act. Article 9 states that any company which is 
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the owner or tenant of premises comprising a hotel to which an order has been 
made under Article 3 or Article 4 shall be entitled to relief from income tax in 
respect of profits or gains arising or accruing during the relevant concession 
period, from the approved hotel enterpriseof which it is the owner, tenant, or 
operator. The Act defines a hotel enterprise to mean the business concerned 
with the establishment or operation of a hotel. 
 
Both the Commissioner of Taxpayer Audit and Assessment and, upon 
administrative review, the Commissioner of Taxpayer Appeals, took the decision 
that the interest income was taxable under Article 5 of the Income Tax Act. The 
taxpayers appeal from this decision to the Revenue Court succeeded for a 
number of reasons. Arguing the intent of the legislature to provide tax incentives 
to facilitate investment in the tourist industry, the court queried the inference to be 
drawn from the Revenues treatment, that an approved hotel enterprise with 
surplus cash flow in an account that earns no interest with which to reduce its 
reliance on debt, should realise a preferred tax position to a company like the 
appellant, which uses its resources more efficiently. Based upon such reasoning, 
the court ruled that the source of income of the hotel enterprise does not matter, 
since the wording of Article 9, which speaks to relief on tax from profit or gains, is 
intended to encompass the wider concept of aggregate income, i.e. income from 
all sources. In any event, the interest earned on the deposit account, in any 
commercial sense, was derived from the approved hotel enterprise, i.e. as a 
result of gains/profits from the business concerned with the operation of the 
hotel, since that was the only business carried on by the hotel. 
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Whilst agreeing it would have been most impudent for the respondent to have 
kept the surplus profit in its vault at the hotel, the Court of Appeal, in hearing 
Revenues appeal from this decision, argued the issue being whether the interest 
was a profit arising or accruing from the approved hotel enterprise. According to 
the court, a purposive construction has to be applied in construing Article 9 of the 
Act, with due consideration given to the nature of the transaction which produced 
the interest income to the taxpayer. Interpreting the provision of the statute, and 
viewing the whole situation realistically, the court agreed with the counsel for the 
appellant that by inserting the words from the approved hotel enterprise, the 
draftsman had qualified the source of profits and gains which were to be relieved 
from the payment of income tax. Justice Harrison, on delivering the judgement, 
argued that the word  from makes it clear (1) that the source of the profit and 
gains to be relieved must be the business concerned with operating the hotel[60]; 
and (2) that the intention of Parliament was not to relieve all the profits and gains 
of the business from income tax. The interest income earned was best described 
as profit and gains of the business, earned solely by virtue of a banker and 
customer relationship which the respondent had with its bank. In light of such 
purposive interpretation, it was held that the interest earned on the investment 
income was subject to the payment of income tax under Article 5 of the Income 
Tax Act.    
 
The judgements in these latter cases are seminal both to administration of taxes, 
as well as to the approach in interpreting local Jamaican taxing statutes. From a 
                                                
60
 The inherent character and activity of the business concerned with the operation of a hotel was identified 
as the provision of services such as accommodation, meals and entertainment for reward. 
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tax administration perspective, the inference is that the Revenue, as part of its 
fact-finding mandate, should be emboldened in assessing any tax avoidance 
schemes. From a legal standpoint, it is evident that the courts are now more 
willing to adjudicate on matters involving the interpretation of provisions of taxing 
statutes. Not only is case law being applied as part of the practice of judicial 
precedence to help provide answers, for example, to the mischief which a statute 
was designed to fix, recourse is also being had to a number of extraneous 
sources. The courts also allow submissions on how the law came to be enacted 
through Cabinet submissions, evidence of experts involved in the development of 
the law, and on notes accompanying the legislation at the side of provisions. 
 
Rationalising the shift from the strict literal taxpayer-favoured approach, one judge 
of the Revenue Court argued: 
 
 Not everything can be legislated for, and Jamaican taxpayers have become 
more creative in finding ways to avoid taxes. The purposive approach makes it 
more difficult for tax avoidance schemes to succeed since judges are no longer 
constrained by the words of tax provisions and are able to look behind at the 
underlying purpose. 
 
 
Note however, it would be incorrect to speak of a wholesale departure from the 
strict literal approach. Some members of the judiciary interviewed acknowledged 
that there might be cases where the facts do not warrant conclusions similar to 
those reached in the high court in the latter cases discussed, and that such 
precedents are being used advisedly. Justices spoke of efforts at overall general 
improvements in local jurisprudence. The aim of the court today, they argued, is 
not to bend over backwards to favour any particular party, but to strike a balance 
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between equity for the taxpayer through protection of individual rights, while 
protecting the public purse to ensure governments ability to fulfil its fiduciary and 
other responsibilities. 
 
8.2.4    SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
8.2.4.1   The Executive 
 
 
Both the IRD and CD share the view that generally, there is a lot of support from 
the Executive for policies and programmes conceptualised to implement 
government policy. There is a history throughout the Tax Administration of good 
relations between the Finance Minister and his senior management team in the 
revenue departments. The head of the IRD spoke of strategic planning retreats 
organised for the entire Tax Administration, some of which are attended by the 
Finance Minister. At these sessions, the opportunity is used to debate a number 
of issues, and as a result, to gauge from the Minister, even before issues reach 
the point of Cabinet submission, the mood of Cabinet with regard to certain 
issues.  
 
The Minister of Finance, during one of his interviews also commented on his style 
of managing the revenue departments: 
 
In several aspects of the running of the revenue departments, I had no 
personal information and did not involve myself in the operational decision 
making. For 14 years, I never got involved in individual tax return matters. For 
example, in the definition of charitable organisations  entities which pay no 
taxes and donations are tax deductible - the law gives the Commissioner the 
power to designate an entity as a charitable organisation. In the case of 
requests for intervention in matters involving acquiring the status as a 
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charitable organisation, I refer persons to the Commissioner of the Inland 
Revenue Department.  
 
The Finance Minister also spoke about making concerted efforts to bring the 
heads of the revenue departments into discussions with the Ministry on the macro 
economy and macro-economic issues, so that they could better understand the 
environment in which they are working. Not only did he believe that the 
organisations should be provided with some room to manoeuvre, the 
departments, he argued, were too big to start having a detailed interest in all of 
their operations. 
 
Heads of both departments spoke of the Executive and the degree of politicisation 
of the bureaucracy in terms of staffing as well as involvement in operational 
functioning. With regard to staffing, officials are fairly well protected by the various 
public service laws and policy guidelines which speak to selection and promotion. 
These include Public Service Regulations, Circulars No. 23 and No. 15 of the 
Office of Services Commission (OSC) dated July 3, 1975 and August 12, 1983 
respectively, as well as the Human Resource Policy for the Public Service of 
Jamaica approved by the Cabinet Office in 1986. Each of these documents 
emphasise key public sector norms and standards such as the criteria of 
recruitment via competition, selection based on merit (relative abilities, knowledge 
and skills). The HR Manager for the Tax Administration confirmed that even 
though there may be some pressure from Cabinet members and other politicians 
when filling contract positions, generally, senior positions are widely advertised in 
the press and elsewhere and free from politicisation. 
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Where politics comes into play within the organisations is on matters relating to 
revenue collections and financial management. When questioned on this issue, 
the Finance Minister confessed: 
 
My primary focus is deviation from targets. The revenue departments 
produce measurable outputs as opposed to some of the other departments 
where outcomes are more qualitative and difficult to measure. Coming from 
a finance and quantitative background it is understandable that for me 
efficiency is judged from a quantitative perspective with a lesser focus on 
the quality aspect of the work. So yes, I would say that the revenue 
departments are more closely monitored from this perspective. Very few 
departments are subjected to the same degree of monitoring. Outturn 
against targets is a real factor, as it bears on the policy area and the 
implications for wider development. 
 
In other areas, informal controls are asserted which impact on the already limited 
financial management autonomy of the IRD. On occasions, communications are 
received with a directive from the Finance Minister about set ceilings for the 
repayment of monies within a given period, or to withhold all payment of tax 
refunds until further advised. 
 
8.2.4.2   The Judiciary 
 
 
Chapter 1 provided background information on the structure of the judicial arm of 
the Jamaican government. Resident Magistrates (RM) courts adjudicate on pure 
collection matters once it is clear there is a legally owed debt outstanding. Here, 
the judges role is merely to enforce collection. Once a question of fact has been 
established the judge has a number of options; including ordering the collecting of 
the full amount outstanding, varying the interests and penalties where it is felt that 
the amount levied was exorbitant or, sending the matter back to the revenue 
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department for reconsideration. In cases where objections raised either by the 
taxpayer or the revenue involve an interpretation of technical aspects of tax policy 
or revenue laws, such matters are heard in the Revenue Court which has the full 
status of a Supreme Court. Appeals move from the Revenue Court to the Court of 
Appeal. Outside of the formal court system, other entities exercise quasi-judicial 
functions. Under section 219 of the Customs Act, the Commissioner has the 
authority to mitigate rather than to go to court. Such powers are also vested in the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue. Appeals against administrative decisions of 
both departments may also be made to the Taxpayer Appeals Department. 
 
From the perspective of compliance officers interviewed in the Inland Revenue 
Department, autonomy is under constant threat from the judiciary. A number of 
tax cases advance through to the court system and senior tax officials point to the 
lack of support, particularly from Resident Magistrates. In a number of cases 
heard in the RM courts, decisions are either delayed and collection stayed 
pending final outcomes; tax liabilities reduced; minimal fines imposed as opposed 
to custodial sentences; or in extreme cases, statements and utterances made 
which are very critical of the tax administration. In cases of delayed judgements, 
decisions are sent back to the revenue for reconsideration, the department 
traditionally complying with any recommendations or suggestions made by the 
court. Where there is a range in the application of fines and penalties that can be 
imposed, judges tend to opt for the lower end. Judgements are sometimes 
perceived as bordering on the ridiculous  millions of dollars owed in taxes 
ordered to be repaid at a rate of J$1,000 per month. In their view, there is at this 
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level an overall lack of a general understanding of the centrality of tax 
administration and the role of the judiciary in the function of revenue collection. 
 
Unlike the IRD, historically, very few cases involving the Customs department go 
to court. Importers have a tendency to admit wrongdoing and throw themselves at 
the mercy of the Commissioner, rather than appealing to the Taxpayers Appeal 
Department or the court. This might be to avoid: costs, the risk of losing the case, 
or facing social ostracism from peers for criminal wrongdoing as a result of the 
publicising of cases. During the 3-year period 2005-2008, the Commissioner in 
exercise of his quasi-judicial function mitigated some 1, 884 cases. Reluctance by 
importers to appeal decisions through the TAD or the courts results in a lack of 
interference in Customs administrative decision-making, thereby enlarging the 
interventional and policy autonomy of the department. 
 
Contrary to the outcomes of rulings on administrative decision-making in the RM 
courts, officials within both departments spoke of the comparatively less threat to 
their decision-making authority from the judges of the Revenue Court. This 
institution is seen as being much more open to looking at the issues objectively, 
which has resulted in the Revenue winning a number of cases. For the period 
2005-2008, seven matters proceeded to trial, with the Revenue being successful 
in six cases. Such success, tax and customs officials attribute to the competence 
and expertise of the Revenue Court judge, unlike the capacity for adjudicating tax 
cases within the Resident Magistrates Court.  
 
According to Sec. 6.(1) of the Revenue Court Act of 1971, the Revenue Court 
Judgeshall be a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court nominated by the 
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Governor-General acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, being 
a person appearing to that Commission to be versed in the law relating to income 
tax. Over the years, the Judges recruited have all met with the criteria as 
specified by the law, either having a postgraduate degree in taxation or having 
had a number of years experience working in the Income Tax Department along 
with their formal qualification. 
 
According to the Head of the Customs Department, the Revenue Court is a true 
ally of the Customs department. Where outcomes have not been in the 
departments favour was largely because of the poor construction of cases, due to 
some minor technicality, or because of some loophole in the law that needed to 
be amended. Adding to this, the Judge of the Revenue Court interviewed noted 
another main challenge to upholding tax administrative decisions, which rests in 
the failure of the revenue departments to comply with administrative procedures 
set out in the revenue statutes. 
 
 
8.3  THE IMPACT OF MESO-LEVEL TASK NETWORK FACTORS 
 
 
Earlier, Chapter 3, as part of its discussion on the task network environment of the 
organisation, introduced the theory of resource dependency and dependency 
relations. Discussed was the importance of the availability, adequacy, and 
timeliness of delivery of resources from organisations within the task network or 
technical environment of the focal organisation; the issue of multiple principals; 
and what this all spelt for autonomous bureaucratic functioning. 
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Linked to Figure 8.1, Table 8.5 specifically identifies some of these key institutions 
with which the departments interface within its immediate task network, 
highlighting the exact nature of the resource exchange61.  
 
Table 8.5: Some Key Institutions in the Revenues Task Network 
and the Nature of the Resource Exchange 
                                                
61
 Chapter 3 noted the often 2-way nature of resource exchange. The reason here for the one-dimensional 
focus is because for the purpose of this study, more important is an analysis of the nature and extent of the 
dependency of the focal organisations on other entities, plus the effect of the actions and behaviours of those 
in power positions. 
Srl. 
No. 
  
Resource Provider 
 
Nature of Resource Dependency 
  
1. 
 
Non-Executive arm of 
Government 
The Legislature Tax laws and regulations. 
The Judiciary (Resident Magistrate Court and 
the Revenue Court) 
 
Disposal of tax cases. 
 
2. 
 
 
Other Departments of 
the Tax Administration 
Office of the Director General Strategic advice on tax and customs matters.  
 
Tax Administration Services Department 
Provision of common services e.g legal services, 
logistics, training, civil works and procurement. 
Taxpayer Appeals Department Adjudication in the administrative appeals process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Government 
Departments/Agencies 
Tax Policy and other Divisions of the Ministry of 
Finance 
Tax policy, policy advice; administrative budget; 
information and oversight. 
Cabinet Office ( Establishments Division)  Post establishment; setting of pay scales. 
Ministry of the Civil Service Classification of posts and salary grading. 
Public Services Commission and Office of the 
Services Commission 
HRM matters (recruitment, promotion, transfer and 
discipline of employees). 
Attorney Generals Chambers Review of legislation; advice on prosecution of cases. 
Auditor General Department External audit of operations. 
Accountant General and Treasury Departments  Release of appropriations; information. 
 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
Preparation of draft legislation; advice and comments 
on submissions related to legislation. 
National Land Registry; Land Valuation 
Department; Corporate Affairs Department 
 
Provision of information relevant to collection of taxes. 
Contractor General Department and National 
Contracts Commission 
 
Approval of purchases of goods and services. 
Financial Investigations Division Conduct of special investigations (e.g financial crimes). 
 
Police and Immigration Departments 
Joint inter-agency operations involving search and 
seizure; enforcement of tax laws and regulations. 
 
 
 
4. 
 
 
 
Private Sector 
Organisations 
Banks Provision of information relevant to collection of taxes. 
Tax Lawyers and Accountants, Chambers of 
Commerce, Professional Associations 
Legitimacy; support for the improvement of voluntary 
compliance and administrative decisions. 
 
Trade Unions 
Legitimacy; support for policy implementation and 
administrative decisions. 
 
Taxpayers and the general public 
Legitimacy; support for policy implementation and 
administrative decisions. 
5.  
Regional & 
International Level 
 
Regional Umbrella Bodies, Foreign Government 
Organisations, International Donor Agencies 
Agreements on co-operation; provision of information 
relevant to the collection of duties and taxes; technical 
expertise and financial assistance. 
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8.3.1    ATTITUDES OF BEHAVIOURS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND 
OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
The task network of the two focal organisations comprises institutions, some of 
which are very co-operative in terms of the support and the resources which they 
provide; others not very supportive. Officials within both organisations spoke of 
the relatively good working relations between the revenue departments and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the overall support provided by top officials in the 
Finance Ministry. Where the departments lauded the efforts of the Ministry was in 
its provision of informational resources, its readiness to push through legislation in 
a timely manner, as well as its gradual involvement of the Revenue in setting 
revenue targets and providing input into policy formulation. According to the 
Consultant Adviser to the Director General: 
 
Before, there was not much interfacing between tax policy and tax 
administration. Now there is more involvement before policy is set. Earlier, 
there was a lot of rolling back, where policy needed to be reworked, 
largely because of a lack of involvement of the administrators of such 
policy. The Tax Administration is now more involved in the strategic 
planning process of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
This information was confirmed during discussion with the Deputy Financial 
Secretary who stated that traditionally, the tax departments were consulted after 
the fact, but noted todays thinking of having administrators more involved in the 
process. 
 
Where interviewees agreed more support could be provided by the Finance 
Ministry is in the area of budgetary support. Both tax and customs senior officials 
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argued the need for stronger representation in defense of their annual budgets. 
The Finance Minister is fully aware of such sentiments among some of his staff: 
 
Some persons in the tax departments felt that both myself and the 
Financial Secretary were harsher on them compared to other Ministers 
and Permanent Secretaries in the running of their departments. My view 
was that if we are speaking of fiscal constraints and belt tightening, then 
we must lead by example, and it all starts at home. Some felt that my 
leading by example was too austere. Because of our minimalist 
inclinations, we could have denied people some of the things to which they 
were rightly entitled. 
 
Also providing a large measure of support are the government departments who 
provide the IRD and CD with informational resources. These include the Registrar 
of Companies, the National Land Agency, and the Titles Office. Whilst assistance 
can sometimes be slow and there may be a sense of reluctance to divulge the 
information, by and large there is a good measure of co-operation. Some of these 
institutions, since being afforded the legal status of executive agencies, have 
begun to charge user fees for their services. The revenue departments are 
sometimes exempted from the payment of such fees, or when they are required to 
pay, they are allowed immediate access to the information and billed afterwards. 
What the IRD pays is a discretionary amount and not the fee that is actually 
payable. The Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Inland Revenue noted that 
such information serves as a critical resource enabling the IRD to arrive at a 
holistic picture of taxpayer transactions, thereby informing subsequent courses of 
action. Absence of good relations, he argued, would be detrimental to tax 
  
289 
 
administrative functioning, given the lack of an alternate source to substitute for 
the provision of these types of information. 
 
Central institutions such as the Treasury and the Establishment Division of the 
Ministry of Finance also impact on the functioning of the bureaucracy through 
exchange relations. Whilst relations with the Treasury are generally harmonious, 
highlighted is the practice of the Treasurys direct issuance of instructions to 
senior officials within the IRD informing of ceiling amounts to be paid for tax 
refunds, notwithstanding the size of total claims made by taxpayers within the 
given period. 
 
Where the IRD and the CD struggle to maintain their independence due to the 
nature of resource exchange and the quality of working relations is with entities 
such as the Fiscal Services Limited (FSL) and the organisations involved in 
border management at the various ports of entry. As a private entity serving as 
the informatics arm of the entire Tax Administration, and as the central repository 
for tax and customs data, FSL has responsibility for implementing and maintaining 
the Integrated Computerised Tax Administration System (ICTAS) as well as other 
computerized tax systems. In the words of the IT Specialist at the Office of the 
Director General, FSLs method of working is choking the operations of the two 
departmens, resulting in a great deal of internal frustration. The FSL Board 
reports directly to the Finance Secretary. Prior to 2008, neither the Director 
General of the Tax Administration nor the heads of the revenue held any position 
of authority on the FSL Board. The result was a very weak technical linkage 
between these entities, with virtually no accountability of FSL to the Tax 
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Administration. The result of this loose relationship was FSLs establishment of its 
own priorities, uncoordinated software development, as well as serious gaps in 
the development of (new) business processes within the two departments. Before 
this situation was addressed in 2008, when the Director General assumed 
chairmanship of the FSL Board, lack of support from the FSL hampered the 
departments in their ability to leverage available in-house technologies to make 
critical decisions and to develop collection and enforcement strategies based on 
information mined from the various systems. 
 
Customs faces a formidable threat to its decision making capacity from agencies 
involved in the joint border management function. Such agencies include the 
Police, Airport Security, Port Security, the Coast Guard, as well as the 
Immigration Department. Lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities, and 
sometimes overlapping roles, quite often result in jurisdictional problems. In the 
wake of 9/11, Customs airport officials argued a diminishing perception of the 
primacy of their role which is stated in the law, and their current subordination to 
the security function. Efforts are being made to correct such jurisdictional issues 
through initiatives such as joint inter-agency training and the signing of 
Memoranda of Understanding. 
8.3.2    CAPACITY OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
A number of central government and other institutions within the organisations 
task network face a number of capacity constraints. Such constraints can either 
serve as opportunities for or threats to discretionary functioning.  
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In the case of the Office of the Services Commission (OSC), consequent to the 
2002 Delegation of Functions (DoF), its role is to monitor and oversee the 
implementation of the various HR functions as laid out in the Instrument. A 
number of human resource constraints prohibit the OSC from effectively 
executing this function. HR audits are therefore infrequently conducted, 
sometimes at most every three years. The Commission is staffed with five 
auditors, only two of which have been dedicated to the DoF. Speaking to the 
Head of the Commission, whilst there is a genuine desire to offer ongoing 
support to the departments and not act solely as record keepers, capacity 
constraints prohibit these types of supportive interventions. Given the in-house 
skills and competencies that already exist within both departments in the areas of 
human resources management and human resources development, the lack of 
intervention by the OSC provides bureaucrats in the focal organisations with 
more elbow room to perform the delegated functions. 
 
Within the departments enabling environment, the lack of capacity of entities 
such as the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (OPC), Fiscal Services Limited, 
and the Tax Administration Services Department (TASD) present huge 
challenges for the focal organisations. Limited human resource capacity of the 
OPC results in some pieces of legislation taking between two to three years to be 
amended, because of the number of cases submitted by all the government 
departments. The IRD experienced a two-year wait for amendments to the 
General Consumption Tax Act. This lengthy time period has significant 
implications for the functioning of tax officials, particularly if the amendment in 
question attempts to plug some loophole which is being exploited by taxpayers.  
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FSL faces constraints in terms of available staffing and the ongoing high levels of 
attrition of qualified staff that leave to take up more lucrative paying jobs within 
the private sector. TASD, which provides training as well as legal services to the 
IRD and the CD, is also constrained by a lack of funding and a lack of manpower 
to deliver training. TASDs training department comprises six senior trainers, one 
senior computer training specialist, 2 trainers, and one training evaluation officer. 
Capacity constraints have resulted in very limited training co-ordinated by the 
TASD for the IRD and the CD, most training being offered is in the area of 
technical skills development. Relatively less training in leadership and 
management development is being designed and delivered to these two 
organisations. Essential for the exercise of policy autonomy and HR autonomy 
will be skill development that focuses on the development and application of 
competencies in areas such as management decision-making. 
 
Whilst these organisations are limited in their capacity for providing the type of 
supportive environment needed by the organisations, both the IRD and CD have 
devised various means and coping strategies to counter these situations. For 
example, lack of support by the TASD in the provision of training is countered by 
the departments forging strategic partnerships with various tax and customs 
regional and international umbrella bodies and donor agencies and financial 
institutions, such as the World Customs Organisation, the Caribbean Customs 
Enforcement Council, the Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre, the 
Inter-American Centre for Tax Administration, the World Bank, and the Inter-
  
293 
 
American Bank. These organisations provide technical and/or financial 
assistance in various areas of institutional strengthening and capacity building.  
 
8.4  THE IMPACT OF MICRO-LEVEL INTERNAL ORGANISATIONAL  
FACTORS  
 
8.4.1    INTERNAL STRUCTURES & SYSTEMS  
 
 
Despite their informal exercise of policy autonomy, and their abilities to design 
and implement a number of programmes and strategies to achieve fiscal goals 
and objectives, both the IRD and CD faced a number of constraints from 
inadequate and inappropriate internal structures and systems. With regard to 
internal structural arrangements, the IMFs 2006 Report highlighted the lack of a 
strong headquarter (HQ) function and the resulting lack of headquarter capacity 
within both departments. This was particularly the case for domestic tax 
administration where headquarter staff seemed preoccupied with daily operational 
priorities  release of goods, dispute settlement, revenue collection  with very 
little time for more strategic types of activities.  
 
The Report noted that because of this structural weakness, essential headquarter 
functions which focus on the setting of operational policy, preparation and 
issuance of directives to the field, project management including the ownership of 
IT requirements, liaison, and the monitoring and evaluation organisational 
performance, were being performed on a purely part time basis by both managers 
and staff. Limited capacity to undertake the abovementioned roles was impacting 
on the organisations ability to determine strategic priorities and to design and 
properly sequenced initiatives. To remedy such shortcomings the Fund proposed 
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new structures for both departments. The new structure proposed for the 
Customs department, illustrated in figure 8.6, would enable HQ activity to be 
restricted to issues such as policy development, planning, monitoring and liaison, 
thus allowing for better and more co-ordinated use of informal policy autonomy.  
Up to the time of the fieldwork study, the department was still operating under the 
original TaxARP structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Proposed Customs Organisational Structure 
Source: IMF Report 2006 
 
Querying the reason for such failings in structural arrangements, the response by 
the Corporate Planner in the Customs department was that such outcomes were 
largely the result of institutional constraints  the departments inability to increase 
staffing complement due to the need for involvement of the Finance Ministrys 
Establishment Division. Non-optimal manpower levels necessitated existing staff 
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having to pay attention to daily more routine functions, at the expense of high 
level planning and monitoring.  
 
Likewise the absence of proper planning and information systems to assist in 
informed autonomous decision-making. Both the IRD and CD have in place 
Planning Units to co-ordinate and oversee the planning process. The IRDs 
Planning Unit, headed by a Deputy Commissioner in charge of planning is staffed 
by 11 specialists. Within the Customs department a Corporate Planner is assisted 
by two Directors and a Revenue Analyst.  
 
With regard to the planning process, shortly after reform, the departments made 
use of a few fragmented performance measures which failed to relate to the 
organisations core functions. Whilst there has been some improvement over the 
years in terms of the way in which planning is undertaken, there is still plenty of 
room for improvement. While corporate and operational work plans identify 
objectives and expected results designed to contribute to strategic goals, they fail 
to reflect the level of effort or changes needed to effect reforms. HR Specialist in 
the Office of the Director General emphasised the lack of formal training in a 
concept which was still relatively new to a number of government departments. 
With reduced spending budgets and subsequent cuts that usually impact on 
training, the departments primary focus is the provision of technical skills training 
to operational staff. 
 
Focusing on the nature and extent of automated management information 
systems, computerised systems exists within both departments, though in a fairly 
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limited supply. The core automated systems for the IRD and CD are the 
Integrated Computerised Tax Administration System (ICTAS) and the Customs 
Automated Services (CASE) respectively. ICTAS was conceptualised to capture a 
whole of transations view of the taxpayer and the level of compliance with 
statutory tax obligations. The system would offer a range of operational 
information to management and allow the free flow of information between the 
departments. Whilst these core systems have been in place for some time, 
several of the modules were still not functional. Management information from 
ICTAS, for example, is inadequate for the dynamic management of arrears 
(information on the intake of new arrears, the number of accounts outstanding, 
and adjustments made to taxpayer accounts). Absence of such critical information 
results in the inability of management to properly address issues such as 
workflows, as well as the development of strategies and programmes to achieve 
both financial and non-financial targets. Equally problematic is the lack of system 
integration between HQ and field offices, with field officers conditioned in their 
decision making capacities due to their need to refer a number of issues to senior 
officials within HQ.  
 
Problems with upgrading the computerised systems arise in part from the 
departments resource dependency on entities such as Fiscal Services Limited 
(FSL) that form part of the departments task network environment. FSLs ability to 
establish its own priorities, to respond at will to requests for technical assistance, 
and its overall lack of accountability to the revenue departments resulted in the 
slowed pace of modernisation. Also at issue was the dependency of the 
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departments on government subventions to finance payment for system 
upgrades.     
 
Whilst poor structural arrangements and lack of proper information systems 
impacted negatively on the ability of both departments to function strategically and 
to leverage their technologies to make better informed decisions, such 
shortcomings were more pronounced in the IRD than in the CD. Compared to the 
IRD, the CD was much more modernised in terms of its level of automation, both 
internally, as well as in regard to the systems in place for improved service 
delivery such as electronic filing and electronic manifests for import and export 
transactions by importers. The IRD languished far behind in its primary state of 
mostly manual record keeping.  
 
The IRDs demonstrated lack of capacity for efficient revenue collection and 
proper debt management due to its weak structures and internal management 
systems, was to result in two highly publicised interventions by the Finance 
Ministry to rally IRD officers to collect outstanding tax arrears. The second 
initiative, an Accounts Receivable Conversion (ARC) Project undertaken in the FY 
2005/06, was an aggressive campaign to collect J$5b in undisputed receivables. 
The programme involved a special collections group of 100 officers who were 
exposed to special training in arrears collection and in reconciling taxpayer 
accounts on the ICTAS system. The group, divided into four team covering the 
four tax administration regions produced weekly collection reports for a project co-
ordinator who gave overall managerial directions to the Project. During the 5-
month period November to March, the Project collected a total of J$5.6b in 
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arrears of individual income taxes, PAYE, Education Tax, and General 
Consumption Tax. The investment in reconciliation of taxpayer accounts showed 
the extent to which the IRD could not rely on ICTAS to produce accurate records. 
 
8.4.2     CONTROL OVER RESOURCES  
 
 
Both the IRD and CD have limited control over resources and are severely 
constrained in their resource availability. Lack of financial autonomy and 
dependency on government appropriations have resulted in far from adequate 
financial and physical resources. Budget ceilings, monthly subventions which 
often do not match monthly warrants, as well as reductions in requested 
supplementaries all serve as stark reminders that despite reforms, cost cutting is 
still a major issue. Lack of funding has resulted in the departments inability to 
make necessary investments to improve organisational capacity, for example 
through training and the purchase of IT equipment.  
 
The IRD and CD also face serious human resource constraints. Whilst the 
Customs operates on average at about 95% of the established staff complement, 
the IRD operates on average at about 80%. Despite delegated authority for the 
management of human resources as part of the Delegation of Function, there 
was no commensurate increase in the staffing level to effectively undertake the 
new roles. The staff complement in the HR department of the IRD remained static 
at nine persons62. Within the CD there was a slight increase in the staff levels 
                                                
62
 This included 1 Director, 2 Senior Personnel Officers, 2 Personnel Officers, 1 Human Resource 
Management Information Systems (HRMIS) Officer, 2 Records Officers and 1 Secretary. 
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from seventeen to twenty-two63. Far outside the Jamiaca public sector norm of a 
ratio of one HR Specialist to one hundred employees, the HR complement in both 
departments constrained them from effectively fulfilling their delegated roles. 
Understaffing also exists in key areas such as information technology, accounting, 
compliance, and enforcement. High attrition rates are experienced in some 
positions such as auditing, where the remuneration in the private sector is much 
higher. 
 
Departments are still largely dependent on central institutions for the provision of 
critical resources. Neither organisation is in a position to increase current staffing 
levels, partly because the Delegation of Function Instrument is not that far-
reaching in its scope and partly because of restraints emanating from the MOU 
pact signed between government and the public sector union. Nor can they 
increase salaries to a level to motivate persons to remain within the organisation. 
 
Overall, it can be argued that factors such as weak internal structures and limited 
resources availability restrict the internal capacity of the two organisations to 
implement policies and programmes at a level and within timeframes largely of 
their own choosing.  
 
Comparing the two departments and their abilities to escape various resource 
constraints, the Customs department is far better placed in terms of its 
dependency relation and position of power vis-à-vis the Finance Ministry. The 
department is able to extend its funding through additional income generated from 
                                                
63
 This included 1 Director, 1 Personnel Manager, 1 Management Analyst, 1 Training Manager, 1 
Performance Manager, 1 Health and Safety Officer, 1 Employee Relations Officer, 2 Training Officers, 3 
Personnel Officers, 4 Secretaries, 1 Leave Clerk, and 4 Records Officers. 
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the charging of user fees. Partnership with the U.S. governments Border 
Protection Services through the Container Security Initiative also provides the 
organisation with an alternate source for acquiring critical resources to assist in 
programme implementation. 
 
8.5  CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter presented findings on influences on the practice of bureaucratic 
autonomy in the Jamaican case study organisations. Research findings showed 
that a number of factors influenced the exercise of administrative discretion in the 
Inland Revenue and Customs departments, some factors serve as constraints, 
while others provide opportunities for action. Table 8.6 summarises these 
influences and the main dimensions of autonomy affected. Juxtaposition of the 
summarised information in table format helps in presenting a more convincing 
answer to the research question relating to the relative importance of the three 
levels of environment being investigated. In the table, a tick denotes where 
influences serve as opportunities for action, whilst a cross is used where factors 
serve to condition the exercise of autonomy along the stated dimension. 
 
Several factors within the Revenues broader institutional environment condition 
the capacity to act along a number of autonomous dimensions. Regarding interest 
group participation, findings show that whilst groups with vested interests in 
agency operations do play a positive role in the furtherance of organisational 
objectives, the bureaucracy, on occasions, face serious challenges to policy 
decisions taken in stark contrast with the interests of specific stakeholder groups 
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Table 8.6 Summary of Influences on the Practice of Autonomy at the 3 levels of Environment 
Level of 
Environment 
Influences / Factors 
Conditioning Autonomy 
Dimension of Autonomy Affected Nature 
of Affect 
√ / x 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest Group Participation 
 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
 
 HRM autonomy 
 
 Financial Autonomy  
    (Customs Department) 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
 
√ 
 
Stakeholder support for policies and 
programmes. 
 
External encroachments on internal 
organisational functioning. 
 
Inability to make use of HR flexibilities in 
the face of corporatist arrangements. 
 
Reduction in level of financial dependence 
on MoF due to substitutability of resources 
provided by interest group to further its 
interest (Container Support Initiative). 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal/Administrative Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 HRM autonomy 
 Financial autonomy 
 Financial management  
      autonomy  
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite amendments to revenue laws 
providing for better enforced compliance, 
policy autonomy still fettered, e.g., as a 
result of inability to access 3rd party 
information and act on such information. 
 
Revenue laws, public administration laws, 
as well as supranational legislation placing 
local institutions such as the judiciary and 
various central bodies, as well as 
international bodies such as the WTO in 
power positions. 
 
 
Legal Tradition 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
x 
 
 
√ 
Detailed style of drafting legislation 
providing limited elbow room for making 
regulations 
Movement towards purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation permitting 
increased flexibilities for administrative 
decision-making. 
System of Government  Policy autonomy 
 Interventional autonomy 
√ 
√ 
Generation of a merit-based bureaucracy 
under the Westminster Parliamentary 
system of government has resulted in little 
political interference in day-to-day 
operations, except in matters relating to 
revenue targets. 
 
 
Technical 
Environment 
Relations with Central 
Government and other 
Government Institutions 
 Policy autonomy 
 Interventional autonomy 
√ 
√ 
Generally good relations providing 
opportunities to implement devised 
programmes with minimal obstructions. 
Capacity of the Centre and of 
other Government Institutions 
 Policy Autonomy 
 HRM Autonomy 
 
x 
x 
 
 
 
Limited capacity for IT systems 
development and human capital 
development of entities charged with 
support of the Revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Environment 
Internal Structures and Systems  Policy autonomy 
 
 
 Interventional autonomy  
 
x 
 
 
x 
Structural weaknesses and lack of proper 
systems impacting on the Revenues 
capacity for policy implementation. 
Demonstrated lack of capacity for debt 
management and tax collection 
occasioning some intervention by the 
Finance Ministry. 
Resource Availability  Policy autonomy 
 
 HRM Autonomy 
x 
 
 
x 
Resource availability impacting on the 
Revenues ability to implement devised 
programmes. 
Limited capacity to act on formal autonomy 
to develop staff due to lack of financial 
resources. 
  
302 
 
such as importers and car dealers. Autonomy came under threat with the 
implementation of corporatist arrangements, when delegated authority for 
decision making on HR issues such as appointments was pulled back to the 
centre. Where changes recommended by the bureaucracy run the risk of a 
political fall-out between politicians and their constituents, change in the status 
quo was very difficult to achieve.  
 
The Revenue operates within a legal/administrative framework that is highly 
centralised with a vast amount of controls, formal rules and regulations. Revenue 
laws incorporating provisions that require judicial involvement for access to third-
party information as well as for the imposition of fines and penalties reduce 
bureaucrats interventional autonomy from the judiciary. A number of central 
institutions with approval and/or oversight functions impact on the agencies 
actual exercise of policy, financial management, human resources management, 
and interventional autonomy. For example, despite formally delegated powers to 
appoint personnel, capacity to act through the recruitment of high caliber staff was 
constrained due to the existence of a centrally devised pay and grading system 
that remunerated far below market rates and which could not be adjusted at the 
local organisational level. Likewise, central approval, monitoring and oversight of 
contract awards hindered the informal practice of financial management 
autonomy in procuring goods and services. 
 
While Jamaicas legal tradition with its fussy precise style of drafting revenue 
laws left very little room for the Revenue to draft subsidiary regulations and little 
opportunity to interpret meaning, the movement towards a purposive approach to 
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interpretation of taxing legislation provided functionaries with greater flexibility to 
exercise policy autonomy. Administrative decisions aimed at enforcing 
compliance through taxpayer fulfillment of their taxing obligations are now finding 
greater favour and support from the judiciary. 
 
Analysing factors at the technical environment meso-level of organisational 
functioning, relations with some central institutions and other departments provide 
opportunities for the exercise of policy autonomy. Revenue departments benefit 
from the support of the Ministry of Finance, for example, in the latters ready 
approval of their policies and programmes, in its timely provision of informational 
resources and more recent involvement of the departments in the quantitative 
revenue target setting exercise, as well as in its support for most 
recommendations proposing amendments to existing legislation. A major 
constraint, however for the Customs department, involves relations with other 
agencies operating at the various border control areas. Ongoing strained relations 
and jurisdictional issues in border management hamper the CD in the 
performance of its duties in revenue collection and societal protection. 
 
Still within the technical environment, the capacity of central institutions and other 
departments is another factor impacting either positively or negatively on 
discretionary decision-making. For example, the limited capacity of the Office of 
Services Commission for central oversight over the management and 
development of human resources provided bureaucrats with increased 
interventional autonomy, and thereby flexibilities to exercise formally granted 
powers to appoint, train, discipline and dismiss staff. Constraints in the practice of 
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policy autonomy and human resources management autonomy stemmed from 
heavy resource dependency on entities such as Fiscal Services Limited with its 
limited capacity to provide critical technical support in the development of IT 
business solutions and software, and the Tax Administration Services Department 
with its limitations in the provision of funding needed to develop human capital. 
 
Focusing on factors within the organisations internal environment, structural 
weaknesses affected the departments capacity to undertake critical tasks such as 
strategic and operational planning, strategic management, strategic 
communications, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of performance. This in 
turn affects their ability to make good use of informal policy autonomy through 
proper identification of strategic priorities, the setting of realistic performance 
targets, as well as the design and implementation of programmes and initiatives 
to address ongoing and emerging challenges in tax and customs administration. It 
was this failure to demonstrate capacity for debt management and collection 
enforcement that resulted in the Ministry of Finances encroachment on the 
interventional autonomy of the Inland Revenue Department. With regard to 
resource availability, inadequate financial, physical (computers, IT equipment and 
physical plant) as well as human resources impact on the organisations capacity 
to act in terms of their ability to properly manage and develop human capital, as 
well as to execute policy through the implementation of some devised 
programmes. These internal organisational constraints which weaken the overall 
capacity of the focal organisations, to a large degree, originate from resource 
dependency, high level top-down controls imposed by central government 
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institutions, as well as from a lack of technical support  i.e. from factors within the 
broader institutional and technical environments.  
 
 
Whilst the Revenue is able to develop coping strategies to deal with constraints in 
its internal environment, such as tapping alternate sources for access to financial 
or physical resources, resources within the technical and moreso institutional 
environments are irreplaceable, hence constraints are more pervasive at these 
levels.  
 
The following chapter nine presents findings for the Dominican case. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
FACTORS CONDITIONING THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: 
THE DOMINICAN CASE 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Mirroring Chapter 8, this chapter presents for the Dominican case, factors 
conditioning the practice of autonomy within the three levels of analyses, at the 
macro, meso- and micro-levels of organisational functioning. The reader will recall 
from Chapter 4 the key-hole comparison approach being adopted in the study 
whereby the level of analysis for the Dominican case is slightly less detailed than 
that for the Jamaican case. 
 
9.2 THE IMPACT OF MACRO-INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ON AUTONOMY 
 
 
The institutional environment of revenue administration in Jamaica was illustrated 
in Figure 8.1. This environment in the DR is somewhat similar, except in some 
crucial respects. Factors such as the system of government, the legal tradition, 
the strong role of the military, as well as the absence of organised labour all 
differentiate the DR from her neighbouring sister.  The following sections analyse 
the influences of these and other factors on the exercise of administrative 
discretion. 
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9.2.1    INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION 
 
 
Efforts by the DGII and DGA to reform and modernise their organisations, through 
initiatives such as process re-engineering and the leveraging of information and 
communications technology have historically been met by very limited opposition 
from constituent stakeholders. The institutionalisation within both organisations of 
a process of engaging with the various entities through the conduct of various 
consultative meetings has resulted in an ongoing high level of support for the 
revenue agencies. The support which both entities received during the passage of 
the two autonomy laws from entities such as the National Business Council 
(CONEP) and the Institutionalism and Justice Foundation (FINJUS) stemmed not 
only from an appreciation of the need to modernise, but also from the history of 
good working relations.  
 
Enlarged scope for bureaucratic autonomy also stem from the non-existence of 
organised labour and the usual attendant threats of encroachment on operational 
decision-making. In the DR, the activities of trade unions have been severely 
circumscribed by civil service laws outlawing unionisation. Employees of neither 
the DGII nor the DGA are members of any public service union. The law permits 
for staff associations but no such entities exist within the focal organisations. 
 
Focusing on threats from interested stakeholders outside of national borders, 
Chapter 8 discussed the involvement of the Unites States government and the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection functioning alongside host country Customs 
administrations enrolled in its Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI was 
implemented at the DRs Port Caucedo in 2006. Officials interviewed at the Port 
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spoke of the fraternal attitude of the CBP officials, describing the CSI as a 
positive experience. Co-operative relationships stem in part from the agreement 
which was signed at the national level between the two governments. The CBP 
official interviewed also spoke of technical assistance being provided to local staff 
in the inspection of Dominican imports and non-U.S. bound exports  tasks 
outside of their remit. The provision by the U.S. government of physical resources 
(in the form of hand-held and large mobile x-ray and scanning equipment), as well 
as its provision of informational and knowledge resources has resulted in its 
serving as a substitute or alternate source for the acquisition of critical resources. 
 
On occasion however, autonomy has been under threat from stakeholder groups. 
In 2006, with the loss of fixed government subventions and the new funding 
regime based on aggregate tariff revenues and funds generated by service fees 
to support its operations, the DGA proceeded to implement a user fee based on 
the value of the merchandise entering the country. In contravention of the WTO 
and CAFTA-DR rules, the business community complained about the legality of 
the imposition of such fees. The outcry resulted in a modification of the law which 
now makes provision for specific user fees based on weight and volume, rather 
than fees calculated on the value of the merchandise. 
 
Arguably, the most serious threat to the structural, policy and interventional 
autonomy of the tax and customs departments came from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as one of the key stakeholders with an interest in the 
functioning of the revenue collecting agencies. In January 2005, the IMF 
approved a 28-month Standby Agreement (SBA) with the DR for approximately 
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USD$648.2m. In 2006, the Fund for the fourth time, postponed revisiting the 5th 
and 6th Letters of Intent of the SBA, causing a partial suspension of the 
Agreement. Further disbursement was conditional on a number of factors, such 
as governments assurance of fiscal sustainability threatened at the time by 
sluggish revenue performance; the provision of a durable framework for the 
efficient conduct of fiscal policy; as well as the identification of effective sources to 
enable increases in tax collection.  
 
 
Whilst one top level official spoke of the Funds attempts to obstruct Dominican 
progress, taking drastic action against the countrys development by blocking the 
way towards the Millenium Development Goals64, another senior official spoke of 
tax reforms being prepared at gun point by pressures from the IMF65. Such 
claims resulted in a rejoinder from the Funds in-country representative, Mr. Erik 
Offerdal who argued the Funds commitment to supporting the Dominican 
authorities to reach the objectives of its economic programme. Proposed IMF 
recommendations were not impositions, but merely part of a suggested menu of 
options.  
 
 
Strenuous fiscal conditionalities of the nature described above resulted in a 
complete reprogramming of Dominican public expenses, and the sacrificing of 
spending to comply with SBA goals. For the tax agencies, encroachments on 
bureaucratic autonomy related to the focus also placed by the IMF on tax 
incomes. Joint agreement between the Dominican government and the Fund on 
                                                
64
 Technical Secretary of the Presidency, Mr. Temistocles Montas, as reported in the Dominican Today 
Newspaper of 16 September, 2006. 
65
 Finance Minister, Mr. Vicente Bengoa, as reported in the Dominican Today Newspaper of 15 
November, 2006. 
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tax policy and tax administrative reform measures resulted in governments total 
loss of control over the setting of macro-economic fiscal and revenue targets. The 
result was a top-down imposition of collection targets by the Ministry of Finance, 
without any consultation with or input from the collection agencies. The IMF 
demanded and received copies of budget and income estimates for the 
departments as well as quarterly reports which enabled checks to be made on 
variances in each tax collection area. Reduced scope for interventional autonomy 
was rationalised by the Funds Resident Representative as follows, during our 
interview: 
 
In fiscal matters, it comes down to making a distinction between issues 
in the context of general surveillance and monitoring and that of Fund 
support. In the former area, involvement is more in terms of providing 
technical assistance through capacity building, making 
recommendations based on international best practices, and our 
experience in the field of revenue administration. In the latter area, 
governments are required to meet certain fiscal targets and benchmarks 
on expenditure controls and mechanisms. They are certain hard targets 
which they have to comply with in order to get access to funds. We do 
not consider it the case of our imposition of targets and figures. 
 
9.2.2    THE LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
 9.2.2.1   The Legal Framework 
 
 
The Tax Code (Law No. 11-92 of 1992) and the Customs Law (Law No. 3489 of 
1953) are the two primary laws in the DR governing domestic taxation and 
international trade. These laws provide the DGII and the DGA with fairly extensive 
powers for the implementation of tax policy. The laws provide the revenue 
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agencies with powers to summons, to distrain or have distrained the property of 
individuals, to inspect and audit, to foreclose, to seize and retain documents and 
goods, and to penalise for offenses committed. The Tax Code incorporates at 
Article 2, a general anti-avoidance provision which allows the DGI to ignore the 
existence of legal entities or certain transactions when used to secure tax 
avoidance. 
 
Both departments make good use of the powers granted under the tax and 
customs legislation. Intensifying its fight against evasion, inspectors of the DGII 
take to the streets closing warehouses and those businesses which have failed to 
comply with their tax obligations. For the FY 2008, the DGII closed a total of 66 
businesses (Dominican Today, December 30, 2008). Likewise the DGA which 
seizes items, including goods, motor vehicles as well as entire buildings, in cases 
of fraud and undervaluation.  
 
The main failings in existing legislation impacting on autonomous bureaucratic 
functioning involve current institutional arrangements for handling tax cases, 
access to third party information, sanctions being applied to the evasion of taxes, 
as well as the requirement of the Revenue to comply with supranational 
legislation. Within a framework where penal cases are dealt with through the 
normal court system, delayed rulings not only result from the sheer volume of 
cases, but also from the time required for judges to evaluate and assess cases.  
 
Regarding third party information, Article 56 b) of the Law No. 183-02 that 
constitutes the Financial and Monetary Code forbids the provision of account 
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details to persons other than the account owner or persons expressly authorised 
by the owner. The same text states: the information that the regulated companies 
supply to the Tax Administration, the organs responsible for the prevention of 
money-laundering and to the penal courts of the Republic should be facts,  
provided case-by-case through the Bank Superintendency, either in relation to 
receiving the request for the information or to the provision of the information. In 
essence, both the request and the response must traverse through the 
Superintendency. Tax officials argued that the slow-down generated by this 
bureaucratic formality impacts negatively on efforts at timely prosecution of 
offenses. 
 
Also at issue are the current provisions for dealing with tax evasion, which in the 
DR is a penal and not a criminal issue. Given limited success with its strategy of 
gentle persuasion, coupled with a compliance rate of below 30%, 
recommendations for the passage of a Bill criminalising tax evasion was deemed 
necessary to guarantee the efficiency which institutions such as the World Bank 
and the IMF were demanding of the Dominican government66. Despite strong 
opposition to its passage by the business community, the DGII argued that the 
deterrent effect resulting from the threat of a criminal complaint would assist the 
department in its ongoing efforts at devising ways and means of executing its 
Anti-Evasion Plan. 
 
Compounding such legal constraints is the requirement for the revenue agencies 
to observe provisions in supranational laws which take precedence over domestic 
                                                
66
 Daily News Newspaper quoting head of the DGII, Juan Hernandez. 
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legislation. In 1995, the DR joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in 
2001 became a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation (ACV). 
Lack of autonomy of the DGA to uplift declared prices and to apply minimum 
values in cases of suspected undervaluation resulted in revenues from 
international trade being placed at serious risk. Likewise the requirement to 
observe provisions in the WTOs Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which constrained customs officials in their 
ability to take autonomous decisions on how to deal with cases involving 
breaches of intellectual property rights. Notwithstanding such requirements, the 
DGAs flouting of WTO rules through its practice of with-holding merchandise at 
the various ports of entry pending its own internal investigations remained a 
source of complaint by several importers. 
 
9.2.2.2   The Administrative Framework 
 
 
Chapter 7 provided some information on the administrative framework which 
provided the context for revenue administration. Pre-reform, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Office of the Technical Presidency (Secretaría Técnica de la 
Presidencia), as well as central institutions such as the National Treasury 
(Tesorería Nacional), the National Budget Office (ONAPRES), the Office of the 
Comptroller General (Contraloría), the General Directorate of Government 
Accounting (Direcciόn General de Contabilidad Gubernamental), and the Audit 
Commission (Cámara de Cuentas) undertook a number of functional as well as 
monitoring and oversight roles. The various laws, regulations and guidelines 
administered by these entities resulted in a number of ex-ante and ex-post 
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controls, on some occasions the various requirements for compliance resulting in 
a duplication of effort and a further drain on fairly limited resources. 
 
The new autonomy Laws 226-06 and 227-06 made clear that the new formally 
decentralised entities would continue to operate in an administrative framework 
subject to the economic, fiscal and tax policies of central government, regardless 
of the powers granted under the new laws. Post reform, the cleaned 
administrative framework incorporated arrangements which continued to impact 
on bureaucratic functioning. Notwithstanding their newfound formal autonomy in 
the management of human resources, including authority to determine pay scales 
and set levels of remuneration, the departments were forced to join other 
government entities in across the board salary reductions as part of governments 
austerity measures to halt rising public debt. Appendix XV provides details of 
Circular No. 27 dated 5 December, 2006 from the Office of the Comptroller 
General, communicating information on the Decree of the President of the 
Republic demanding payroll cuts. 
 
Despite their financial, and financial management autonomy, the focal 
organisations still have an undertaking to submit their budgets to ONAPRES 
primarily to check its linkage to national strategic goals and priorities. The 
approval of ONAPLAN is still required ex ante any spending on large capital 
projects. Public procurement laws and regulations still guide the performance of 
this task, oversight roles being performed by the Government Supply 
Commission.  
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In order to ensure that autonomy is practiced within a proper framework of 
accountability, oversight is provided by a number of central bodies, along with a 
number of requirements on the part of the organisations for reporting on 
performance. Law 10-04 on the Audit Commission of the Dominican Republic 
established the Commission (also referred to as the Accounts Chambers) as the 
supreme audit body with a responsibility for external audit. The Commissions 
remit covers the entire remit of public administration, including the autonomous 
institutions. The focal organisations therefore undergo compliance audits that 
compare their approved budgets against actual expenditures. The DGII and DGA 
are also subject to the Audit Commissions fulfilling of any requests made by 
Congress or the Finance Ministry for special audits or investigations of their 
internal operations. Internal audit oversight, primarily in the form of ex post 
checking, is provided by the Office of the Comptroller General which has its own 
designated Internal Audit Units operating both in central government agencies, as 
well as within the decentralised non-financial public bodies.  
 
In the area of performance reporting, both organisations are required to submit 
daily reports on revenue performance to the Finance Ministry, the National 
Treasury and the Comptroller General. As a pre-condition of the 2005 Standby 
Agreement with the IMF, the organisations also have an undertaking to submit 
very detailed monthly and quarterly reports to the Fund.  
 
9.2.3    LEGAL TRADITION 
 
The Dominican legal system is based on the civilian Romano-Germanic legal 
tradition. A hierarchy of enacted law, with the Constitution at the apex, followed by 
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legislation (civil and commercial codes), executive decrees, administrative 
regulations, and finally local ordinances, serve as the primary source of law. Also 
of increasing importance is the influence of various international treaties and 
conventions. Acting as secondary sources of law or authorities, are case law 
(jurisprudence) and doctrine. While case law plays an increasing role in the legal 
system, its use is still to some extent restricted because of the necessity to first 
interpret and apply the written law. Such law, which is not binding, is therefore 
applied in the event where primary sources are absent, unclear or incomplete and 
jurisprudence can shed light on the situation. 
 
The following two sections analyse, in a format similar to chapter 8, the influence 
of legal drafting style and statutory interpretation on the exercise of administrative 
discretion. 
9.2.3.1   Legal Drafting Style 
 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted the traditional fuzziness of civilian tax codes and laws and 
the requirement of regulations to fill in a number of the blanks; such requirements 
providing the bureaucracy with increased opportunities for local decision-making. 
Research findings show, however, that particularly as relates to tax and customs 
laws, legislative drafting style is not in keeping with the tradition as legislation is 
very detailed and specific in its nature, providing direction to bureaucrats and 
taxpayers alike. Figures 9.1  9.3 present the results of content analyses of 
sections of the Dominican Tax Code (Codigo Tributario, 11-92) and the Customs 
Act (Law 1189 of 1953). Figure 9.1 shows how drafters, in Article 287 of the Tax 
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Taxable Income 
Article 287  Allowable Deductions 
No. of Pages spanned:   4     
No. of paragraphs:  50                                              
No. of Lines:       133                                                  
No. of Words:  1,469 
No. of specific cases identified as                
qualifying under the Article:  13 
Code, set out the law on allowable deductions for the purpose of calculating 
taxable income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Content Analysis of Article 287  
of the Dominican Code 11-92                                                                                              
 
  
The thirteen specific cases qualifying under the Code for income tax deductions 
are outlined in detail over four pages, which in total comprise 50 paragraphs, 133 
lines, and 1,469 words. Figure 9.2 shows provisions in the said article for 
deductibles for depreciation. After clearly defining the concept, the law then 
categorises such assets, affixes the percentages for depreciation according to 
each category, outlines the methods of accounting for the assets as well as the 
timeframe for the entry of such assets into records. The legislation also 
distinguishes between new asset acquisitions and assets of owners own 
construction, specifying what charges must be computed to arrive at a value for 
including such assets into the asset account.  
 
 
 
  
318 
 
DOMINICAN TAX CODE 11-92 
  Article 287 (e): Depreciation. Amortization for wear and tear, breakdown, and old age, as well as justifiable losses from 
disuse of property used in the business operation. 
I. Depreciable assets. For the purposes of this Article, the concept of depreciable assets means the assets used in the 
business that lose value from wear and tear deterioration, or disuse. 
II. Deductible amount. The amount allowed for deduction for depreciation for the fiscal year for any category of assets, will 
be determined by applying to the assets account, at the close of the fiscal year, the percentage applicable for that category 
of assets. 
III. Classification of Depreciable Assets. Depreciable assets must be classified in one of the three following categories: 
   Category 1. Buildings and their structural components. 
Category 2. Automobiles and light trucks for everyday use; office furniture and equipment, computers, information 
systems, and data processing equipment. 
   Category 3. Any other depreciable property. 
The assets classified in Category 1 will be kept on the books on the basis of separate assets accounts. 
The assets classified in Category 2 will be placed in one single account. 
The assets classified in Category 3 will be placed in one single account. 
IV. The applicable percentages for Categories 1, 2 and 3 will be determined according to the following table: 
Category Applicable Percentage 
1 5 
2 25 
3 15 
IV.I. Depreciable assets which are leased out will be depreciated according to the following:  
(1) 50% for assets corresponding to Category 2; and  
(2) 30% for assets corresponding to Category 3.  
An enterprise owning these assets will carry separate joint accounts, as previously indicated for their leased assets. 
V. Additions to the Assets Account. The initial addition to the assets account through the acquisition of any asset will be its 
cost plus insurance and freight, and installation costs. The initial addition to the assets account for an asset of one's own 
construction will include all taxes, charges, including customs duties, and interest attributable to such assets from periods 
prior to their placement in service. 
VI. Moment of Ingress of the Assets into the Account. An asset will be considered part of an account when the following 
conditions take place:  
(1) If the asset is of one's own construction or falls in Category 1, when the asset is placed in service;  
(2) in the case of any other asset, when the same is acquired.   
Figure 9.2: Article 287 (e) of the Dominican Tax Code 11-92 
 
Figure 9.3 likewise illustrates the degree of detail typically used in the drafting of 
provisions within the Dominican Customs Act (Law 3489). 
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Contraband 
Article 167: Describes the offense of smuggling as the entry or exit from the national territory, as well as the 
internal transport, distribution, storage, or the public or clandestine sale of goods, tools, products, machinery, 
spare parts, materials, raw materials, commercial or artistic objects and articles that have been passed or not by 
the customs of the country, with or without the complicity of any officer or authority, without having complied 
with all the requirements or full payment of duties and taxes provided by the import and export laws. In 
addition, for the purpose of this law, the crime of smuggling also includes the traffic of exempted goods, 
without previous filling of the requirements of the Act's exemptions, for the sale of the same.  
 
Paragraph I: the crime of smuggling is committed when the holder of any goods is unable to furnish, at the 
request of competent authority, within a period of 24 working hours of the day of being caught, the requested 
documentation to show that he has complied with all the tax provisions contained in this article, or that he 
acquired the goods from a person who in turn can prove within that same period, that he has complied with all 
the requirements. 
 
Paragraph II: In no case will it be accepted a plea by the holder, person or persons unknown, of the penalties 
provided for by this law, and the holder will be considered, for all purposes of the same, as the offender 
responsible. 
 
Paragraph III: The cigars, cigarettes, and drugs that are confiscated by virtue of this Act, may not be sold, and 
must be publicly destroyed within forty-eight (48) hours of having been proven the crime of smuggling, as 
provided in paragraph I of this article. This destruction will be conducted in the presence of a Commission 
appointed for this purpose, which will produce minutes to be forwarded to the Customs Collector. Other 
confiscated objects, if part of the free trade movement, will be sold by the Customs Office at public auction in a 
period of no more than thirty (30) days, and the proceeds deposited into the Treasury. 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Article 167 of the Dominican Customs Act (Law 3489) 
 
After defining the term and the points in time at which such a crime is committed, 
legislators then clearly specified those acts that constitute an involvement in such 
behaviour. Also specified are the administrative procedures which must be 
followed for the disposal of certain identified goods, as well as for those goods 
that are part of the regular free trade movement. 
 
According to one attorney interviewed, such detail is necessary in order for judges 
to correctly apply the law, even though for administrators, such specification can 
prove very demanding, limiting their freedoms to make internal decisions. In the 
words of the National Director of the DGA, if this particularity did not exist, it would 
turn the collection of revenues (and its derivatives) into a virtual national trauma, 
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that would obstruct even the normal course of the State (Miguel Cocco, quoted in 
the Dominican Today, Jan. 22, 2007). 
 
 
9.2.3.3   Statutory Interpretation 
 
 
The legal philosophy underpinning taxing legislation in the DR aims toward the 
achievement of a balance between the rights of taxpayers and the supremacy of 
the State to make proper determinations for the public good. Hence, whilst there 
are numerous provisions scattered throughout the various revenue laws 
protecting the rights of individuals, for example through the incorporation of 
administrative procedures which must be followed by bureaucrats, provisions are 
also inserted within the said legislation which favour the State by specifying the 
authority of the Revenue. In the latter case, for example, Article 2 of the Tax Code 
states: 
 
The legal forms adopted by the taxpayers does not impose any obligation on 
the Tax Administration, which can attribute to the situations and actions that 
have occurred a meaning in accordance with the facts, when from the tax law 
it follows that the activity generating income was defined by attending to the 
reality. On the other hand, when the activity generating income is defined 
attending to the legal form itself, then it must attend to that. 
 
Applying such philosophy to methods of statutory interpretation, research 
findings show that cases decisions are reached taking into consideration a 
combination of factors relevant to the case. As one Judge, Justice Fernandez of 
the Tax and Administrative Litigation Court67 opined: 
 
 
                                                
67
 This court has been renamed the Superior Administrative Court) 
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Before, maybe one could say that a number of judgements tended to favour 
the taxpayer. Whilst a few judges still stick to the literal approach, we are 
now crossing over that bridge between the strict literal approach and the 
purposive approach to interpreting the Tax Code and taxing legislation. Along 
with the issue of fundamental rights, there is a need to look at the facts that 
could affect the conclusion. In this particular area of taxes, the principle of the 
general interest has become quite strong. We have to look at the benefit to 
society, not confining ourselves to looking at the benefit of the particular 
person in front of the court. 
 
This summation was borne out after examination of a review of a few tax cases 
lodged in the Supreme Administrative Court, namely judgements in the case of 
Electricity and Co-generation Uvero Co., S.A v. General Directorate of Internal 
Taxes (2007); General Directorate of Internal Taxes v. Development and Credit 
Bank ADOPEM, S.A (2008); and Sun Development, S.A (Melia Caribe Tropical) v. 
General Directorate of Internal Taxes. In the first case involving Electricity and 
Co-generation Uvero Co., S.A (hereafter the Electricity Co.), the matter involved 
the payment of minimum taxes and loss deductions, with the requirement for 
judicial interpretation of Article 287 (k) of the Tax Code. The Article states: 
Losses sustained by enterprises in their economic activities will be deductible 
from the profit obtained in the fiscal years that immediately follow that of the 
losses, provided that this deduction cannot extend beyond three fiscal years. The 
Electricity Co. appealed against Resolution No. 271-6 Reconsideration issued in 
2006 by the DGII, which amended the companys affidavit for Income Tax for the 
fiscal year 2004. The appellant argued that the Revenue had exceeded its 
authority, and that the DGIIs allegation that pursuant to the law, the income tax 
paid at a fixed amount of 1.5% of monthly gross sales for 2003 was a final 
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payment  (i.e. payment on account of such tax) not compensatable or deductable 
during the fiscal year 2004, had no legal basis.  
 
The court, in its ruling, agreed with the taxpayers argument that the DGIIs 
attempt to exclude from the affidavits of income tax for the fiscal year 2004, 
losses incurred by the taxpayer during the tax year 2003 only under the allegation 
that in 2003 the tax was paid according to the aforementioned 1.5% of sales on 
gross income, and therefore is irrelevant for 2004 according to Article 287 (k) of 
the Tax Code, violates the principle of legality in tax, provided for in the 
Constitution. According to the provision in Article 8, clause 5 of the DR 
Constitution, no one shall be compelled to do what the law does not require or 
prevented from doing what the law does not prohibit. If the law does not specify 
that the minimum payment may not be offset by losses, the tax administration 
when interpreting the law cannot prevent their compensation. The DGII had 
therefore exceeded the scope of its authority by implicitly repealing the application 
of Article 287 (k) without a legal basis that supported the repeal. 
 
This judgement was to be later challenged in 2008 in an appeal which also 
related to minimum taxes and loss deductions, this time involving the DGII 
(appellant) and the Development and Credit Bank ADOPEM, S.A (hereafter the 
D&CB). The Revenue argued that rulings by the court allowing loss reductions in 
cases of payment by the taxpayer of the minimum of 1.5% gross income is a 
wrong application of the true spirit of the laws68 which established this provision. 
                                                
68
 The 1.5% minimum payment of income tax on gross income was established by Law Nos. 147-00 and 12-
01. 
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According to the DGII, these laws were aimed at incorporating special provisions 
in the income tax itself, by creating an assumption of profits or income during the 
1.5% period of payment, which thus rules out the existence of losses against 
which claims can subsequently be made. Ruling in favour of the appellant, the 
court agreed that the losses permitted by Article 287 (k) of the Tax Code only 
apply under the ordinary regime. Under this special regime, though still a part of 
income tax, the obligation to pay minimum income tax constitutes a legal 
presumption of profit for the taxpayer, thus eliminating any possibility for 
reimbursement or compensation in later years. 
 
Also demonstrating the shift towards the purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation is the case of Sun Development, S.A (Melia Caribe Tropical) 
(appellant, hereafter Sun Development) v. the General Directorate of Internal 
Taxes (respondent), which involved the issue of transfer pricing and utility rates 
being quoted for hotel nights. The appellant sold its operations through a tour 
operator, a related company located in a tax haven. Article 281 of Law 11-92 
states: 
 
 Legal acts concluded between a local company with foreign capital 
and a natural person or legal entity domiciled abroad which directly or 
indirectly controls it, will be considered, in principle, to be made 
between independent parties when their provisions adhere to normal 
market practices between independent entities. 
 
Doubting the veracity of the information submitted by the taxpayer, and upon 
checking the tariffs quoted by similar companies operating in the same conditions 
in the same geographic area, the DGII found evidence that despite the appellants 
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statements of very high liabilities, the use of market intermediaries for sales 
purposes was nothing more than unreported income injected through this 
mechanism as working capital. Sun Development appealed the DGIIs Resolution 
No. 257-10 Reconsideration concerning the undervaluation of company revenues, 
charging that adjustments to its Affidavit of Income Tax for the fiscal year 2007 
were unfair, ill-founded and without legal basis. Having examined all relevant 
documents, the allegations of both parties, as well as an admissible expert report, 
the court ruled that the determination adopted by the DGII was based on 
evidence which allowed the administration to go from known data to unknown 
information. The DGIIs estimation of Sun Developments tax liability did not 
violate any constitutional or legal provision, being as it were a course of action 
well within the organisations powers under Article 2 of the Tax Code. 
 
Research findings revealed that the interpretation of taxing statutes in the DR 
shows no penchant for favouring one entity (taxpayer or tax official) over the 
other. In some cases where there is no expressed obligation to tax or any 
provision outrightly prohibiting the taxpayer from devising strategies that may 
result in the avoidance of tax, the strict literal approach is applied, thus impacting 
on the Revenue in its capacity for collection enforcement. The more recent shift 
towards the more purposive approach to interpretation provides a lot more 
flexibility for the bureaucracy, as judges seek to move beyond the surface to 
examine the motive behind particular provisions in the various pieces of taxing 
legislation, i.e the remedy or remedies which the law is trying to correct. 
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9.2.4    SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
9.2.4.1   The Executive 
 
 
Examining the issue of executive-agency relations69, one DGA senior official 
argued that the type of pressure brought to bear on the institution is related to the 
type of relationship which the President has with the General Director. Appointed 
directly by the President, both heads of the DGII and the DGA have very good 
working relations with the President. On occasions, both have made use of 
informal strategies to bypass the Ministry of Finance to deal directly with the 
President on issues for which there might have been little demonstrated support 
from the Finance Ministry. Particularly the DGA, staff noted that given the close 
relations between the President and Mr. Cocco and the respect which the former 
had for the head of the DGA and the department, the image of the organisation 
throughout the public service was not only that of an effective income generating 
institution, but as a liaison or route for communicating with the President. Such 
respect resulted in the organisations being able to proceed with the business of 
tax administration with minimum interference by the Executive Power.   
 
Regarding the degree of politicisation of the staffing of the bureaucracy, Article 55 
of the Dominican Constitution offers extensive powers to the President of the 
Republic in the incorporation and removal of officials. As head of public 
administration, the President appoints and removes cabinet ministers as well as 
other public officials and employees whose appointment is not recognised by the 
Constitution or by law. This includes Executive branch appointees who exercise 
                                                
69
 The focus here is strictly on the President as Head of the Executive. 
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high level administrative, managerial and consultative functions. Likewise, the 
Civil Service Act provides for the Chief Executive to discretionally appoint 
individuals to a wide range of positions, outside the normal recruiting process.  
 
Historically, across the wider public service, the DGII and DGA being no 
exception, there was a great deal of political involvement in recruitment, 
promotion and dismissal of staff, as well as Executive involvement in operational 
decision-making. In the DGA, change in regime could result in as much as a 85% 
to 95% staff turnover. Instead of answering to the Ministry of Finance the 
organisation was reporting directly to the President. A 2003 survey on 
remuneration in the DGII showed salaries, as a norm, were not applied by the 
personnel department according to the position or levels of responsibility, but by 
the authority that requested the hiring. Despite falling under the civil service 
career and administrative regime which came into effect in 1991, this system 
failed to prevent in 2003, a high turnover of staff in the DGII whereby half of its 
staff had less than five years of service, and 23% less than one year. 
 
Both the Head of the Internal Audit of the DGA, and the Director of Human 
Resources in the DGII noted that such politicisation was no longer the order of the 
day within the two organisations. The situation radically changed during the period 
2004-2012 under the two Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) administrations 
headed by President Leonel Fernandez. According to the DGAs Internal Audit 
Head, 95% of the staff within the organisation at the time were part of the staffing 
complement during the 1996-2000 Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) 
administration. Some department heads have, as a result of the longevity of 
  
327 
 
tenure, built up between 8-25 years of work experience. In the words of the DGIIs 
HR Manager, whilst one cannot say that the administration is completely free of 
politics, what was unfolding was the establishment of a HR regime in accordance 
with the law. As an example of the quest for professionalisation of its staffing, a 
private company was contracted in 2007 to select 60 new auditors, which involved 
a period of training followed by an evaluation. No officials, neither inside nor 
outside of the organisation had any input into final selection of the candidates.  
  
9.2.4.2   The Judiciary 
 
 
Both the DGII and the DGA argue the strong and ongoing lack of support from the 
judiciary which is a serious cause of concern. Such concerns, which centre on the 
leniency of judges in dealing with tax evaders and smugglers, misapplication of 
the revenue laws and the illogical and illegal rulings being handed down across 
the entire ambit of the country, have resulted in various comments and 
statements in the print media. 
  
In an article entitled Dominican Internal Taxes alleges lack of support from 
Justice Branch in the Dominican Today Newspaper, the General Director of the 
DGII, Mr. Juan Hernandez highlighted the failure of his department to get the 
necessary and proper support from the judiciary in its fight against evasion, since 
no legal proceedings were concluded against firms or physical persons charged 
for violations pertinent to tax laws. According to Hernandez: 
 
the processes are very slow in the cases that we have taken before 
the justice systemthere is too much bureaucracy in preparing legal 
casesthere are multiple persons that we have charged due to 
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different types of violations and up to this day, we have not seen the 
first completed proceeding (Dominican Today, January 22nd, 2007). 
 
Even more harsh are the views and comments of his counterpart in the DGA, who 
point to the complacency, as well as the general lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the judiciary about the tax environment and tax issues. In an 
article entitled Tax dodgers and smugglers go unpunished, Customs chief says, 
the Dominican Today reported statements made by the General Director, Mr. 
Cocco during a joint press conference with the Head of the Centre for Import and 
Investment of the Dominican Republic. According to the article, Mr. Cocco: 
 
[described] himself as impertinent in regards to the follow up that 
he provides to the cases of contraband taken to court, so that 
responsible and determinant sanctions against the tax evaders are 
established, but lamented that that still has yet to be accomplished 
(Dominican Today, August 29th, 2005). 
 
What happens, the General Director went on further to state, is that there is 
complacency in the rulings and on the tax problem there doesnt seem to be much 
concern in certain spheres of Justice. Citing one case where the importer was 
apprehended twice and convicted for smuggling three containers of liquor, but 
because of being sentenced to house arrest, was able to travel abroad and was 
again caught with contraband. Mr. Cocco spoke of the courts failings to dissuade 
persons from becoming repeat offenders by not handing down stiffer penalties. 
This, despite the administrations provision of comprehensive explanations of 
cases accompanied by detailed explanations of the law to make the court 
understand the nature of the issue. The inoperative manner in which the 
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Dominican Justice operates has led to it being labeled by the DGA as an 
accomplice in tax evasion (ibid). 
 
9.3 THE IMPACT OF MESO-LEVEL FACTORS ON AUTONOMY  
 
 
9.3.1    ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
AND OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
As previously mentioned, the environment of the focal organisations in the DR, 
whilst similar to that of the Jamaican revenue agencies, also exhibit a few striking 
differences. One of these differences lies at the task network level, and involves 
organisations with which the revenue departments are required to interface. 
Particularly at the Dominican ports of entry, a number of other organisations exist 
to jointly execute the task of border protection. These include the departments of 
National Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Public Health, and 
Agriculture, as well as various environmental authorities. The strong presence of 
the military dates back to the DRs lengthy period of dictatorship, which created a 
strong role for the military in Dominican society. Established at the various ports 
are Verification Commissions made up of representatives of these various 
institutions, which must be present at the opening of each container.  
 
It is at the border points that enormous pressures are brought to bear on the 
operations of the DGA, with the department facing constant threat to both its 
policy and interventional autonomy. According to the DGAs international trade 
advisor: 
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At the ports of entry, each entity wants to be the main character in the 
movie. Right now everyone is in control and there has been known 
cases of confrontation with regard to jurisdiction. Teams work in theory 
towards the same objective, but in practice they work first to the 
objectives of their institution.  
 
The strongest and most frequent threats were said to come from the military. 
According to customs officials interviewed stationed in these locations, despite a 
lack of knowledge on Customs laws and regulations, the military constantly 
intervenes in the operations of verification of merchandise with an attitude, to 
extract their own benefits. The Sub-Director of Santo Domingo Airport also spoke 
of the historical lack of inter-agency co-operation, which has somewhat improved 
over the years as a result of the conduct of regular co-ordinated high level 
meetings between heads of the various organisations. Jurisdictional issues are 
pro-actively dealt with through the DGAs conduct of joint inter-agency training 
programmes in which other agencies are invited to participate. 
 
A lack of support on the part of central institutions and other government 
departments is also an issue for DGII officials who spoke of the bureaucratic red 
tape involved in accessing vital information from other government entities such 
as the Property Registration department. Lack of computerisation result in the 
DGII having to physically visit the department to access taxpayer files which 
cannot be removed from the office. Officials in both departments reiterated the 
views of their respective Heads about the support of the Justice department. 
Problems lie in the delays in handling case, the lack of knowledge of personnel 
and poor administration resulting in loss of legal papers filed with the department.  
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9.3.2    CAPACITY OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER 
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
 
With regard to other central institutions, the departments have a high level of 
freedom to manoeuvre largely as a result of the lack of capacity of such entities. 
With more than RD$675 billion pesos to track and audit, the external audit 
Accounts Chamber is woefully short of personnel and equipment. Of its request 
for RD$1.1 billion in its 2007/08 budget, it was assigned only RD$423 million, a 
10% increase over the last years budget but still short of the RD$792 it is 
supposed to receive according to the law. The result is the conduct of audits 
which are not very detailed and comprehensive. Likewise the Office of the 
Comptroller General which is also limited in its capacity for internal oversight. A 
high level of interventional autonomy from the National Office of Administration 
and Personnel (ONAP) is a result of sufficient personnel skilled in areas such as 
the evaluation of training, as well as the evaluation and classification of 
personnel. The limited capacity of the central and other government institutions 
mentioned here is typical of the levels of capacity of the majority of entities with 
which the revenue organisations interface. 
 
9.4 THE IMPACT OF MICRO-LEVEL FACTORS ON AUTONOMY  
 
9.4.1    INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS 
 
 
With the granting of semi-autonomous status to the DGII came the mandatory  
requirement for the establishment of a range of new internal structures, systems, 
procedures and norms. A number of systems and processes that were non-
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existent in both organisations prior to 2006 were implemented during the course 
of the next two years. As a first step in the transitory process, the departments 
each devised a new organisational structure that would enable realisation of the 
primary reform goal of achieving efficiency. According to the Sub-Director of the 
DGA the department conceptualised a new structure for a modern customs that 
would allow for the execution of best practices in customs co-operation and 
customs management. New departments in the reorganised structure include a 
department of International Relations and Negotiations, as well as a department 
of Planning and Economic Studies. The department of International Relations 
and Negotiations has a dedicated function which includes liaising with a number 
of regional and international institutions as well as with the donor community to 
monitor the various training programmes on offer, as well as to actively seek out 
possibilities for the provision of technical and/or financial assistance. This function 
has therefore been removed from the regular training function where a lot of 
opportunities were being left untapped. 
 
Since 2005, a formal planning programme commenced in the DGII, the DGA 
following suit in 2006. The whole concept of planning within the DGII assumed a 
high priority with the incorporation of management best practices such as the use 
of the Balanced Scorecard. A Planning Committee was established to oversee the 
institutionalisation of the planning process, and training programmes in strategic 
planning, strategic management and application of the Balanced Scorecard 
methodology rolled out across the entire organisation. Use of planning information 
has resulted in modifications to strategic and operational plans as appropriate to 
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facilitate results. According to the Sub-Director, such practices and institutional 
arrangements have provided the bases for better informed decision making. 
 
Focus within the DGII on processes and procedures has also resulted in the use 
of integrated audits which makes use of scorecard information. A typical audit of a 
department or division includes a review of the expenditure of the budget, the 
scorecard data, as well as a review of operational processes. Also in existence 
are procedures manuals which are being used extensively to develop internal 
capacity. 
 
Focusing on computerisation, interconnection with other institutions allows the 
focal organisations to access data that will provide a range of information on 
taxpayers. The DGAs proprietary system for customs data management, 
SIADOM70, connects the department with all the ports, airports and border 
crossings of the country (27 in total), and maintains interconnection with the DGII, 
the Secretariat of Agriculture, as well as with a number of Intelligence agencies. 
 
Implementation of a number of these computerised systems and procedures was 
possible as a result of reduced central government dependencies and increased 
financial autonomy. Where in-house capacity was weak in areas such as 
organisation re-design and the establishment of HR regimes, both the DGII and 
the DGA made use of external consultants to assist in the development and 
implementation of systems and procedures. 
 
                                                
70
 The full Spanish title of the system is Sistema Informatico Aduanero Dominicano (SIADOM). 
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 9.4.2    CONTROL OVER RESOURCES 
 
 
Prior to 2006, the DGII and the DGA faced a number of manpower, materials, 
training and technology constraints in their dependency relations vis-à-vis the 
Finance Ministry and other government entities. Capacity constraints in the DGA 
for example, resulted in the department having to outsource some of its legal work 
to external attorneys, including the preparation of cases, given a complement of 
only nineteen person in its legal department. 
 
Since the granting of autonomy, the heads of both these departments have 
focused on computerisation as a strategy for modernisation. The DGII has rolled 
out a number of computers and laptops across the organisation. Each department 
has implemented  programmes so that users of tax and customs services can 
conduct their activities through various web-based applications.  
 
The extent of computerisation within the DGA includes the availability of x-ray 
equipment, security cameras, probes for detecting human presence, mirrors for 
bomb detection, closed circuit system with seventeen cameras at the Santo 
Domingo airport with operations filmed 24 hours a day. Use is made of a 
sophisticated back-up system and fibre-optic technology. The implementation of a 
new risk profiling system has permitted the department to move from 100% 
checking to selectivity checks via use of risk profiling and risk analysis. This has 
permitted the elimination of three checking tables at the Santo Domingo Airport as 
staff is now re-deployed to various other units to perform functions involving back 
end verification. All equipment has been bought from the budget of the DGA. In 
2007, the department subscribed to a loan agreement with the Government of 
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South Korea to the amount $23m. for the automation of all Customs processes. 
The aim is for the creation of a paperless Customs with everything available 
electronically 24 hours per day. Repayment for the loan will also be from the 
departments own resources. Both organisations have been hailed as models in 
Latin America - institutions well advanced in term of their levels of modernisation.  
 
 
9.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter presented findings on factors conditioning the exercise of 
bureaucratic autonomy in the Dominican case. According to the studys findings, 
influences operated at all three levels of the environment, micro- meso- and 
macro-levels, albeit with different forces. Mirroring Table 8.6, Table 9.1 
summarises those influences as earlier elaborated.   
 
At the micro-level, the revenue organisations faced serious resource constraints 
prior to reform. Post reform, legal autonomy to borrow and to incur debt, along 
with financial management autonomy to procure goods and services resulted in a 
marked reduction in resource constraints. Less human intervention in transaction 
processing as a result of the more automated work environment released 
manpower which was deployed to other critical areas. A heavy focus on strategic 
planning and strategic management, as well as emphasis on capacity building in 
these and other areas all provided room for greater internal organisational 
capacity. 
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Level of 
Environment 
Influences / Factors 
Conditioning Autonomy 
Dimension of Autonomy Affected Nature 
of Affect 
√ / x 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest Group Participation 
 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 
 Structural autonomy 
 
 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
 
 
 Financial Autonomy  
    (Customs Department) 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Institutionalisation of the practice of 
information sharing and involvement of 
stakeholders in decision making process. 
Also the absence of organised labour.  
 
Additional lines of reporting to the IMF 
(achievement of fiscal revenue targets) 
 
Reporting to multiple principals. Donor 
conditionalities and the resulting 
reprogramming of national pririties having 
implications for bureaucratic functioning 
 
Reduction in level of financial dependence 
on MoF due to substitutability of resources 
provided by interest group to further its 
interest (Container Support Initiative). 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal/Administrative Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 HRM autonomy 
 Financial autonomy 
 Financial management  
      autonomy  
 
 Interventional Autonomy 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
√ 
 
Despite amendments to revenue laws 
providing for better enforced compliance, 
policy autonomy still fettered, e.g., as a 
result of inability to access 3rd party 
information and act on such information. 
 
Revenue laws, public administration laws, 
as well as supranational legislation placing 
local institutions such as the judiciary and 
various central bodies, as well as 
international bodies such as the WTO in 
power positions. 
Post-reform scaling back on the degree of 
ex-ante and ex-post monitoring and 
oversight by central institutions. 
  
 
 
Legal Tradition 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
x 
 
 
 
√ 
Detailed style of drafting legislation 
providing limited elbow room to interpret 
policy and to implement regulations 
pursuant to legislation. 
Witnessing of some movement towards 
purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation resulting in less challenges 
by the courts to administrative decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
System of Government 
 Interventional autonomy  
 
 Policy autonomy  
 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
 
 Policy autonomy 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
 
x  
 
 
x 
Post reform (PLD administration) scaling 
back in levels of politicisation of top level 
appointments. 
Greater degree of independence by 
bureaucrats to execute tax policy due to 
less politicisation. 
High levels of intervention in administrative 
decision-making by the judiciary, including 
reversal of decisions. 
Inability to effectively implement strategies 
and programmes to ensure compliance 
with tax obligations. 
 
 
Technical 
Environment 
Relations with Central 
Government and other 
Government Institutions 
 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
x 
Most threat to autonomy as a resul of 
military interference. Undermining of the 
Revenue to implement at will enforcement 
strategies. 
Capacity of the Centre and of 
other Government Institutions 
 HRM Autonomy 
 Interventional autonomy 
 
 
√ 
√ 
 
 
Limited capacity for monitoring and 
evaluation by entities charged e.g. with 
oversight of HRM functions. Enlarged 
scope to make decisions free of external 
input.  
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Organisational 
Environment 
 
Internal Structures and Systems 
 
 Policy autonomy 
 
 
 
√ 
 
 
New organic structures and the application 
of planning and monitoring systems better 
positioned the revenue agencies to be 
more responsive administrations 
 
 
 
Resource Availability 
 HRM autonomy 
 
 Policy Autonomy 
√ 
 
 
 
√ 
Post reform enhanced physical resource 
availability freeing up human resources to 
deploy to more critical areas and areas 
suffering manpower shortages 
Increased organisational capacity with 
which to implement policies and 
programmes. 
 
 
Table 9.1: Summary of Influences on the Practice of Autonomy at the 3 levels of Environment 
 
At the task network meso level of bureaucratic functioning, both organisations 
were able to boast vertical and horizontal support linkages with the parent 
Finance Ministry and a number of other government departments. Other 
flexibilities, for example freedom from encroachment on delegated human 
resources management autonomy, were afforded as a result of the general lack of 
capacity of some central institutions and other departments with which the focal 
organisations interfaced.  Constraints at this technical environment level stemmed 
primarily from difficulties in accessing vital taxpayer information from third parties 
for use in making informed decisions on the most efficient and effective means to 
implement tax policy, as well as from strained relations with the military, as in the 
case of the DGA.  
 
At the broader institutional level, whilst enhanced room for manoeuvre resulted 
from opportunities presented through the absence of organised labour within the 
revenue agencies, and from the latitude granted by the Presidency to grow staff 
professionally, a number of constraints fettered the practice of interventional, 
structural, financial and policy autonomy. The strict conditionalities attached to the 
DRs 2005 Standby Agreement with the IMF led to the subsequent inclusion of the 
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Fund amongst the list of multiple principals to whom the Revenue was required to 
report on a frequent basis. Revised governance arrangements were to impact on 
the organisations structural, interventional and policy autonomy with respect to 
involvement in the setting of quantitative revenue targets. Other governance 
arrangements which mandated the recognition of external supranational 
legislation on trade and commerce in supersession of national laws also posed a 
threat to bureaucratic decision making. Freedoms of the DGA to devise its own 
ways and means of safeguarding national revenues and protecting intellectual 
property rights were restricted on account of WTO rules on valuation and 
intellectual property rights (IPR).  
 
Equally constraining was the attitude and behaviour of the judiciary, as well as the 
administrative framework within which the organisations operate. The Revenues 
assessment of the timeliness, logic and legality of judicial rulings resulted in a 
characterisation of the behaviour of the judiciary as nothing short of adversarial. 
Repeated resort to use of punishments that made a mockery of the judicial 
system seriously and negatively impacted on interventional and policy autonomy. 
Prior to tax administrative reforms, revenue operations were performed under a 
plethora of central rules and guidelines, with a number of central institutions 
monitoring and overseeing financial and non-financial transactions both before 
and after their performance. The organisations found it difficult to break free from 
a majority of these constraints. Formal release of a number of constraints post 
reform gave true meaning to the concept of bureaucratic functioning at arms 
length of central government controls. Research findings showed that relative to 
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the other levels of environment, the institutional environment of tax administration 
played a more critical role in terms of opportunities for action and threats to the 
practice of administrative discretion. 
 
In the following final chapter, a more detailed comparative analysis of the two 
cases is undertaken. Guided by the frameworks devised and applied throughout 
the study, answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the study are 
afforded more detailed responses.  
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CHAPTER 10 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis now turns to a detailed comparative analysis of research findings on 
the matters investigated in the two case studies. Discussion continues to be 
guided by the framing of the research questions as well as the studys theoretical 
frameworks. Following the comparative analysis and just before the study finally 
concludes, a few thoughts are presented on potential areas for future empirical 
work. 
 
10.2 RATIONALE  UNDERLYING FISCAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
 
The value proposition or raison dêtre for fiscal administrative (tax and customs) 
reforms vary extensively across jurisdictions, with institutional and political factors 
helping to explain the differing trajectories or paths chosen for implementation. 
Comparing the two cases, there existed a number of similarities and differences 
surrounding the reasons for reform.  
 
Both countries were faced with an inefficient and unworkable system of tax 
administration that neither coped adequately with changing macro-economic 
circumstances nor yielded adequate revenues, thus warranting the need for a 
prompt reversal of the situation. Jamaicas TaxARP programme unfolded against 
a backdrop of macro-economic problems, sustained poor revenue performance, 
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poor levels of voluntary compliance and a limited capacity for tax collection. 
Likewise in the DR, economic liberalisation and the giving way of the traditional 
gatekeeper role of Customs to the concept of trade facilitation demanded drastic 
changes in the conduct of business with regard to international trade and 
domestic resource mobilisation.  
 
Faced with an equal urgent need for change, the cases however differed in their 
foci of attention. In Jamaica, the combined quest for improved efficiency, 
effectiveness and to some extent reduced levels of corruption (in the case of the 
Customs department) was aimed at reducing the amount of duplication of effort 
within the tax system; enhancing integration to increase the capacity of the tax 
administration for compliance enforcement; and most importantly, improving 
overall revenue yield. Unlike Jamaica, it was efficiency which stood at the 
forefront of thinking of the Dominican authorities. Immersed in a process of 
commercial integration and market liberalisation and faced with the changing 
demands of a more open economy, important reforms were needed that would spur 
investment and facilitate business activities with major trading partners. Foreseen 
loss of revenues from international trade raised the profile of domestic resource 
mobilisation and by extension the requirement for increased efficiency and 
effectiveness in the administration of domestic taxes. For the DR, therefore change 
was about being more responsive to customer needs and the ability to be flexible to 
devise products and services that would result in improved service delivery. Findings 
on the reasons for change are therefore consistent with the rationale espoused by the 
New Public Management approach to reform, namely improved service delivery as 
well as improved performance through increased efficiency and effectiveness.  
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Notwithstanding the why of reforms, also at issue was the how, i.e. the manner of 
implementation. In both cases, choices were largely intuitive, based mostly on the 
advice of external experts - best practices as espoused by international donors 
(the World Bank in the case of Jamaica, and the IMF in the case of the DR) - 
rather than on a cost-benefit analysis or formal assessment of whether the 
performance gains being sought could have been achieved through reforms along 
others lines at variant with the NPM approach.  
 
Institutional choice needs to be examined not only in light of macroeconomic 
issues but also within the context of the political environment and the extent to 
which entities in the international and local political arena were able to influence 
reform decisions. Jamaica was able to escape donor pressures due to the GoJs 
relative strong control over the internal management of its affairs relative to its 
dependency relation with donors during the 1970s and 1980s. Reform was 
therefore the product not of foreign ideas as such, but of the pragmatic application 
of such ideas. It was the result of Jamaicans thinking about their own problems 
and their selection of what they deemed to be a judicious balancing of theoretical 
desirability and practical feasibility. Unlike her neighbouring sister, the DRs 
inability to escape such donor pressures stemmed from the countrys historical 
weak position of power and strong dependency relation vis-à-vis the IMF which 
limited freedom of choice in terms of reform options. 
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10.3    NATURE AND EXTENT OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY IN PRACTICE 
 
 
Table 10.1 is a comparative analysis of the relative degrees of formal and informal 
autonomy granted to and exercised by the four focal organisations within the two 
cases, as separately presented in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
 
 
DIMENSIONS 
OF 
AUTONOMY 
 
 
 
MEASUREMENT 
 
JAMAICA 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
PRE-
REFORM 
Y/N 
POST-
REFORM 
Y/N 
PRE-
REFORM 
Y/N 
POST-
REFORM 
Y/N 
CD IRD CD IRD DGA DGII DGA DGII 
 
LEGAL 
Established by specific law? - - √ √ - - √ √ 
Separate legal status? x x x x x x √ √ 
Own patrimony? x x x x x x √ √ 
STRUCTURAL Board of Directors Model? √ √ x x x x √ √ 
POLICY Ability to select policy instruments and (sub-)processes 
for achievement of fiscal objectives? 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
FINANCIAL Funding as a % of collection? x x x x x x √ √ 
Automatic release of funds? x x x x x x √ √ 
Ability to extend funding? x 
x 
x √  x 
x 
√  √ 
x 
 √ √ 
x FINANCIAL  
MANAGEMENT 
Budget flexibility? x x x x x x √ √ 
Authority to procure goods and services? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Ability to manage/dispose of assets? x 
x 
x x 
xx 
x √ √ √ √ 
 
STRATEGIC  
HRM 
Authority to set levels of remuneration? 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
x 
 
x 
 
√ √ √ √ 
Ability to determine policy on: recruitment, promotion, 
performance management? 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
 
 
OPERATIONAL 
HRM 
Ability to recruit and select staff? x x √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Authority to pay salaries? x x x x √ √ √ √ 
Ability to appraise individual performance? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Authority to build capacity through training and 
development? 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Ability to discipline staff? x x √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Authority to terminate employment? x x √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
 
INTERVEN-
TIONAL 
Ability to influence setting of performance standards 
(quantitative revenue targets)? 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Performance monitoring and measurement by external 
principal? 
 
√ 
 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Application of sanctions for non-performance? x x x x x x x x 
Performance subject to internal and external audit? √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
 
Table 10.1: Comparative Analysis of Relative Autonomy of the Revenue Administrations in 
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic 
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Figure 10.1 is a graphic representation of the same information. Despite the 
qualitative nature of the study, an attempt was made to come up with a statistical 
figure, on a scale of 0-10, which would provide some indication of the extent of 
autonomy practiced along the various dimensions. This representation is 
therefore only indicative. 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Comparing the Relative Autonomy of the Revenue Administrations 
in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic  A Graphic Illustration 
 
The governments of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic took decisions, in 1999 
and 2006 respectively, to undertake administrative reforms of their revenue 
agencies. Use was made of totally different institutional forms for the achievement 
of fiscal goals and objectives. In Jamaica, revenue agencies, including the two 
focal organisations, were all brought together under one roof similar to the type of 
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structural arrangement for the typical semi-autonomous revenue authority. 
Because of the umbrella-type configuration, the Jamaica Tax administration is 
therefore often described as a semi-autonomous institution. However, when 
examining its legal status the entity was never far removed pre- or post-reform 
from the centre of government. The Inland Revenue Department (IRD) and the 
Customs Department (CD) had no formal legal basis outside its parent Finance 
Ministry of Finance. This situation paled in comparison to the Dominican case. 
Formal arms length distancing of the Internal Taxes Department (DGII) and the 
Customs Department (DGA) from the centre through the passage of legislation 
granting formal autonomy along five different fronts, including the ability to be 
sued in their own right and to dispose of assets, was in stark contrast to pre-
reform legal ties to the centre. 
 
Structurally, in the Jamaican model, instead of the new governance arrangements 
distancing the Revenue from the centre, lack of meaningful authority to the 
Director General  (DG) and lack of empowerment of the Office of the DG resulted 
in maintenance of the status quo as far as authority and accountability in matters 
involving revenue administration. In the Dominican case, post-reform governance 
arrangements replaced the originally conceptualised fully empowered internal 
Board of Directors with an internal advisory Council reporting to an external 
Higher Council of Tax Administration, albeit still allowing for a large degree of 
structural autonomy from the Finance Ministry. Arms length distancing of the 
revenue agencies might have been the result of the confidence which 
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policymakers placed in these institutions to implement tax policy without threats to 
authority or political accountability. 
Regarding financial autonomy, the sole source of income prior to reform, in both 
cases, was through government appropriations. Only the Customs departments 
were in a position to extend funding via the charging of user fees. Cost cutting 
continued to be a major issue, with established budgetary ceilings and reductions 
being made in the run-up to final approved allocations. Lack of necessary funds 
resulted in cutbacks in spending, as well as modifications to the scope and timing 
of commencement of various programmes. Post-reform, the situation remained 
largely unaltered for the Jamaican agencies. In the DR, however, steady 
automatic income derived from a percentage of collection funding and the 
concomitant reduction in financial resource dependency not only facilitated a 
marked turnaround in resource availability, the DGII and DGA used their 
financially autonomous status to undertake various programmes and strategies to 
efficiently and effectively implement tax policy.  
 
Focusing on policy autonomy, this was one area where the Revenue, in both 
countries, exercised a large amount of informal freedoms. Whilst in Jamaica, 
however, autonomy along this dimension was never formalised, in the DR, the 
2006 autonomy laws codified the previous informal arrangements. Analysing the 
reason for the granting of such informal discretion, this author posits the case of 
agency theory and informational asymmetry. Regarding technical customs issues 
of trade facilitation, risk profiling and risk management, intelligence analysis, and 
enforcement, bureaucrats are moiré likely to know more than elected officials and 
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policymakers about what needs to be done and how to do it. Even if the latter do 
not explicitly delegate such authority, bureaucrats greater information, theoretical 
understanding and operating expertise may give them greater scope for 
independent action.  
 
Regarding financial management autonomy, the four revenue agencies, pre-
reform, were subject to a rigid set of controls. A high degree of formalism existed, 
with a number of central organisations providing ex ante and ex post controls. A 
large number of centralised rules and regulations also governed the spending of 
government funds. In Jamaica, flexibilities in the procurement of goods and 
services were utilised moreso by the Customs than the Inland Revenue 
Department. In the case of the DR, heavy centralised controls on financial 
expenditure were to a large extent relinquished post-2006, with the granting of 
financial management autonomy. The ability to pay at will for goods and services 
without the need for checks by and clearances from various central institutions 
seemed critical to goal achievement. 
 
In the area of human resources management, the two cases differed in the 
amount of formally delegated freedoms and the practice of administrative 
discretion. In Jamaica, whilst the formal delegation in 2002 of certain HR functions 
afforded the Revenue a number of flexibilities with respect to operational HRM, 
the strategic management of HR still continued to be the sole preserve of central 
government institutions. Whilst good use was made of operational HR freedoms 
to recruit and select staff, to develop internal capacity, and to devise and 
implement performance management systems, the lack of ability to devise an 
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appropriate job classification system, to create posts and to determine pay levels 
seriously crippled the achievement of strategic HRM objectives.  
Research findings showed, however, the ability of both Jamaican institutions to 
break free of some their constraints. The agencies engaged in informal (and 
sometimes illegal) behaviours such as exceeding establishment levels, borrowing 
posts from one area to use in another area in the organisations, as well as paying 
honoraria to boost the salaries of lower paid staff.  
 
Contrary to their Jamaican counterparts, revenue agencies in the DR exercised a 
high level of factual, albeit informal strategic and operational HRM prior to reform. 
Autonomisation only served to formalise previously existing informal 
arrangements. HRM autonomy led to a number of positive outcomes such as 
sustained near optimal manpower levels as a result of the timely recruitment of 
personnel, as well as higher levels of staff retention in a number of competitive 
positions due to pay rates near comparable to private sector market rates. 
 
Focusing on interventional autonomy, the tax and customs agencies in both 
jurisdictions were subjected pre-reforms to a great deal of reporting requirements, 
as well as internal and external audits of their performance along both quantitative 
and qualitative measures. Whilst this situation continued post-reform in the 
Jamaican case, the Dominican revenue agencies witnessed a relaxing of such 
controls post-reforms. Front end checking and re-checking would now move back 
end monitoring and supervision by fewer central institutions. 
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Having analysed and compared the nature and extent of autonomy as practiced 
both within and across the two cases, study findings also permitted a response to 
the question of the relative importance of the various autonomy dimensions. 
Evidence pointed to financial, financial management and human resources 
management autonomy being the linchpins to successful reforms. Where 
freedoms in these areas were in short supply, the organisations were pitted in 
strong dependency relationships with relatively weak positions of power vis-à-vis 
central institutions, given the lack of alternate sources for substitution of critical 
resource needs. Such freedoms, when in existence, permitted the organisations 
to forge ahead, unimpeded with their plans and programmes, given the availability 
income, personnel and authority over expenditure. 
 
Despite the explicit rationale provided and the results sought, one can safely 
argue that tax and customs administrative reform in Jamaica went totally against 
the grain of New Public Management (NPM) dictates of transformational change 
through the creation of decentralised, autonomous bodies unencumbered by 
imposed central constraints. Limited attempts at true liberation of managers from 
the pre-reform rules-based, process driven style of bureaucracy, leads one to 
fairly conclude that what transpired in Jamaica in terms of decentralisation of 
revenue administration and the modicum of freedoms granted to the Revenue 
was in essence a mere tinkering with the idea of reform along NPM lines. Tax 
administrative reform in the DR, on the other hand, can be described as 
substantial in the sense of the discretionary space granted for the efficient and 
effective implementation of tax policy. Reforms, albeit brought about and 
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monitored under fairly extreme pressures, were to represent a sharp break with 
the past situation. 
 
10.4    INFLUENCES ON THE PRACTICE OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 
 
Examination of influences on the practice of autonomy reveals a complex mixture 
of constraints and opportunities for action at all three levels of environment, as 
identified in the studys theoretical framework. Table 10.2 presents a comparative 
analysis of the two cases.  
 
 
FACTORS CONDITIONING THE PRACTICE OF 
AUTONOMY 
 
 
MEASURE 
 
 
JAMAICA 
 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MACRO-
INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
INTEREST GROUP 
PARTICIPATION 
External pressure brought to bear on 
administrative functioning? 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
 
LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
Adequate enforcement powers in revenue laws 
for effective enforcement? 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
Conflicting provisions in domestic non-tax 
legislation? 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Continued application of central laws and 
guidelines? 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
LEGAL TRADITION 
 
Legislation drafted in detailed specific manner? 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Strict literal approach to statutory interpretation? 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
Supportive Executive? 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High level of politicization of the bureaucracy? 
 
Low/Medium 
 
Medium 
 
Supportive Judiciary? Low (RM) High (RC) 
 
Low 
 
Judiciary knowledgeable in tax matters? Low (RM) High (RC) 
 
Medium 
 
Existence of special revenue/tax court? 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
 
MESO TASK 
NETWORK 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
ATITUDES OF CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT & OTHER 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
Level of support for the revenue departments 
(Central government and other institutions) 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
 
CAPACITY OF CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT & OTHER 
INSTITUTIONS 
Level of capacity of central government and other 
institutions (monitoring and oversight of the 
revenue  agencies) 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
 
MICRO INTERNAL 
ORGANISATIONAL 
NETWORK 
 
 
INTERNAL STRUCTURES & 
SYSTEMS 
 
Appropriateness of  structure for policy 
implementation 
 
Low 
 
High 
Existence of proper Planning and Management 
Information, Financial Management Systems 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
CONTROL OVER 
RESOURCES 
 
Degree of control over resources? 
 
Low 
 
High 
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Table 10.2: Comparative Analysis of Factors Conditioning the Practice of Autonomy  
in the Revenue Administrations 
 
Figure 10.2 is a graphic illustration of the findings. 
 
 
Figure 10.2: Comparing Influences on the Practice of Autonomy in the Revenue Administrations 
in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic  A Graphic Illustration 
 
 
A discussion now ensues under the three respective headings. 
 
 10.4.1 INFLUENCES AT THE ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEVEL 
 
Factors in the internal organisational environment of the revenue administrations 
served, in both cases, to condition the exercise of bureaucratic autonomy.  Prior 
to reforms, the organic structures which existed offered little of the flexibilities 
needed for the operation of responsive institutions. In the case of the DR, 
reformed structures and governance arrangements resulted in the establishment 
of institutions better poised to deal with 21st century challenges facing tax and 
customs administrations. 
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Pre-reform, all four agencies struggled to grapple with the institutionalisation of 
concepts such as strategic planning, the introduction and implementation of 
strategic plans, as well as the introduction of management information systems. 
Lack of capacity for planning within Jamaican institutions resulted in their inability 
to gather information to be used as the basis for informed decision-making on 
compliance and enforcement issues and the devising of strategies to address 
such issues. The Dominican administrations countered its lack of capacity in 
these areas by engaging the services of external consultants to develop the 
necessary structures and systems that would aid in autonomous decision-making. 
 
Internally, resource dependency on other government entities due to a lack of 
financial and financial management autonomy proved a major issue for all four 
agencies. The Revenue lacked the necessary financial, human resource and 
physical resources with which to effectively execute programmes. With the 2006 
autonomisation of the DR revenue agencies, financial autonomy provided the 
opportunity for the timely procurement of goods and services, and the timely 
recruitment of the right personnel to fill critical roles. 
 
Constraints within the internal organisational environment impacted in a large way 
on the overall capacity of the organisations to achieve performance goals and 
objectives.  Whilst in Jamaica, the Revenue continued to suffer from heavy 
resource dependency, post 2006, the overall capacity of the two DR agencies for 
revenue administration was strengthened due to more readily available resources, 
a more appropriate organic structure and the application of planning and 
management systems. In both cases, it must be noted the efforts made at building 
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capacity through networking and the drawing on regional and international 
institutions in the tax and customs arena to access technical and financial 
assistance. 
 
 10.4.2 INFLUENCES AT THE TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT LEVEL 
 
The task network or technical environment within which the revenue agencies 
operated moreso supported discretionary behaviours than constrained action. In 
both cases, the parent Ministries of Finance generally made no attempts at 
micromanagement through interferences in operational decision making. In the 
Jamaican case, however, there was evidence on more than one occasion of the 
Ministrys intervention in programme implementation when it appeared the need 
for a more firm steering towards meeting quantitative revenue collection targets. 
 
Understanding and appreciation of interdependencies resulted in a high level of 
collaboration between the revenue agencies and the institutions with which they 
were required to interface on an ongoing basis. In Jamaica, threats to policy and 
interventional autonomy at the technical environment level filtered down from 
constraints imposed by the administrative framework and the central rules and 
guidelines that existed in the broader institutional environment. Where, for 
example, government agencies were required to collect user fees or were 
constrained by rules regarding access to and the manner of provision information, 
organisations worked with the Revenue to find ways to circumvent such 
constraints. 
 
  
354 
 
In the DR, it was the Customs mostly whose autonomy was seriously undermined 
at the border by military personnel. The pervasiveness of tradition and the 
Dominican culture of military dominance was therefore evident in this respect. 
Ways and means were actively being sought to establish and clarify jurisdictional 
lines of authority and accountabilities at these strategic border points. 
 
In both cases, the capacity constraints of a number of central agencies charged 
with monitoring and oversight provided opportunities for independent action. Key 
support and control agencies lacked the technical knowledge, personnel, and/or 
available time, and in so doing positively impacted on bureaucratic functioning by 
permitting greater interventional autonomy to proceed unimpeded with the task of 
policy implementation. 
 
 10.4.3 INFLUENCES AT THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT LEVEL 
 
In both case studies, a number of factors at the broader macro-institutional level 
served to influence the actual practice of autonomy. With respect to interest group 
participation, the Jamaican organisations were sturdily planted within an 
environment of strong organized interests yet were able to gain useful allies, for 
example with the public sector unions. Real pressures and threats to already 
limited financial management autonomy and operational human resources 
management autonomy came as a result of the corporatist arrangement between 
the GoJ and the union to broad macro-economic problems. The governments 
relative measure of autonomy from international donor agencies and its resulting 
ability to exercise a great deal of control over the management of its economic 
affairs facilitated the eventual move away from top down imposition of quantitative 
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revenue collection targets to consultations with the tax and customs 
administrations during the target setting process. 
 
In the DR, the non-existence of organised labour within the two revenue 
departments, coupled with a spirit and an institutionalised practice of ongoing 
consultations with stakeholders resulted in limited threats to interventional and 
HRM autonomy. It was the DRs subordination to an external interest that 
constituted a powerful force in its internal politics which placed serious constraints 
on bureaucratic functioning. External pressures and the indelible mark left on tax 
administration by the IMF was clearly visible in its impact on lower level internal 
operational decision making on key issues of structural organisation, the 
identification of tax collection priorities, and the establishment of quantitative 
revenue targets.  
 
Both cases suffered a similar fate with respect to the influence of the 
legal/administrative framework on the practice of autonomy, though the DRs 
reform of its administrative framework provided bureaucrats with a lot more elbow 
room for manoeuvre in key areas such as financial management.  
 
In both cases, tax legislation provided bureaucrats with a fair degree of flexibilities 
for the exercise of policy autonomy. Particularly in the case of Jamaica, conditions 
set by the World Bank donor resulted in particular attention being paid to the issue 
of modifications to the legal framework and laws surrounding tax administration 
during the design phase of TaxARP. It was moreso non-tax laws relating to 
access to third-party information which impacted on the structural and 
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interventional autonomy of bureaucrats in both jurisdictions, and which created a 
certain measure of dependency on external institutions to assist in building 
profiles of taxpayers. 
 
Over and above constraints imposed by non-tax laws are the conditioning effects 
that result from supranational laws superimposed on top of national legislation. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO), as an independent rule-setting 
organisation on trade-related matters, has played an important role in Customs 
administration, particularly in the two cases, in generating institutional paths that 
have altered the local rules of the game. Forced to abide by WTO rules on trade 
facilitation and standards relating to the free flow of goods throughout the supply 
chain, the customs departments in Jamaica and the DR were hamstrung in 
making their own determinations in the clearance of suspect under-valued goods. 
 
Turning to the administrative framework, this is one area where the Revenue 
faced serious constraints that impacted on several dimensions of autonomous 
working. In Jamaica, both pre- and post reform, a high degree of formalism 
resulting from a complex overlay of centralised structures and rules characterised 
bureaucratic functioning. Constraints resulting from central rules and guidelines 
impacted on the exercise of policy, financial management, human resources 
management, and interventional autonomy. It was a method of steering which 
carried over, to a large degree, beyond TaxARP reforms.  
 
Likewise, to some extent, the situation with the Dominican revenue agencies. 
Autonomy was fettered as a result of an apparent penchant for hyperformalism 
and the labyrinth complexity of rules and regulations, over and beyond those 
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which existed in the Jamaican case. Only after more wholehearted efforts at real 
delegation and the relinquishing of a number of pre-reform centralised controls did 
the DGII and the DGA gain some respite from such constraints. 
 
Looking at the type of pre-colonial administrative cultures that existed in both 
jurisdictions71, and examining findings on administrative frameworks existing at 
the time, it would be fair to argue, particularly in the Jamaican case, that 
administrative cultures and behaviours traceable to the colonial past have 
demonstrated great tenacity which have served to negatively impact on the 
practice of autonomy. Worth noting, however, is that despite such constraints, 
bureaucrats have sought and found ways and means of escaping the clutches or 
iron cage of central controls. Research finding therefore support the argument 
that bureaucracies are not passive recipients of pressures and constraints 
imposed by environmental factors but instead can exercise human agency in 
administrative functioning. 
 
Analysing the impact of legal tradition, findings in both cases resulted in a null 
hypothesis. Examination of the style of legal drafting within the two jurisdictions 
showed a penchant for fussy detailed legislation which allowed for certainty and 
predictability in tax and customs laws. The high level of detail clearly specifying 
administrative procedures to be followed by tax and customs officials, as well as 
taxpayers rights and responsibilities, leave little room for blanks to be filled in by 
bureaucrats. The rationale for detailed drafting might be a result of the specific 
policy area and the category of persons being regulated. The move in both 
                                                
71
 See Chapter 1 for the discussion on the administrative cultures of Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. 
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jurisdictions from the strict literal to a more purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation does not necessarily favour one party over the other. Whilst the 
findings in this study do not support the advanced hypothesis that different legal 
traditions are likely to impact differently on the ability fo the bureaucracy to 
exercise administrative discretion, caution must be exercised in the interpretation 
of such results. Findings may have unearthed what may be an indirect as 
opposed to direct relationship between traditionalism and autonomy, suggesting 
the need to explore, for example, the effect of intervening factors such as the 
policy sector or policy area. 
 
In terms of the differing impact of systems of government (presidential vs. 
parliamentary) on the practice of autonomy and the type of bureaucracies which 
these different regimes would wish to have in operation, study findings revealed 
that in both jurisdictions, the search was for professional bureaucracies staffed at 
the top by personnel recruited largely on the basis of merit. In the DR, whilst the 
absence of a fully functional Civil Service and Career Law resulted in a lack of 
control over employee job protection, the commitment of the Executive to 
reversing the traditional deleterious employment practice of use of the spoil 
system and politicisation of the civil service made way for the growth of a 
professional cadre of top leaders with a wealth of technical knowledge and 
expertise in tax and customs administration. 
 
Focusing on the judiciary and its potential impact on bureaucratic functioning, this 
arm of government exerted its own influences on bureaucratic functioning. In the 
DR, actions of the judiciary severely hamstrung bureaucrats in the exercise of 
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policy and interventional autonomy. The Revenue accused this institution of 
blatantly undermining its efforts at ensuring taxpayer compliance with revenue 
laws and its disregard for the centrality of value of tax administration in terms of its 
contribution to sustainable economic development. Whilst somewhat similar 
sentiments were felt by Jamaican counterparts in terms of the attitudes and 
behaviours of magistrates in the lower level Resident Magistrates Court, revenue 
agencies felt a greater sense of empowerment  based on their experiences in the 
higher level specialised Revenue Court where the capacity for adjudicating tax 
cases was higher and where judges possessed a great deal of knowledge and 
experience in tax matters as mandated for their recruitment under the 1972 
Judicature (Revenue Court) Act.   
 
Overall findings on influences on the practice of bureaucratic autonomy showed 
that administrative discretion was conditioned by a majority of factors posited at 
the three levels of environment. The study showed that notwithstanding the 
historical and cultural differences between the Hispanic and Anglophone cases, 
certain structural similarities led to some common functional realities. In both 
cases, findings support the hypothesis that factors within the broader macro-
institutional environment, more s than those within the immediate organisational 
or task network environment serve to condition levels of bureaucratic autonomy. 
 
Whilst the exercise of human agency to tap existing networks and to forge new 
partnerships helped to alleviate several constraints felt at the internal organisation 
and task network levels, the revenue agencies struggled in their attempts to break 
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free of the more formidable constraints faced within the institutional environment, 
in particular constraints imposed as a result of the legal/administrative framework. 
 
10.5  FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
By examining the cases of two seemingly distinct Caribbean countries, Jamaica 
and the Dominican Republic, the main goal of the study was to enhance 
understanding of the factors which serve to condition autonomy within tax 
bureaucracies. The restriction of this study to a small number of cases means that 
the results of the dual pair-wise comparison are more suggestive than definitive. 
Findings are also contextualised within the fiscal revenue administration setting 
where the fieldwork was conducted. In light of such, this author posits that future 
research directions could either aim towards increasing the application of current 
findings, or toward building on the results of the study. 
 
In the first instance, this small-n study could be viewed as the first preliminary 
stage of analysis; and statistical, quantitative analysis used as the second stage 
of research, whereby  the factors analysed here are tested in a large-n sample as 
appropriate. Other work could also make use of the studys theoretical framework 
to examine other factors conditioning the exercise of autonomy not explored here, 
such as leadership, organisational culture and the broader system of education. 
 
The research argues the greater relative importance of financial, financial 
management and human resources management autonomy to bureaucratic 
functioning. Future studies could seek to bear out and add weight to this finding 
since at this stage such result is by no means being offered as concrete evidence.  
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This research also suggests that the reluctance on the part of some policymakers 
and central authorities to delegate certain forms of autonomy was in large part 
due to the nature of the task being undertaken by the revenue agencies  
primarily that of revenue collection. Note however, that organisations are not 
monolithic structures that undertake one single function, but perform a range of 
sub-tasks for goal accomplishment. Revenue agencies engage in varied tasks 
such as revenue collection, trade facilitation, compliance and enforcement. Again 
building on this study, the revenue agency could be deconstructed according to 
its various functional areas as part of an empirical analysis which seeks to 
examine the influence of task-related variables, e.g. visibility, measurability and 
political salience on the exercise of bureaucratic discretion.  
 
10.6  CONCLUSION 
 
Autonomy and the importance of its acquisition have continued to be a vital issue 
within public administrative functioning. This thesis focused on the doctrine of 
autonomous bureaucratic functioning; questioning the nature and extent of 
autonomy, influences on the practice of administrative discretion, as well as the 
impact of legal tradition and system of government on discretionary decision 
making. The study involved a comparative analysis of conditions under which 
autonomy is likely to become a workable arrangement, or put differently, what 
needs to happen in order for the apparatus to working relatively smoothly, i.e. for 
results achieved to match quite well with results desired. 
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Case study findings showed that the achievement of flexible, autonomous 
bureaucracies must involve a number of actions by policymakers. This includes 
actions which need to be taken inside of the box, such as making it possible for 
changes to occur in organisational structuring, systems and processes, as well as 
organisational resource availability. Whilst these inside bureaucracy actions are 
imperative, they are only a small part of the   Actions also need to be taken 
outside of the box that includes, for example, a review of legislation and 
governance arrangements, changes to inefficient public sector-wide institutional 
arrangements, as well as developing the capacity of the judiciary to deal with 
revenue cases. 
 
One major observation from the comparative study is that one cannot easily infer 
from administrative reform programmes and formal structures to implementation 
and practice. The delicate equilibrium between bureaucratic autonomy and 
political control is no easy and straightforward feat to be accomplished. Particular 
challenges seem to be embedded in the autonomisation of revenue agencies 
which collects large sums of money which serve to finance public expenditure. 
The study showed that reality is far more complex than the reality of the 
practitioner model. 
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  APPENDIX IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Relationship between IRD Gross Collections and 
Central Government Tax Revenue (CGTR), 2000/01 - 2006/07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) IRD: Revenue Projections and Collections 
2001 - Nov. 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)  Customs Department: Revenue Projections and Collections                                                                      
2001 - Nov. 2008 
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APPENDIX V 
                  JAMAICA CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT  Organisational Chart 
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APPENDIX IX 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Main Revenue Collecting Agencies - Collections as a 
Percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) DGII - Revenue Projections and Collection 
2001-2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Revenue Projections and Collections 
2004-2006
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The Relationship Between Methods, Theoretical Perspectives, Paradigms and Criteria 
 
 
 
                             
 
                       
 
 
                              
                                          
 
 
               
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Devers, 1999: pp. 1164 
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APPENDIX XI 
MEASURING THE ORGANISATIONS LEVEL OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE 
This questionnaire uses different dimensions to arrive at a measure of organisational autonomy.  For each of the dimensions in the 
following table, select the situation which best describes the organisations previous method of operation as well as what now obtains. 
Guidelines for completing this Section: 
(1) Section A: Managerial Autonomy refers to the organisations ability to make decisions regarding the choice and use of inputs 
and resources. It encompasses both human resources management and financial management. 
 
(2) Section B: Policy Autonomy does not refer to the design and development of tax policy or changes to tax policy itself. It is 
restricted to the sub-processes and procedures chosen to effect externally prescribed outcomes, the choice of policy 
instruments to implement externally set policy, the quantity and quality of services produced - i.e how policy will be 
implemented.  
 
 
Degree of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
Measure/Indicator 
For each Section,  tick one 
box only in each of the two 
columns 
 
 
 
Minimum Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
Low Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
High Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Maximum level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
A.  Legal Autonomy: 
 
 
 
i) The organisation is a part of central government without its own status. 
 
 
ii) The organisation has a separate status within central government (e.g 
based on a Delegation Act) but has no own legal personality different 
from that of central government. 
 
iii) The organisation has a legal personality under public law and is created 
by a parliamentary act. 
 
iv) The organisation has a legal personality under private law. 
 
 
 
 
 
Before              Now 
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Degree of 
Autonomy/Independence Measure/Indicator 
For each Section,  tick one 
box only in each of the two 
columns 
 
 
Minimum Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Low Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
 
High Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Maximum level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
B. Structural Autonomy: 
 
i) The head of the organisation is appointed and evaluated by central 
government. He/she is directly accountable to central government. There is 
no advisory or supervisory body involved. 
 
ii) The head of the organisation is appointed by central government. He/she is 
accountable to central government and to a supervisory board in which the 
majority of the members is representing central government. The 
representatives of government on the supervisory board could be resigned 
at any time. 
 
iii)   The head of the organisation is appointed and evaluated by the supervisory 
board in which the representatives of government have a majority vote. 
These representatives could be resigned by government at any time. 
iv) The head of the organisation is appointed by the supervisory board in which 
the representatives of third parties have a majority vote. 
 
 
Before              Now 
 
 
 
Minimum Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Low Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
High Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Maximum level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
C.  Financial Autonomy: 
 
i) The organisation is fully funded by central government, does not have to 
cover deficits itself and has no ability to extend its funding by e.g charge of 
user fees or loans on the capital market. 
 
ii) The organisation is financed primarily through central government, but a 
minor part of funding stems from budget allocation of, for example, user fees 
or loans. The organisation has to cover only a minor extent of deficits itself. 
 
iii) The organisation is financed primarily through income from sources other 
than central government (e.g tariffs, user fees, profits), but a minor part of 
funding stems from central government. The organisation has to cover a 
major extent of deficits itself. 
 
iv) The organisation is financed exclusively through income from sources other 
than central government (e.g tariffs, user fees, profits). The organisation has 
to cover all deficits itself. 
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Degree of 
Autonomy/Independence Measure/Indicator 
For each Section,  tick one 
box only in each of the two 
columns 
 
 
 
 
Minimum Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Low Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
High Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Maximum level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
D.  Policy Autonomy (sub-processes, procedures, choice of policy instruments): 
 
i) The decision concerning the structure and content of the primary production 
process, policy instruments and outputs, objectives and effects are taken by 
central government without prior advice of the organisation. The organisation 
may not decide on individual applications of general rules and has no 
authorisation to set general rules. 
 
ii) The organisation may take decisions concerning the structure and content of 
the production processes within the lines of the policy instruments, output 
norms, objectives and effect norms set by central government. 
 
iii) The organisation may decide upon which policy instruments to use and 
outputs norms within the objectives and effects norms set by government. 
The head of the organisation may decide him/herself on individual 
applications of general regulations. 
 
iv) The organisation may itself decide upon all aspects of policy like objectives, 
policy instruments to use and processes. The organisation is authorised to 
issue general regulations. 
 
Before              Now 
 
 
 
Degree of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Minimum Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
Low Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
High Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
Maximum level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
E.  Managerial Autonomy (financial management and human resources         
management): 
 
i) The decisions concerning managerial actions are taken externally by central 
government without prior consultation with the organisation. 
 
ii) The organisation may take managerial decisions (e.g concerning financial 
transactions) within strict procedures set by central government.  
 
iii) The organisation may itself set the procedures concerning the use of inputs 
within general principles set by central government. 
 
iv) The organisation may itself decide upon all aspects of management, like the 
general principle, the procedures and the transactions. 
. 
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Degree of 
Autonomy/Independence Measure/Indicator 
For each Section,  tick one 
box only in each of the two 
columns  
 
 
 
 
 
Minimum Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
Low Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
 
High Level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
 
 
 
Maximum level of 
Autonomy/Independence 
 
F.  Interventional Autonomy: 
 
 
i) The operations of the organisation are supervised directly by the central 
government against strict norms. Deviations may or may not result in severe 
sanctions and immediate intervention by the central government. 
 
ii) The organisation has rather extensive reporting requirements on a quite 
detailed level against explicit norms. Deviations may or may not result in 
substantial sanctions and possible intervention by central government. 
 
iii) The organisation has only limited reporting requirements on a general level 
to central government and is only ad hoc subjected to evaluation or audits 
commissioned by central government. The norms as basis for evaluation 
and auditing are neither explicit nor strict. Sanctions and interventions are 
only possible after consultation of the organisation and there is only a limited 
threat of sanctions or intervention by central government. Sanctions are 
rather soft. 
 
iv) The organisation has no reporting requirements to central government and is 
not subjected to evaluation or audits commissioned by central government. 
There is no threat of sanctions or intervention by central government. 
 
Before              Now 
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SECTION 2: MORE INDEPTH DATA GATHERING ON LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 
 
This section seeks to gain more indepth information against one (1) of the dimensions 
of autonomy measured above (interventional autonomy). The information will assist in 
measuring reporting and accountability controls. 
 
 
INTERVENTIONAL  AUTONOMY 
 
 
1.  What are the formal obligations of the organisation vis-à-vis central government, 
(i.e what type of formal documentation is the organisation required to submit, 
e.g Annual Reports, Half-yearly Reports, Appropriation Accounts, Revenue 
Accounts, Arrears of Revenue, Reports on Revenue Loss etc.)? 
 
  Document Type  Frequency of Submission 
 
i.  
ii.  
iii.  
iv.  
v.  
vi.  
 
 
 
2.   Was/Will the performance of the organisation (be) subjected to ex-post audit?
          
 Before Now 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
 
 
3.   By whom is the organisation audited? 
 
  Name(s) of Agency/Agencies: _______________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4.   On what criteria was performance evaluated? 
 
List of Criteria:  ___________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
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5.   On what criteria will the performance of the new semi-autonomous entity be 
evaluated? 
 
List of Criteria:  ___________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE. 
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APPENDIX XII 
 
INFLUENCES ON AUTONOMY: MASTER INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE    
                                                                                             
 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
 
A.   ABOUT THE INTERVIEWEE 
 
1.   Name ....................................................... 
2.   Position.................................................... 
3.   Length of Time in your Current Position 
4.   Length of Time as a member of the Organisation ......................... 
 
 
RATIONALE BEHIND THE REFORM OF TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
B.   RATIONALE FOR THE GRANTING OF AUTONOMY 
 
(1).  What was/were the main reason(s) for the reform of tax administration? 
     Probes: 
 The need for a catalyst to launch broader revenue administration reform (e.g modernised    
                  operations, improved automation, integrated and function-based structures);  
 Low effectiveness of tax administration and poor levels of compliance; 
 Impediments caused by central civil service rules and regulation (financing, recruitment,      
     promotion, discipline, training); 
 Poor communication and data interchange among existing revenue departments (e.g income     
 tax, customs, value added tax); 
 High levels of corruption; 
 The desire to create within the public service an island of excellence which could later serve 
as a benchmark for others undertaking reform; 
 Other reason(s). 
 
(2) Was there any formal assessment of costs and benefits, e.g. to determine if reforms could more 
efficiently be undertaken within current existing arrangements? 
 
 
ADDITIONAL MEASURE OF AUTONOMY  
 
C.   LEGAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
(1)  How is the organisation constituted within the overall organisational structure of government? 
           Probes: 
 As a department under the Ministry of Finance; 
 As a semi-autonomous body. 
 (2)  Does the organisation have its own separate legal character? Is it able to own assets and create 
liabilities to be used, for example, for the improvement of its capital and infrastructure needs?  
 
 
D.   GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK (INCLUDING INFORMALITIES) 
 
          Steering Arrangements 
 
(1)   What is the role of the head of the organisation vis-à-vis the Minister of Finance as well as vis-à-vis 
the Financial Secretary/Permanent Secretary? 
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 Reporting Relationships and Accountability Mechanisms 
 
 
(2)  How does the organisation report to Government? Please describe any specific measures, in law as 
well as in practice (captures formal as well as informal operations). 
(3) What informal rules are applied? (e.g. requests for information; means of access within the 
department).  
(4)  What mechanisms exist for reporting (a) to Government and (b) to Parliament? 
(5)  Is the boundary currently surrounding the organisation clearly demarcated? 
(6)  Are the goals, functions and responsibilities of the organisation agreed and clearly specified? 
(7) What accountability arrangements exist to ensure high standards of performance and to safeguard 
against abuse of authority? 
(8)  Please describe the specific arrangements for external and internal audit, in law as well as in 
practice (captures formal as well as informal operations). 
(9) Are accountability mechanisms appropriate for the effective monitoring and oversight of the 
organisation? If no, please elaborate. 
 
 
 Performance Management Systems 
 
 
(10)  Does the organisation currently have a set of specific, measurable performance indicators against 
which it is assessed? Please elaborate 
(11) In your view, what is/are the most important measure(s) of performance? 
(12)  Who sets revenue targets? Ministry of Finance alone? Ministry and the organisation in consensus 
agreement? Other external entity (e.g. donor agency?) 
(13)  How are other performance indicators developed? 
(14)  Do performance objectives emphasise inputs, outputs, or outcomes? 
(15) Who monitors and evaluates the performance of the organisation? 
(16) Who makes the most use of performance data within the organisation? To what extent and for what 
reasons are performance data used? 
(17) Who (if anyone) makes the most use of performance data outside of the organisation? To what 
extent and for what reasons are performance data used? 
 
 
INTERNAL ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
E.   INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS 
 
     Structures 
(1)  In your view, is the structure of the organisation appropriate to support the achievement of its goals 
and objectives? If no, please elaborate. 
(2)  Is there an Internal Audit Unit with the organisation? What is the nature of its function? 
(3)  What is the type and efficacy of controls to safeguard integrity within the organisation? 
    
 Systems 
 
(4) Is there a Corporate/Strategic Plan within the organisation? 
(5)  Is the Corporate/Strategic Plan linked to Operational Work Plans? 
(6)  Is use being made of any manual or computerised planning/monitoring/information systems to aid in 
decision making, evaluation and control?  
   Probes:  
          E.g: Use of performance management, human resource management, or financial management 
           systems. 
(7)   If IT systems are being used: 
 What is the extent of computerisation? Are systems appropriate for your requirements?  
 Are they up to date?  
 Do management and staff make optimal use of IT systems? 
(8)  What is the extent of system integration? Is there interconnectivity between HQ and site offices? 
(9)  How efficient are internal information flows? Is there effective downward, upward and lateral    
      communication throughout the organisation? 
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F.   THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 
 
 (1)   What is the origin of the organisations budget? (Discretionary from governments annual budget, 
or fixed percentage of collections?   
 (2)   Can financial resources be obtained from other sources? 
      Probes: 
 Is the organisation permitted to retain for its own use any portion of the revenue yield, e.g. 
a proportion of collections exceeding the stipulated revenue target? 
 Is the TA allowed to levy and retain user fees on any of its services? 
(3) Has the availability, adequacy and continuity of funding affected the functioning of the 
organisation? If so, how? 
 
 
G.   CONTROL OVER HUMAN RESOURCE ACQUISITION AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
  
(1)   Are staffing levels adequate for the organisation to achieve its aims and objectives? 
(2)   How easy is it for the organisation to create new staffing positions? 
(3)   How easy is it for the organisation to recruit new staff? 
(4)   How easy is it for the organisation to remove poor (non) performers or corrupt members of staff? 
(5)   Does the organisation have the authority to transfer staff to other tasks and geographical locations? 
(6)   Does the organisation have the authority to alter the skill mix as appropriate in order to deal with 
internal contingencies? 
 
TECHNICAL/TASK NETWORK ENVIRONMENT 
 
H.   PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE ATTITUDES/BEHAVIOURS AND CAPACITY OF THE CENTRE 
 
(1) How would you describe the behaviours/attitudes displayed by bureaucrats within central 
government departments during their conduct of business with senior tax and customs officials?  
(2)  Would you say that the other Ministries and departments with whom you interact provide you with a 
facilitative and supportive type of environment?   
(3)  Do you think that central government departments have the capacity needed to fulfil their role? 
Explain. 
       Probes: 
 Capacity of the MoF for public expenditure management 
 Capacity of the MoF for central co-ordination, resource allocation, logistical support etc. 
 Capacity of the Treasury for managing expenditure 
(4)  Do you think that bureaucrats within central government ministries and departments place too much  
      emphasis (time and resources) on the monitoring and control of organisational activities? 
(5)  To what extent is the formal institutional framework pertaining to the functioning of the organisation  
      adhered to by management and staff of the central organisations? 
        Probes 
 Practice of bypassing formal hierarchical channels? 
 
I.   ACTUAL MANIFESTATIONS OF POWER/DEPENDENCE RELATIONS 
 
(1) Would you say that actors within central government ministries and departments use their powers to    
      influence or constrain the behaviour/actions of officials with the organisation? 
(2)  Can you cite a few instances in which use was made of power positions to ensure compliance with 
specific requests?  
 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
J.   INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION 
 
(1)   What institutional arrangements exist within the organisation for stakeholders to voice their 
concerns on issues or decisions by which they affected?     
(2)   What sorts of pressures are brought to bear upon the organisation? 
(3)   How successful are these attempts to influence the functioning of the organisation? 
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(4)   Do employees of the organisation belong to one or more unions?  
(5)   How strong are these employee representatives?  
(6)  Do they share the mission, vision, and objectives of the organisation as defined by management? 
(7)  What is the general attitude of the unions towards measures to improve the effectiveness, efficiency  
      and integrity of the organisation?  How much resistance is exerted towards organisational change 
initiatives and efforts aimed towards improvements? 
(8)  Of which international organisations is the department a member? 
(9)  By which regional/international agreements are the organisation bound due to its membership in the 
regional/international body? 
(10)  In what ways do the various agreements hinder the organisation from functioning autonomously at 
the local national level? 
(11)   Have any of the organisations reform programmes been financed by international donor agencies? 
(12)  What is their role in the reform implementation process? Do they seek to control the process or do  
        they play a more advisory and facilitative role? 
(13) What is the response of the organisation to attempts by donor agencies to influence the context 
and method of implementation of reforms?   
 
 
 
K.   LEGAL/ADMMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
(1)  Are the enforcement powers granted to the organisation under the tax laws and regulations 
adequate to allow effective enforcement? 
(2)  What types of powers are granted under tax and customs laws to impose sanctions and penalties? 
Is the application of such laws automatic or discretionary? 
(3)  What is the nature and extent of their application (e.g number of temporary closures per month; 
number of seizures etc.). 
(4)   What general laws affect revenue administration? 
        Probes: 
 Bank Secrecy Laws 
 Company Law 
 Partnership Law 
 Criminal and Civil Procedure Codes 
 Law of Evidence 
 Bankruptcy Law 
 Other 
(5)   Do any of the general laws create problems for effective revenue administration? If so, how? 
(6)  In your view, are the formal administrative laws, rules and instructions conducive to the effective 
functioning of the organisation? Please elaborate. 
 
 
L.   POLITICAL INTERVENTION 
 
(1)  Do politicians show any interest at all in operational and management decisions? Do they in any 
way seek to influence decisions relating to specific cases? 
(2)  In which operational areas do Ministers/policy makers show most interest? 
(3)  Is the management of the organisation able to resist such attempts at external control? 
(4)  How have such issues been dealt with in the past? 
(5)  Has the level of external involvement in any way changed over the period of time?  
(6)  With respect to external involvement, how would you compare your situation with other government  
      organisations?  
 
M. THE JUDICIARY  
 
(1) How supportive is the judiciary of the tax and customs administrations? 
(2) To what extent are judges skilled and knowledgeable in tax and customs policy and operations? 
(3) In what way does their expertise/lack of expertise in these areas impact on administrative decision 
making, in particular with regard the exercise of autonomy by tax officials? 
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(4) How would you comment on the view that the courts sometimes tend to interfere in the operational 
functioning of the revenue administrations? If you agree, please identify some of the ways. 
      Probes: 
 Court judgements against administrative choices 
 Enforcement of compliance with administrative procedures established in the legislation 
 
N. GENERAL VIEWS 
 
 
(1)  In your view, what are three of the main issues which need to be urgently addressed in order for the 
organisation to function autonomously? 
(2)  Is anything currently being done to address these issues? 
(3)  Are there any issues which I have not raised which you think may be important? 
 
Thank you for your time and co-operation. 
 
 
 
 
Note: Questions will be asked of interviewees with regard to the pre- and post- reform status of 
the organisation. 
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APPENDIX XIII 
 
 
INFLUENCES ON AUTONOMY: LEGAL TRADITION TOPIC GUIDE 
 
 
 
A. SOURCE OF LAW 
 
1. What is the primary source of law in .....(country) ? Are there any secondary sources of law?
  
2. Over the years, has there been any break with the traditional source of law? If so, how and 
why? 
 
 
B. STYLES OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 
 
1. How would you describe the traditional method of drafting legislation in...... (country)? 
 
Probes: 
 Laws are written at high levels of abstraction, use of broad general statements of 
principle, tax and customs functionaries left to fill in the details. 
 Laws are very detailed and specific, attempts to cover every humanly conceived 
possibility. 
 
2. How would you describe the traditional method of drafting taxing legislation in .... (country)? 
 
3. What factors influence the way in which taxing legislation is drafted? 
 
 Probes: 
 Legislative attitude towards administrative decision-making? 
 The nature of the activity being regulated? 
 The type of society/individuals being regulated? (compliant vs. non-compliant nature 
of the society). 
 
4. Has there been any change, over the years, in the way in which taxing legislation is 
drafted? If so, please explain. 
 
5. In your view, does the way in which tax laws are drafted impact on the ability of tax officials 
in ....... (country) to properly exercise administrative discretion? If so, how? 
 
 
C. STATUTORY INTEPRETATION 
 
1. In this countrys  ....... (civil/common law) tradition, how are laws generally interpreted? 
     
 Probes: 
 Use of the literal approach to interpretation; and/or 
 Use of the purposive approach to interpretation  
 
2. To what extent has there been, over the years, any change in the way in which laws in 
general are interpreted? What was/were the reason(s) behind such change(s)? 
 
3. Focusing specifically on taxing legislation, how would you describe the way in which such 
legislation is traditionally interpreted in ...... (country)? 
 
4. To what extent has there been, over the years, any change in the way in which taxing 
legislation is interpreted? What was/were the reason(s) behind such change(s)? 
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APPENDIX XV 
 
DOCUMENTATION FOR DESK ANALYSIS 
 
The following documentation is being requested to assist in the conduct of the 
study: 
 
 
DOMESTIC AND CUSTOMS TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
 
 
1.    Organisation of the tax and customs administration 
 
a. Provide a copy of your organisational chart and a description of the 
organisational structure, as well as any other information which may be of 
assistance ( e.g Strategic Plan, Annual Reports, Newsletters, Employee Attitude 
Surveys, Customer Satisfaction Surveys, etc). 
 
b. Provide information on Staff Establishment by functional area as well as real 
allocation of staffing. 
 
 
c. Provide information on your operational budgets for the past three (3) years 
as well as detailed information on the allocation of funds for each (sub)program or 
budget head. 
 
d. Provide information on salary scales, other benefits paid to staff, as well as 
any data on salary surveys conducted. 
 
e.   Description of facilities (buildings, office equipment etc.).  
 
 
 
2.    Human Resource Management/Human Resource Development 
 
a. A copy of the organisations HR Strategy. 
b. A copy of the organisation Training Strategy. 
c. Description of formal level of training of staff in key functional areas. 
d. Strategy for identifying training needs, for providing training to meet such 
needs, for evaluating training, and for managing knowledge within the 
organisation. 
e. Strategy for succession planning within the organisation.  
 
 
 
3. Information Technology 
 
a. A copy of the organisations IT strategy. 
b. Description of existing computer facilities. Software used. Hardware available. 
CPUs (models and numbers, main memory and disk capacity in megabytes. 
Printers. Number of desktops, laptops and terminals in use  
c. Indicate if electronic filing or other web-based systems are available for taxpayers. 
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APPENDIX XVI  
 
 
 
Comptroller General of the Dominican Republic 
 
 
Circular No.: 0000027     Date: 5th December 2006 
 
 
ALL STATE SECRETARIATS, GENERAL DIRECTORATES, CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT INSTTUTIONS AND DECENTRALISED AND AUTONOMUS 
PUBLIC SECTOR BODIES 
 
 
SUBJECT: PAYROLL REDUCTIONS 
 
 
 
Politely, in attention to the statement by His Excellency the President of the 
Republic, in a decree pronounced on the 4th of December of this year, indicating 
that from January 2007, all payrolls MUST be reduced as follows: 
 
 10% of monthly salary for those earnings above RD$125,000.00 
 5% for those earning more than RD$100,000.00 and up to RD$125,000.00 
 3% for those earning more than RD$50,000.00 and up to RD$100,000.00 
 
For central government institutions, reductions will be an indispensable condition 
for authorisation of monthly payroll warrants by the Comptroller General. 
 
Decentralised and autonomous bodies will be required to send a copy of the 
payroll payable in the month of December 2006, and a copy of the payroll payable 
in the month of January 2007 to the Comptroller General. This will enable a check 
to be made on the implementation of the Presidential decree. 
 
Reductions should apply equally to staff recruited within the public administration. 
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